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HomeMy WebLinkAbout209:06 JAMES A CURTIS LEGAL COUNSELu to LAND OF NATURAL WEALTH AND BEAUTY - AIRPORT LAND USE COMMISSION 7 COUNTY CENTER DRIVE • OROVILLE, CALIFORNIA 95965-3397_ TELEPHONE: (530) 538-7601 FAX: (530) 538-7785 June '28, 1999 Mr. James A. Curtis, Attorney at Law Shine, Compton & Nelder, APC 131 S. Auburn Street Suite 200 Grass Valley, CA 95945 Re: Legal Opinion Regarding Airport Land Use Commission Authorityto Establish and Levy Fees Dear Mr. Curtis: In 1989 the state aeronautics law granted ALUCs the authority to charge fees for review of land use proposals and airport plans (§21671.5(f)). The Butte County Airport Land Use Commission is interested in adopting a fee schedule as allowed'by the Aeronautics Code. Several questions have come up as a result of the Commission's desire to adopt and collect fees. 1. Would a fee adopted by the Butte County Airport Land Use Commission be subject to approval by the Butte County Board of Supervisors? } 2. If the Board of Supervisor's approval is NOT required, what is the correct method for collection of fees and who is responsible for accounting? 3. Would the Butte County Airport Land Use Commission have to reach an agreement with the - Board of Supervisors in order for the Butte County Auditor's Office to establish a fund for fees received and expended? 4. If approval of the Board of Supervisors IS required in order for the Airport.. Land Use Commission to adopt fees, does the Board of Supervisors have authority to amend the amount of the fee as set by the Commission? Would you please look at this issue and provide a written response. Please do not exceed $747.00, which is the amount remaining in the existing contract.. Sincerely, Paula Leasure ' Principal Planner SHINE, COMPTON & NELDER, APC ATTORNEYS AT LAw Raymond E. Shine The Old Post Office 131 South Auburn Street Charles A. Compton Suite 200 Maralee Nelder * - t Grass Valley, California 95945 James A. Curtis, Of Counsel • Certified Sp(530) 272-2686 ecialist in Family Law r 1' faX (530) 272-5570 California State Board of Legal Specialization r l May 25, 1999 f Mr. Thomas A. Parilo, Director of Development Services t Butte County Department of Development. Services J' l 7 County Center Drive Oroville, CA 95965 t RE: Butte County Airport Land Use Commission I Dear Tom: Enclosed please find -a revised copy of the opinion we mailed to your office on May 13th Please replace the original document with the enclosed document. We found a few smalltYP �' p o a hical errors and wanted to send you a clean copy. - Sorry for any inconvenience this may cause. t t Sincerely, ' S Keel B. Beutler. for James A. Curtis :kbb Enclosure (1) Planning DapalIM0111 MAY: 2.8 1999 Qroville, Caligarnin 0 • SHINE, COMPTON & NELDER, APC ATTORNEYS AT LAW Raymond E. Shine Charles A. Compton Maralee Nelder * James A. Curtis, Of Counsel Certified Specialist in Family Law California State Board of Legal Specialization May 13, 1999 Robert Hennigan, Chairman. , Butte County Airport Land Use Commission Mr. Thomas A. Parilo, Director of Development Services Butte County Department of Development Services 7 County Center Drive Oroville, CA 95965 RE: Butte County Airport Land Use Commission Dear Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo: The Old Post Office 131 S.,Auburn Street Suite 200 Grass Valley, California 95945 (530) 272-2686 fax (530) 272-5570 Pursuant to your letter of April 6, 1999, you have requested my opinion for the guidance of the Butte County Airport Land Use Commission on the following matters, regarding. their 1998 amendments to the Chico Municipal Airport Environs Plan.' 1. Does the Butte County AirportLand Use Commission ("ALUC") have the authority to prevent construction of single family dwellings on existing parcels (that are presently zoned for such use) through the adoption of amendments to the 1978 Chico Municipal Airport Environs Plan ("CMAEP")?2 1 ' I note that the request for a legal opinion contained a fourth question concerning when private property owners can be said to have obtained "vested rights". In my subsequent conversation with Mr. Parilo I was informed that an opinion on this question is no longer, desired. 2 The CMAEP is also sometimes referred to as the Comprehensive Land Use Plan for the Airport or "CLUP". • 0 Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 2 2. If so, can the Butte County Board of Supervisors override these amendments to the CMAEP? 3. If the Board of Supervisors does not take action to either amend the County General Plan or prepare (and adopt) overriding findings within 180 days (of the adoption of the amendments to the CMAEP), would ALUC have the authority to review single family building permit (applications) within the new CLUP? As is explained below, it is my opinion that: ALUC does not have the authority to adopt changes'to the comprehensive land use plan for the Chico Airport (the "CLUP") so as to prevent the construction of single family dwellings on existing parcels that are zoned "R-1 ", if the practical effect is to prohibit any reasonable use of the real property, resulting in a taking of the private property. 2. The Board of Supervisors has authority under Public Utilities Code Section 21676 to overrule the Airport Land Use Commission's determination as to consistency between the CLUP and the. County General Plan and thereby, in effect, override the subject amendments to the CLUP. Any such action by the Board of Supervisors must be supported by specific and legally adequate findings that the proposed action is consistent with the purposes set out in Public Utilities Code Section 21670. 3. If " ALUC finds that the County has not revised the County General Plan or, alternatively adopted findings overrule ALUC (in accordance with Public Utilities Code Section 21676),,ALUC may require the County to submit all subsequent actions, regulations and permit applications to ALUC for review until the general plan is amended or such overruling findings are made. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Factually, I have been advised that in October 1998, the Butte County Airport Land Use Commission (ALUC) adopted amendments to the 1978 Chico Municipal Airport Environs Plan (CMAEP). The CMAEP constitutes a comprehensive land use plan ("CLUP") for the Chico airport consistent with the provisions for such plans contained in the Public Utilities Code Section 21675. In pertinent part, the 1998 amendments to the CLUP created an Overflight Protection Zone ("OPZ") around the Chico Airport. The 1998 amendments state that within the OPZ "development of new residential uses shall be prohibited in the area defined as Zone A..." and, "in Zone B no new single family residential uses shall be permitted." The amendments then state that "approval of Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 3 multiple family residential uses in Zone B shall contain conditions requiring dedication of aviation easements...." Your opinion request of April 6,1999 states, "the Airport Land Use Commission does not want single family dwellings to be permitted odexisting legally created parcels in Zone "A" even though they are currently zoned R-1, R-2, R-3, SR; SR -1, and SR -3. It is my understanding that some of the property within the OPZ has previously been subdivided and zoned for single family residential use. I have been informed that due to the size of some of the subdivided property, such properties may not be suitable for other productive uses, other than for development with single family residences. In any event, it is my understanding that the County's general plan and zoning ordinances do not presently contemplate or allow multi -family residential uses on property that is zoned R-1, R-2, SR, SR, SR -1, or SR -3.3 Accordingly, the initial question here that ALUC seeks advice on is whether the 1998 amendments to the CMAEP can legally prohibit the construction of single family homes on the previously subdivided property that is within the OPZ.' ANALYSIS:' t I begin my analysis with a recognition that the State Legislature has declared it to be in the public interest to provide for the orderly development of public airports and the land surrounding those airports. Among the objectives of the state law is the protection of "public health, safety and welfare by ensuring the orderly expansion of airports and the adoption of land use measures that minimize the public's exposure to excessive noise and safety hazards within areas around public airports to the extent that these areas are not already devoted to incompatible uses." (See Public Utilities Code Section 21670)5. State law requires the establishment of a local airport land use commission ("ALUC") in each county that has an airport operated for the benefit of the general public. The ALUC is responsible for the preparation and adoption of a comprehensive airport land use plan (CLUP) pursuant to PUC Section 21675. In turn, pursuant to Government Code Section 65302.3, the County's general plan is required to be consistent with the airport land use plan adopted by ALUC. Further, upon amendment of the CLUP, the County is required to amend the general plan, if it is necessary to do so in order to maintain ' See Sections 24-120 and 24-135 of the Butte County Zoning Ordinance. ' Hopefully the indepth nature of this analysis will also serve as guidance to the Commission in future land use planning efforts. S The Public Utilities Code is hereinafter referred to as the "PUC". Ll Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo • May 13, 1999 Page 4 consistency with the CLUP. If the County does not concur with ALUC's determination of the consistency between the CLUP and the County general plan, the County, may overrule ALUC's determination by adopting specific findings, supported by evidence, that the County's action is consistent with the purposes set out is PUC Section 21670. The instant legal opinion concerns certain amendments to the land use plan adopted for the Chico Municipal Airport in 1978, referred to as the Airport Environs Plan or CMAEP. QUESTION # 1. CAN THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CMAEP LEGALLY PROHIBIT THE CONSTRUCTION OF SINGLE FAMILY HOMES ON THE PREVIOUSLY SUBDIVIDED PROPERTY THAT IS WITHIN THE OPZ? While it is clear that under state law ALUC has the power to adopt a land use plan that restricts the right to use and to develop property within the planning area around the airport, the facts as presented in the instant opinion request raise the question as to whether the CLUP can, in effect, prohibit the building of single family residences on property that has been subdivided and zoned for that purpose. The answer to this question involves an analysis of the right of governmental entities to regulate the use of private property, where the regulation has the potential to effectively deny the private property owners all economically viable and beneficial use of their property. Modernly, both the federal and state courts have characterized such regulations as constituting a "taking of real property" that requires compensation in accordance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In the absence of payment of just compensation, such regulations are viewed as unconstitutional. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission (1992) 120 L Ed 2d 798, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of whether South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act ("BMA") constituted a taking of two parcels of land, located on a barrier island off of the coast, owned by Mr. Lucas. At the time that Lucas purchased his property it had been subdivided and zoned for residential development. In adopting the BMA, the South Carolina legislature stated that (among other reasons) the BMA was necessary to protect life and property, to promote tourism and to protect the beaches and dunes along the coast. The trial court found that the effect of the BMA was to prohibit Lucas from building single family residences upon his two parcel and that this prohibition deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots and rendered them valueless. (See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission (1992) 120 L. Ed. 2d798 at 809.) 6 In discussing the law in this area the U.S. Supreme Court commented: 6 In considering the case before it got to the United States Supreme Court, the South Carolina Supreme Court had concluded that when a regulation respecting the use of private property is designed to prevent serious public harm, no compensation is constitutionally required See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission (1992) 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 at 809. The U. S. Supreme Court disagreed. Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 5 "As we have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land use regulation `does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land'." (Id. at pg. 813) The Supreme Court acknowledged that governmental entities are clearly entitled to regulate land use and the fact that the regulations may negatively affect the value of property does not give rise ' to a violation of the constitution and a taking of property: "And the functional basis for permitting the government, by regulation, to affect property values without compensation — that `Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law', does not apply to the relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses." "On the other side of the balance; affirmatively supporting a compensation requirement, is the fact that regulations that leave the owner of land without ' economically beneficial or productive options for its use — typically, as here, by requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state — carry with them a heightened ; risk that- private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm." (Id. at pg. 814) In Lucas. the Supreme Court concluded that when a private property owner is denied all reasonable and economically viable use of his property, such regulations can be upheld only when their affect is to prohibit harmful uses that, under common law, would amount to a nuisance by the private property owner. , (Id. at pgs. 819-821) In the recent decision in Kavanaugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board (1997) 16 Cal. 4`h 761, at 773-774, the California Supreme Court provided further clarification of the law, in stating: "The state and federal Constitutions prohibit government from taking private property for public use without just, compensation. (Cal. Const., Art. I, § 19; U.S. Const., 5th Amend.),— the United States Supreme Court recognized that a regulation of property that `goes too far' may effect a taking of that property, though its title remains in private hands. In such a case, the property owner may bring an inverse condemnation action- and if it prevails, the regulatory agency must either withdraw the regulation or pay just compensation. (First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304, 317, 321 [107 S.Ct. 2378, 2389, 96 L.Ed.2d 250].) Even if the agency withdraws the regulation, the property owner may have a right to just compensation for the temporary taking while the regulation was in effect." (Citation omitted.) Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 6 "The United States Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a standard for when a regulation "goes too far" and effects a taking. The court has stated broadly that the takings clause is `designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis added.) "A regulation, however, may effect a taking though, as is true here, it does not involve a physical invasion and leaves the property owner some economically beneficial use of his property. In Lucas, the high court expressly rejected the "assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one step short of complete is not entitled to compensation." (Id. at pg. 774) This last statement is significant since it represents a clarification by the California Supreme Court that a regulatory taking may exist even though the owner of private property is left with some economical value to his or her property. The determination of when a regulation goes too far and effects a taking can be made either from a review of the face of the regulation, a "facial challenge" or from the application of the regulation to the specific facts of individual properties, an "as applied" challenge. The latter inquiry requires the court to evaluate theregulation's effect on specific property in light of a number of factors.' In Kavanaugh the Supreme Court stated, at pgs 775-776: "When a regulation does not result in a physical invasion and does not deprive the property owner of all economic use of the property, a reviewing court must evaluate the regulation in light of the "factors" the high court discussed in Penn Central and subsequent cases. Penn Central emphasized three factors in particular: (1) "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant"; (2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment -backed expectations"; and (3) "the character of the governmental action." (Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 124 [98 S.Ct. at p. ` 2659]; MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. Yolo County (1986) 477 U.S. 340, 349 [106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566,91 L.Ed.2d 285]; KaiserAetna v. United States (1979) 444 U.S. 164, 175 [100 S.Ct. 383, 390, 62 L.Ed.2d 332]:) Subsequent cases, as well as a close reading of Penn Central, indicate other relevant factors: (1) whether the regulation," interfere[s] with interests that [are] sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes" (Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 125 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2656]); (2) whether the regulation. affects the existing or traditional use of the property and thus interferes with the property owner's "primary expectation" (id. at pp. 125, 136 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 2659, 2665]); (3) "the nature of the State's interest in the regulation" (Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis (1987) 480 U.S. 470,488 [107 S.Ct. 1232, 1243, 94 L.Ed.2d 472] (Keystone); see also Mugler v. Kansas (1887) 123 U.S: 623, 668-669 [8 S.Ct. 273,300-301,31 L.Ed. 205]) and, particularly, whetherthe regulation is "reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose" (Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 127 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2660]); (4) whether the property owner's holding is limited to the specific interest the regulation abrogates or is broader (id. at pp. 127-128 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2661]); (5) whether the government is acquiring "resources to permit or facilitate ,uniquely public functions;" such as government's "entrepreneurial operations", (id. at pp. 128, 135 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 266, 2665]); (6) 9 Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo 9 May 13, 1999 Page 7 Applying the courts' above teachings to the question of whether the 1998 amendments to the CLUP constitutes a taking of private property will most likely require an analysis of each of the individual parcels that are affected by these amendments and is beyond the scope of the opinion request. However, to the extent that the 1998 amendments prohibit any reasonable economically viable use of specific properties within the OPZ, then the regulation would constitute a taking of property and no further analysis would be needed and no further action would be required by the property owner in order to be able to proceed with litigation against the public entity adopting same.' From the facts described above, it is my opinion that to the extent that the 1998 amendments to the CMAEP are read as prohibiting the building of single family residences on parcels that have been subdivided and zoned for such use, there is a very real prospect that these amendments could be found to be unconstitutional as a "taking" of private property.' THE 1998 AMENDMENTS READ AS NOT CONSTITUTING A TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY As noted above, the 1998 amendments to the CMAEP prohibit development of new residential uses within the OPZ. Of potential import here is the fact the these amendments do not provide any definition of what constitutes residential development, or more precisely, "development of new residential uses". The absence of language in these amendments (or in the original 1978 CMAEP) whether the regulation "permit[s the property owner] ... to profit [and] ... to obtain a 'reasonable return' on ... investment" (id. at p. 136 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2665]); (7) whether the regulation provides the property owner benefits or rights that "mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed" (id. at p. 137 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2666]; Keystone, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 491 [107 S.Ct. at p. 1245]; Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 262 [ 100 S.Ct. at p. 2142]); (8) whether the regulation "prevent[s] the best use of [the] land" (Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 262); (9) whether the regulation "extinguish[es] a fundamental attribute of ownership" (ibid.); and (10) whether the government is demanding the property as a condition for [page 776]the granting of a permit (Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374, 385 [114 S.Ct. 2309, 23 16, 129 L.Ed.2d 304] (Dolan); Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 831, 841 [107 S.Ct. at pp. 3150-3151])". "This list is not a comprehensive enumeration of all the factors that might -be relevant to a takings claim, and we do not propose a single analytical method for these claims. Rather, we simply note factors the high court has found relevant in particular cases. Thus, instead of applying these factors mechanically, checking them off as it proceeds, a court should apply them as appropriate to the facts of the case it is considering." a In the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1997) 137 L.Ed.2d. 980, the Supreme Court found that the effect of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency's environmental regulations was to prohibit Ms. Suitum from building a modest residence on her property in the Lake Tahoe basin and provided a basis for a suit against the Agency for a taking of private property.. 9 For a good discussion of the law relating to "regulatory takings" see Chapter 12, Curtin's California Land Use and Planning Law, 18`h Ed (1998); also see article on "Zoning Regulations Limiting Use of Property Near Airports As Taking of Property", 18 ALR 0,542. 9 Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo C� May 13, 1999 Page 8 clarifying what is meant by this term appears to invite (or require) interpretation by the reader. It is one of the maxims of the law pertaining to the interpretation of statutes (and ordinances) that where a law is susceptible to several interpretations, one of which invites serious constitutional problems, courts will construe the statute, if possible, to avoid the problems. (See F&L Farm Company v. City Council (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1345.) If the choice here is between a reading of the 1998 amendments in a manner that results in an unconstitutional taking of real property (by depriving property owners of individual parcels that are zoned for single family use, the right to build homes) or, alternatively, construing the phrase "development of new residential uses" as applying to property that is susceptible of further land divisions or more intense development such as. for commercial purposes, the courts may apply the latter construction, since it would not amount to an unconstitutional taking of private property. QUESTION #2 DOES THE BUTTE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS HAVE AUTHORITY TO OVERRIDE THE 1998 AMENDMENTS TO THE CMAEP? PUC Section 21676 states iri relevant part: "a) Each local agency whose general plan includes areas covered by an airport land use commission plan shall, by July 1, 1983, submit a copy of its plan or specific plans to the airport land use commission. The commission shall determine by August 31, 1983, whether the plan or plans are consistent or inconsistent with the commission's plan. If the plan or plans are inconsistent with the commission's plan, the local agency shall be notified and that local agency shall have another hearing to reconsider its plans. The local agency may overrule the commission after such hearing by a two-thirds vote of its governing body if it makes specific findings that the proposed action is consistent with the purposes of this article stated in Section 21670." (Emphasis added.) Section 21670 states in relevant part: "(a) The Legislature hereby finds and declares that: (1) It is in the public interest to provide for the orderly development of each public use airport in this state and the area surrounding these airports so as to promote the overall goals and objectives of the California airport noise standards adopted pursuant to Section 21669 and to prevent the creation of new noise and safety problems. (2) It is the purpose of this article to protect public health, safety, and welfare- by ensuring the orderly expansion of airports and the adoption of land use measures that Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 9 minimize the public's exposure to excessive noise and safety hazards within areas around public airports to the extent that these areas are not already devoted to incompatible uses." (Emphasis added.) And as noted above, Government Code Section 65302.3 requires the County to amend its general plan, as may be necessary to maintain consistency with the airport land use plan (CLUP), within 180 days of any amendment to the CLUP. Section 65302.3 further states that "if the legislative body does not concur with any provision of the plan required under PUC Section 21675, it may satisfy the provisions of this section by adopting findings pursuant to Section 21676 of the Public Utilities Code." (See also PUC Section 21676.5, discussed below.) Read together, it is clear from these statutes that the County Board of Supervisors, has the authority to overrule a decision by ALUC concerning the consistency of the County General Plan (and the County's implementing ordinances) with the airport land use plan. However, an important limitation on the Board's authority here is that any such action by the Board must be supported by specific findings.10 With regard to the 1998 amendments it appears that in addition to the above discussion, the Board of Supervisors might have several reasons for concluding that continuing to allow the construction of single family homes on existing parcels is consistent with the purposes set out in PUC Section 21670. First, to the extent that the decision is to simply allow private property owners to build single family residences on individual parcels that are zoned for this purpose and are the product of past subdivision approvals, the County may determine that the subject parcels have "already been devoted to incompatible uses", within the meaning, of Section 21670 (highlighted above). In concept, the argument here would be that the real discretionary decisions concerning land development typically occurs first with the adoption of the general plan and zoning ordinances which establish the uses to which property may be put, followed by more detailed decisions regarding the use of specific property when a property owner seeks subdivision approval. At each of these stages.the public entity has the inherent discretion to allow or to prohibit the development'in an area within its jurisdiction. Each of 10 The question of the requirement for specific findings and what generally constitutes findings was addressed in the case of California Aviation Council v. City of Ceres (1992) 9 Cal.AppAth 1384. In Ceres the court concluded that the decision of the Ceres City Council to overrule the local airport land use commission's determination that an ordinance approving a specific plan for property covered by the local land use plan was not consistent with that plan, was not supported by adequate findings. The court concluded that the decision to overrule was adjudicatory in nature and required the Council to identify the facts that it was relying upon and to link those facts to its decision that the purposes of PUC Section 21670 were met in the instant case. The court referenced the case of Topanga Association for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) as to the requirements for specific factual findings for adjudicatory decisions. (Id at pg. 1392-1394) Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May. 13, 1999 Page 10 these decisions must also be preceded with an evaluation of the environmental consequences and potential impacts stemming from. the public agency's .decision, as required by the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"). Once these approvals are in place and property has been subdivided and sold off to individuals, it can be hard, if not legally impossible, to roll back the clock without creating an unconstitutional taking of private property. The exception would be in those extraordinary situations where the use of the individual residential parcels may create a nuisance ( per the above discussion.) Another basis for the Board's decision to overrule the ALUC might exist in what appears to be somewhat contradictory provisions of the 1998 amendments. To the extent that the text in these amendments appears to allow development of multiple family residential projects while prohibiting. development of single family homes on some or all of the property within the OPZ, it could be argued that such action would increase the population density within the OPZ and thereby be counter to the goals in PUC Section 21670, to minimize the public's exposure to noise and safety hazards in areas around the airport." QUESTION 0. IF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS DOES NOT TAKE ACTION TO EITHER AMEND THE COUNTY GENERAL PLAN ORPREPARE (AND ADOPT) OVERRIDING FINDINGS WITHIN 180 DAYS (OF THE ADOPTION OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CMAEP) WOULD ALUC HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REVIEW APPLICATIONS FOR SINGLE FAMILY BUILDING PERMITS WITHIN THE OPZ? The reference to the 180 day time limit in which the County is required to amend the general plan is set out in Government Code Section 65302.3. That statute allows the Board of Supervisors to either amend the general plan or, alternatively, adopt findings in accordance with PUC Section 21676, "if the legislative body does not concur with any provision of the plan required under Section 21675...." The statutory intent here appears to be to give the Board of Supervisors some limited ability to overrule or to reject parts of the airport land use plan with which it may disagree. " In reading Section 65302.3 I note that it does not track precisely with the provisions in Section 21676. Specifically, the authority of the Board to overrule the ALUC by adopting findings is tied to a decision by ALUC concerning the consistency of the two plans onany zoning ordinances or building " The specific language that is of concern here is as follows: "The area defined as Zone B (of the OPZ) is subject to less intensive overflight activity. In Zone B no new single family residential uses shall be permitted. Any approval of multiple family residential uses in Zone B shall contain conditions requiring the dedication of aviation easements to the airport operator and notification of potential tenants of overflight activity." Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 11 regulations adopted by the County. 12 In contrast, the requirement in Government Code Section 65302.3 for the County to amend the general or specific plan is triggered by the amendment of the airport land use plan (CLUP), not by a separate determination of consistency between the two plans. If we assume that it is possible that the CLUP could be amended in such a manner so as to be totally consistent with the existing County General Plan, it would follow that in such,a case, the Board would not have any obligation to take any further action under Section 65302.3. This raises the question then of how the County is supposed to know when it is obligated to take action under Section 65302.3 and the timing as to when the County's obligation arises. Under the rules of statutory construction, these statutes should be read together so as to harmonize them, if it is possible to do so. (See Mar v. Sakti International Corporation (1992) 9 Cal.AppAth 1780, at 1784) Reading these statutes in this manner leads to a conclusion that the 180 day time line for action by the Board of Supervisors should be begin with adoption or amendment of the CLUP, which ALUC has specifically determined requires the County to make amendments to the County General Plan. Unless ALUC specifically identifies existing provisions of the general plan which ALUC finds are inconsistent with the amendments to the CLUP when it adopts amendments to the CLUP, the County could be left to guess as to whether ALUC has determined the existing general plan to be inconsistent with the new amendments. In such a case, it would seem inappropriate to view the County as having an obligation to take action unless specific inconsistencies between the two plans are identified by ALUC with direction given to the County to make appropriate amendments to the general plan. With respect to the 1998 amendments to the CLUP, the amendments do not appear to identify specific provisions of the County General Plan that are inconsistent with these amendments. The letter of transmittal notifying the County Planning Department of the 1998 amendments.also does not appear to identify specific inconsistencies. Rather, that letter merely cites the provisions'of the PUC and Government Code (discussed above) that create the obligation on the part of the County to take action, if inconsistencies exist. In light of this, it is my opinion and recommendation that if ALUC believes that there are inconsistencies between the CLUP, as amended in 1998, then ALUC should specifically identify the inconsistencies and notify the County of its duty to make appropriate amendments. The second portion of your third question seeks direction as to whether ALUC can require the County to submit applications for specific building permits (and I assume, other land use actions pending with the County) to ALUC for its review. In this regard, PUC Section 21676.5 states: 'Z Also see PUC Section 21676.5 which authorizes ALUC to require the County to submit all subsequent (land use) actions to ALUC for review until the general plan is amended or specific findings are made. 9 Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 12 "(a) If the commission finds that a local agency has not revised its general plan or specific plan or overruled the commission by a two-thirds vote of its governing body after making specific findings that the proposed action is consistent with the purposes of this article as stated in Section 21670, the commission may require that the local agency submit all subsequent actions, regulations, and permits to the commission for review until its general plan or specific plan is revised or the specific findings are made. If, in the determination of the commission, an action, regulation, or permit of the local agency is inconsistent with the commission plan, the local agency shall be notified and that local agency shall hold a hearing to reconsider its plan. The local agency may overrule the commission after the hearing by a two-thirds vote of its governing body if it makes specific findings that the proposed action is consistent with the purposes of this article as stated in Section 21670." "(b) Whenever the local agency has revised its general plan or specific plan or has overruled the commission pursuant to subdivision (a), the proposed action of the local agency shall not be subject to further commission review, unless the commission and the local agency agree that individual projects shall be reviewed by the commission." Section 21676.5 gives ALUC the authority to require the County to submit pending land use actions, including but not limited to the approval of permits to ALUC for its review until the general plan is made consistent with the CLUP, or the Board of Supervisors adopts appropriate findings overruling ALUC. Of interest here, nothing in Section 21676.5 expressly provides for or references a 180 day grace period from the adoption of any amendments to the CLUP. As noted above, the 180 day time line is set out in Government Code Section 65302.3. Again, being mindful of the requirement to read statutes in a manner so as to harmonize them, it would appear reasonable to infer that the authority of ALUC to require review of land use actions by the County should not begin until after the expiration of the 180 day time period set out in Government Code Section 65302.3. However., I also recognize, that from the standpoint of the public policy expressed in PUC Section 21670, there may be good reason to conclude that ALUC's authority to require review commences upon the adoption of any amendment to the CLUP which creates an inconsistency with the County General Plan. Unfortunately, my research andreview of the law here did not provide any dispositive answer to this issue. Accordingly, I am at a loss to provide an opinion as to when this obligation arises. However, in any event, and referring back to the above discussion regarding an implied obligation on the part of ALUC to identify any inconsistencies between the two plans when the CLUP is amended, it is my opinion that ALUC could not reasonably exercise its authority to require the County to submit land use actions to it for review unless and until it finds that the general plan is inconsistent with the CLUP and identifies the inconsistencies. Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 13 It should also be noted that assuming that ALUC identifies inconsistencies between the CLUP and the County General Plan, under PUC Section 21767.5 (b), once the Board of Supervisors amends the general plan or overrules ALUC's consistency determination (with appropriate legally adequate findings), ALUC's authority to require review of pending land use matters expires, unless the County otherwise agrees to -further review by ALUC. I trust that the foregoing is responsive to your request. If the members of the Butte County Airport Land Use Commission have any questions or wish to discuss the issues addressed herein, I would be happy to attend their meeting to address same. Thank you for the opportunity to be of service. Very truly yours, James A. Curtis JAC:kbb P:UAC\Butte\ALUC-opn-fin.wpd G SHINE, COMPTON & NELDER, APC ATTORNEYS AT 1 ,Aw Raymond E. Shine The Old Post Office Charles A. Compton 131 S. Auburn Street Maralee Nelder * Suite 200 Grass Valley, California 95945 James A. Curtis, Of Counsel ' Certified Specialist in Family Law (530) 272-2686 California State Board of Legal Specialization fax (530) 272-5570 May 13, 1999 Robert Hennigan, Chairman Butte County Airport Land Use Commission Mr. Thomas A. Parilo, Director of Development Services Butte County Department of Development Services 7 County Center Drive Oroville, CA 95965 RE: Butte County Airport Land Use Commission Dear Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo: Pursuant to your letter of April 6, 1999, you have requested my opinion for the guidance of the Butte County Airport Land Use Commission on the following matters, regarding their 1998 amendments to the Chico Municipal Airport Environs Plan.' 1. Does the Butte County Airport Land Use Commission ("ALUC") have the authority to prevent construction of single family dwellings on existing parcels (that are presently zoned for such use) through the adoption of amendments to the 1978 Chico Municipal Airport Environs Plan ("CMAEP")?z ' I note that the request for a legal opinion contained a fourth question concerning when private property owners can be said to have obtained "vested rights". In my subsequent conversation with Mr. Parilo I was informed that an opinion on this question is no longer desired. s The CMAEP is also sometimes referred to as the Comprehensive Land Use Plan for the Airport or "CLUP". -7/7 i --SAM )S�S. 0(2-,st" Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 2 2. If so, can the Butte County Board of Supervisors override these amendments to the CMAEP? 3. If the Board of Supervisors does not take action to either amend the County General Plan or prepare (and adopt) overriding findings within 180 days (of the adoption of the amendments to the CMAEP), would ALUC have the authority to review single family building permit. (applications) within the new CLUP? As is explained below, it is my opinion that: 1. ALUC does not have the authority to adopt changes to the comprehensive land use plan for the Chico Airport (the "CLUP") so as'to prevent the construction of single family dwellings on existing parcels that are zoned "R -I", if the practical effect is to prohibit any reasonable use of the real property, resulting in a taking of the private property. 2. The Board of Supervisors -has authority under Public Utilities Code Section 21676 to overrule the Airport Land Use Commission's determination as to consistency between the CLUP and the County General Plan and thereby, in effect, override the subject amendments to the CLUP. Any such action by the Board of Supervisors must be supported by specific and legally adequate findings that the proposed action is consistent with the purposes set out in Public Utilities Code Section 21670. 3. If ALUC finds that the County has not revised the County General Plan or, alternatively adopted findings overrule ALUC (in accordance with Public Utilities Code Section 21676), ALUC may require the County to submit all subsequent actions, regulations and permit applications to ALUC for review until the general plan is amended or such overruling findings are made. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Factually, I have been advised that in October 1998, the Butte County Airport Land Use Commission (ALUC) adopted amendments to the 1978 Chico Municipal Airport Environs Plan (CMAEP). The CMAEP constitutes a comprehensive land use plan ("CLUP") for the Chico airport consistent with the provisionsifor such plans contained in the Public Utilities Code Section 21675. In pertinent part, the 1998 amendments to the CLUP created an Overflight Protection Zone ("OPZ") around the Chico Airport. The 1998 amendments state that within the OPZ "development of new residential uses shall be prohibited in the area defined as Zone A..." and, "in Zone B no new single family residential uses shall be permitted." The amendments then state that "approval of 0 Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo 0 May 13, 1999 Page 3 multiple family residential uses in Zone B shall contain conditions requiring dedication of aviation easements...." Your opinion request of April 6, 1999 states, "the Airport Land Use Commission does not want single family dwellings to be permitted on existing legally created parcels in Zone "A" even though they are currently zoned R-1, R-2, R-3, SR,.SR- 1, and SR -3., It is my understanding that some of the property within the OPZ has previously been subdivided and zoned for single family residential use. I have been informed that due to the size of some of the subdivided property, such properties may not be suitable for other productive uses, other than for development with single family residences. In any event, it is my understanding that the County's general plan and zoning ordinances do not presently contemplate or allow multi -family residential uses on property that is zoned R-1, R-2, SR, SR, SR -1, or SR -3.3 Accordingly, the initial question here that ALUC, seeks advice on is whether the 1998 amendments to the CMAEP can legally prohibit the construction of single family homes on the previously subdivided property that is within the OPZ. ANALYSIS:' I begin my analysis with a recognition that the State Legislature has declared it to be in the public interest to provide for the orderly development of public airports and the land surrounding those airports. Among the objectives of the state -law is the protection of "public health, safety and welfare by ensuring the orderly expansion of airports and the adoption of land use measures that minimize the public's exposure to excessive noise and safety hazards within areas around public airports to the extent that these areas are not already devoted to incompatible uses." (See Public Utilities Code Section 21670)5. State law requires the establishment of a local airport land use commission ("ALUC") in each county that has an airport operated for the, benefit of the general public. The ALUC is responsible for the preparation and adoption of a comprehensive airport land use plan (CLUP) pursuant to PUC Section 21675. In turn, pursuant to Government Code Section 65302.3, the County's general plan is required to be consistent with the airport land use plan adopted by ALUC. Further, upon amendment of the CLUP, the County is required to amend the general plan, if it is necessary to do so in order to maintain a See Sections 24-120 and 24-135 of the Butte County Zoning Ordinance. Hopefully the indepth nature of this analysis will also serve as guidance to the Commission in future land use planning efforts. s The Public Utilities Code is hereinafter referred to as the "PUC". • Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo • May 13, 1999 Page 4 consistency with the CLUP. If the County does not concur with ALUC's determination of the consistency between the CLUP and the County general plan, the County may overrule ALUC's determination by adopting specific findings, supported by evidence, that the County's action is consistent with the purposes set out is PUC Section 21670. The instant legal opinion concerns certain amendments to the land use plan adopted for the Chico Municipal Airport in 1978, referred to as the Airport Environs Plan or CMAEP. QUESTION # 1. CAN THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CMAEP LEGALLY PROHIBIT THE CONSTRUCTION OF SINGLE FAMILY HOMES ON THE PREVIOUSLY SUBDIVIDED PROPERTY THAT IS WITHIN THE OPZ? While it is clear that under state law ALUC has the power to adopt a land use plan thai restricts the right to use and to develop property within the planning area around the airport, the facts as presented in the instant opinion request raise the question as to whether the CLUP can, in effect, prohibit the building of single- family residences on property that has been subdivided and zoned for that purpose. The answer to this question involves an analysis of the right of governmental entities to regulate the use of private property, where the regulation has the potential to effectively deny the private property owners all economically viable and beneficial use of their property. Modernly, both the federal and state courts have characterized such regulations as constituting a "taking of real property" that requires compensation in accordance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In the absence of payment of just compensation, such regulations are viewed as unconstitutional. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission (1992) 120 L Ed 2d 798, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of whether South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act ("BMA") constituted a taking of two parcels of land, located on a barrier island off of the coast, owned by Mr. Lucas. At the time that Lucas purchased his property it had been subdivided and zoned for residential development. In adopting the BMA, the South Carolina legislature stated that (among other reasons) the BMA was necessary to protect life and property, to promote tourism and to protect the beaches and -dunes along the coast.'The trial court found that the effect of the BMA was to prohibit Lucas from building single family residences upon his two parcel and that this prohibition deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots and rendered them valueless. (See Lucas v.. South Carolina Coastal Commission (1992) 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 at 809.) 6 In discussing the law in this area the U.S. Supreme Court commented: , 6 In considering the case before it got to the United States Supreme Court, the South Carolina Supreme Court had concluded that when a regulation respecting the use of private property is designed to -prevent serious public harm, no compensation is constitutionally required See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission (1992) 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 at 809. The U. S. Supreme Court disagreed. Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 5 "As we have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land use regulation `does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land'." (Id. at pg. 813) The Supreme Court acknowledged that governmental entities are clearly entitled to regulate land use and the fact that the regulations may negatively affect the value of property does not give rise to a violation of the constitution and a taking of property. "And the functional basis for permitting the government, by regulation, to affect property values without compensation — that `Government hardly could go on if, to some extent values incident .to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law', does not apply to the relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses. On the other side of the balance, affirmatively supporting a compensation requirement, is the fact that regulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use — typically, as here, by requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state — carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm." (Id. at pg. 814) In Lucas the Supreme, Court concluded that when a private property owner, is denied all reasonable and economically viable use of his property, such regulations can be upheld only when their affect is to prohibit harmful uses that, under common law, would amount to a nuisance by the private property owner. (Id. at pgs. 81;9-821) . In the recent decision in Kavanaugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board (1997) 16 Cal. 4`h 761, at 773-774, the California Supreme Court provided further clarification of the law, in stating: "The state and federal Constitutions prohibit government from taking private property for public use without just compensation. (Cal. Const., Art. I, § 19; U.S. Const., 5th Amend.), ... the United. States Supreme Court recognized that a regulation of property that `goes too far' may effect a taking of that property, though its title remains in private hands. In such a case, the property owner may bring an inverse condemnation action, and if it prevails, the regulatory agency must either withdraw the regulation or pay just compensation. (FirstLutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304, 317, 321 [107 S.Ct. 2378, 2389, 96 L.Ed.2d 250].) Even if the agency withdraws the regulation, the propertyowner may have a right to just compensation for the temporary taking while the regulation was in effect. (Citation omitted.) 0 Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo • May 13, 1999 Page 6 The United States Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a standard for when a regulation "goes too far" and effects a taking. The court has stated broadly that the takings clause is `designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness. and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis added.) "A regulation, however, may effect a taking though, as is true here, it does not involve a physical invasion and leaves the property owner some economically beneficial use of his property. In Lucas, the high court expressly rejected the "assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one step short of complete is not entitled to compensation." (Id. at pg. 774) This last statement is significant since it represents a clarification by the California Supreme. Court that a regulatory taking,may. exist even though the owner of private property is left with some economical value to his or her property. The determination of when a regulation goes too far and effects a taking can be made either from a review of the face of the regulation, a "facial challenge" or from the application of the regulation to the specific facts of individual properties, an "as applied" challenge. The latter inquiry requires the court to evaluate the regulation's effect on specific property in light of a number of factors.' In Kavanaugh the Supreme Court stated, at pgs 775-776: "When a regulation does not result in a physical invasion and does not deprive the property owner of all economic use of the property, a reviewing court must evaluate the regulation in light of the "factors" the high court discussed in Penn Central and subsequent cases. Penn Central emphasized three factors in particular: (1) "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant"; (2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment -backed expectations"; and (3) "the character of the governmental action." (Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 124 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2659]; MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County (1986) 477 U.S. 340, 349 [106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566,91 L.Ed.2d 285]; KaiserAetna v. United States (1979) 444 U.S. 164, 175 [100 S.Ct. 383, 390, 62 L.Ed.2d 332].) Subsequent cases, as well as a close reading of Penn Central, indicate other relevant factors: (1) whether the regulation "interfere[s] with interests that [are] sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes" (Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 125 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2656]); (2) whether the regulation affects the existing or traditional use of the property and thus interferes with the property owner's "primary expectation" (id. at pp. 125, 136 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 2659, 2665]); (3) "the nature of the State's interest in the regulation" (Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis (1987) 480 U.S. 470,488 [ 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1243, 94 L.Ed.2d 472.] (Keystone); see also Mugler v. Kansas (1887) 123 U.S. 623, 668-669 [8 S.Ct. 273,300-301,31 L.Ed. 205]) and, particularly, whether the regulation is "reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose" (Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 127 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2660]); (4) whether the property owner's holding is limited to the specific interest the regulation abrogates or is broader (id. at pp. 127-128 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2661]); (5) whether the government is acquiring "resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions," such as government's "entrepreneurial operations" (id. at pp. 128, 135 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 266, 2665]); (6) Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 7 Applying the courts' above teachings to the question of whether the 1998 amendments to the CLUP constitutes a taking of private property will most likely require an analysis of each of the individual parcels that are affected by these amendments and is beyond the scope of the opinion request. However, to the extent that the 1998 amendments prohibit any reasonable economically viable use of specific properties within the OPZ, then the regulation would constitute a taking of property and no further analysis would be needed and no further action would be required by the property owner in order to be able to proceed with litigation against the public entity adopting same.' From the facts described above, it is my opinion that to the extent that the 1998 amendments to the CMAEP are read as prohibiting the building of single family residences on parcels that have been subdivided and zoned for such use, there is a very real prospect that these amendments could be found to be unconstitutional as a "taking" of private property.' THE 1998 AMENDMENTS READ AS NOT CONSTITUTING A TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY As noted above, the 1998 amendments to the CMAEP prohibit development of new residential uses within the OPZ. Of potential import here is the fact the these amendments do not provide any definition of what constitutes residential development, or more precisely, "development of new residential uses". The absence of language in these amendments (or in the original 1978 CMAEP) whether the regulation "permit[s the property owner] ... to profit [and] ... to obtain a 'reasonable return' on ... investment" (id. at p. 136 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2665]); (7) whether the regulation provides the property owner benefits or rights that "mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed" (id. at p. 137 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2666]; Keystone, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 491 [107 S.Ct. at p. 1245]; Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 262 [100 S.Ct. at p. 2142]); (8) whether the regulation "prevent[s] the best use of [the] land" (Akins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 262); (9) whether the regulation "extinguish[es] a fundamental attribute of ownership" (ibid.); and (10) whether the government is demanding the property as a condition for [page 776]the granting of a permit (Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374,385 [114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316, 129 L.Ed.2d 304] (Dolan); Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 831, 841 [107 S.Ct. at pp. 3150-3151])". "This list is not a comprehensive enumeration of all the factors that might be relevant to a takings claim, and we do not propose a single analytical method for these claims. Rather, we simply note factors the high court has found relevant in particular cases. Thus, instead of applying these factors mechanically, checking them off as it proceeds, a court should apply them as appropriate to the facts of the case it is considering." s In the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1997) 137 L.Ed.2d. 980, the Supreme Court found that the effect of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency's environmental regulations was to prohibit Ms. Suitum from building a modest residence on her property in the Lake Tahoe basin and provided a basis fora suit against the Agency for, a�taking of private property. 9 For a good discussion ofthe law relating to "regulatory takings" see Chapter 12, Curtin's California Land Use and Planning Law, 18`h Ed (1998); also see article on "Zoning Regulations Limiting Use of Property Near Airports As Taking of Property", 18 ALR 4", 542. E Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo 0 May 13, 1999 ' Page 8 clarifying what is meant by this term appears to invite.(or require) interpretation by the reader. It is one of the maxims of the law pertaining to the interpretation of statutes (and ordinances) that where a law is susceptible of several interpretations, one of which invites serious constitutional problems, courts will construe the statute, if possible, to avoid the problems. (See F&L Fam Company y. City Council (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 345.) If the choice here is between a reading of the 1998 amendments in a manner that results in an unconstitutional taking of real property (by depriving property owners of individual parcels that are zoned for single family use, the right to build ,homes) or, alternatively, construing the phrase "development of new residential uses" as applying to property that is susceptible of further land divisions or more intense development such as for commercial purposes, the courts may apply the latter construction, since it would not amount to an unconstitutional taking of private property. QUESTION #2 DOES THE BUTTE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS HAVE AUTHORITY TO OVERRIDE THE 1998 AMENDMENTS TO THE CMAEP? PUC Section 21676 states in relevant part: "a) Each local agency whose general plan includes areas covered by an airport land use commission plan shall; by July 1, 1983, submit a copy of its plan or specific plans to the airport land use commission. The commission shall determine by August 31, 1983, whether the plan or plans are consistent or inconsistent with the commission's plan. If the plan or plans are inconsistent with the commission's plan, the local agency shall be notified and that local agency shall have another hearing to reconsider its plans. The local agency may overrule the commission after such hearing by a two-thirds vote of its governing body if it makes specific findings that the proposed action is consistent with the purposes of this article stated in Section 21670." (Emphasis added.) Section 21670 states in relevant part: "(a) The Legislature hereby finds and declares that: (1) It is in the public interest t6provide for the orderly development of each public use airport in this state and the area surrounding these airports so as to promote the overall goals and objectives of the California airport noise standards adopted pursuant to Section 21669 and to prevent the creation of new noise and safety problems. (2) It is the purpose of this article to protect public health, safety, and welfare by ensuring the orderly expansion of airports and the adoption of land use measures that i Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo , i May 13, 1999 Page 9, minimize the public's exposure to excessive noise and safety hazards within areas around public airports to the extent that these areas are not already devoted to incompatible uses." (Emphasis added.) And as noted above,, Government Code Section 65302.3 requires the County to amend its general plan, as may be necessary to maintain consistency with the airport land use plan (CLUP), within 180 days of any amendment to the CLUP. Section 65302.3 further states that "if the legislative body does not concur with any provision of the plan required under PUC Section 21675, it may satisfy the provisions of this section by adopting findings pursuant to Section 21676 of the Public Utilities Code." (See also PUC Section 21676.5, discussed below.) Read together, it is clear from these statutes that the County Board of Supervisors has the authority to overrule a decision by ALUC concerning the consistency of the County General Plan (and the County's implementing ordinances) with the airport land use plan. However, an important limitation on the Board's authority -here is that any such action by the Board must be supported by specific findings.10 With regard to the 1998 amendments it appears that in addition to the above discussion, the Board of Supervisors might' have several reasons for concluding that continuing to allow, the construction of single family homes on existing parcels is consistent with the purposes set out in PUC Section 21670. First, to the extent that the decision is to simply to allow private property owners to build single family residences on individual parcels that are zoned for this purpose and are the product of past subdivision approvals, the County may determine that the subject parcels have "already been devoted to incompatible uses", within the meaning of Section 21670 (highlighted above). In concept, the argument here would be that the real discretionary decisions concerning land development typically occurs first with the adoption of the general plan and'zoning ordinances which establish the uses to which property may be put, followed by more detailed decisions regarding the use of specific property when a property owner seeks subdivision approval. At each of these stages the public entity has the inherent discretion to allow or to prohibit the development in an area within its jurisdiction. Each of 10 The question of the requirement for specific findings and what generally constitutes findings was addressed in the case of California Aviation Council v. City of Ceres (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1384. In Ceres the court concluded that the decision of the Ceres City Council to overrule the local airport land use commission's determination that an ordinance approving a specific plan for property covered by the local land use plan was not consistent with that plan, was not supported by adequate findings. The court concluded that the decision to overrule was adjudicatory in nature and required the Council to identify the facts that it was relying upon and to link those facts to its decision that the purposes of PUC Section 21670 were met in the instant case. The court referenced the case of Topanga Association for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) as to the requirements for specific factual findings for adjudicatory decisions. (Id at pg. 1392-1394) Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 10 these decisions must also be preceded with an evaluation of the environmental consequences and potential impacts stemming from the public agency's decision, as required by the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"). Once these approvals are in place and property has been subdivided and sold off to individuals, it can be hard, if not legally impossible, to roll back the clock without creating an unconstitutional taking of private property. The exception would be in those extraordinary situations where the use of the individual residential parcels may create a nuisance ( per the above discussion.) Another basis for the Board's decision to overrule the ALUC might exist in what appears to be somewhat contradictory provisions of the 1998 amendments. To the extent the text in these amendments appears to allow development of multiple family residential projects while prohibiting development of single family homes on some or all of the property within the OPZ, it could be argued that such action would increase the population density within the OPZ and thereby be counter to the goals in PUC Section 21670, to minimize the public's exposure to noise and safety hazards in areas around the airport." QUESTION 0 IF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS DOES NOT TAKE ACTION TO EITHER AMEND THE COUNTY GENERAL PLAN ORPREPARE (AND ADOPT) OVERRIDING FINDINGS WITHIN 180 DAYS (OF THE ADOPTION OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CMAEP) WOULD ALUC HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REVIEW APPLICATIONS FOR SINGLE FAMILY BUILDING PERMITS WITHIN THE OPZ? The reference to the 180 day time limit in which the County is required to amend the general planis set out in Government Code Section 65302.3. That statute allows the Board of Supervisors to either amend the general plan or, alternatively, adopt findings in accordance with PUC Section 21676, "if the legislative body does not concur with any provision of the plan required under Section 21675...." The statutory intent here appears to be to give the Board of Supervisors some limited ability to overrule or to reject parts of the airport land use plan with which it may disagree. In reading Section 65302.3 I note that it does not track precisely with the provisions in Section 21676. Specifically,, the authority of the Board to overrule the ALUC by adopting findings is tied to a decision by ALUC concerning the consistency of the two plans or any zoning ordinances or building " The specific language that is of concern here is as follows: "The area defined as Zone B (of the OPZ) is subject to less intensive overflight activity. In Zone B no new single family residential uses shall be permitted. Any approval of multiple family residential uses in Zone B shall contain conditions requiring the dedication of aviation easements to the airport operator and notification of potential tenants of overflight activity." • Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo 11 May 13, 1999 Page 11 regulations adopted by the County." In contrast, the requirement in Government Code Section 65302.3 for the County to amend the general or specific plan is triggered by the amendment of the airport land use plan (CLUP), not by a separate determination of consistency between the two plans. If we assume that it is possible that the CLUP could be amended in such a manner so as to be totally consistent with the existing Couniy General Plan, it would follow that in such a case, the Board would not have any obligation to take any further action under Section 65302.3. This raises the question then of how the County is supposed to know when it is obligated to take action under Section 65302.3 and the timing as to when the County's obligation arises. Under the rules of statutory construction, these statutes should be read together so as to harmonize them, if it is possible to do so. (See Mar v. Sakti International Corporation (1992) 9 Cal.AppAth 1780, at 1784) Reading these statutes in this manner leads to a conclusion that the 180 day time line for action by the Board of Supervisors should be begin with adoption or amendment of the CLUP, which ALUC has specifically determined requires the County to make amendments to the County General Plan. Unless ALUC specifically identifies existing provisions of the general plan which ALUC finds are inconsistent with the amendments. to the CLUP when it adopts amendments to the CLUP, the County could be left to guess as to whether ALUC has determined the existing general plan to be inconsistent with the new amendments. In such a case, it would seem inappropriate to view the County as having an obligation to take action unless specific inconsistencies between the two plans are identified by ALUC with direction given to the County to make appropriate amendments to the general plan. With respect to the 1998 amendments to the CLUP, the amendments do not appear to identify specific provisions of the County General Plan that are inconsistent with these amendments. The letter of transmittal notifying the County Planning Department of the 1998 amendments also does not appear to identify specific inconsistencies. Rather, that letter merely cites the provisions of the PUC and Government Code (discussed above) that create the obligation on the part of the County to take action, if inconsistencies exist. In light of this, it is my opinion and recommendation that if ALUC believes that there are inconsistencies between the CLUP, as amended in 1998, then ALUC should specifically identify the inconsistencies and notify the County of its duty to make appropriate amendments. The second portion of your third question seeks direction as to whether ALUC can require the County to submit applications for specific building permits (and I assume, other land use actions pending with the County) to ALUC for its review. In this regard, PUC Section 21676.5 states: " Also see PUC Section 21676.5 which authorizes ALUC to require the County to submit all subsequent (land use) actions to ALUC for review until the general plan is amended or specific findings are made. Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 12 "(a) If the commissionfinds that a local agency has not revised its -general plan or specific plan or overruled the commission by a two-thirds vote of its governing body after making specific findings that the proposed action is consistent with the purposes of this article as stated 'in Section 21670, the commission may require that the local agency submit all subsequent actions, regulations, and permits to the commission for review until its general plan or specific plan is revised or the specific findings are made. If, in the determination of the commission, "an action, regulation, or permit of the local agency is inconsistent with the commission plan, the local agency shall be notified and that local agency shall hold a hearing to reconsider its plan. The local agency may overrule the commission. after the hearing by a two-thirds vote of its governing body.if it makes specific findings that the proposed action is consistent with the purposes of this article as stated in Section"21670." "(b) Whenever the local agency has revised its general' plan or specific plan or has f overruled the commission pursuant to subdivision (a), the proposed action of the local agency shall not be subject to further commission review, unless the commission and the local agency agree that individual projects shall be reviewed by the commission." j Section 21676.5 gives ALUC the authority to require the County to submit pending land use actions, including but not limited to the approval of permits to ALUC for its review until the'general plan is made consistent with the CLUP; or the Board -of Supervisors adopts appropriate findings overruling ALUC. Of interest here, nothing in Section 21676.5 expressly provides for or references a 180 day grace period from the adoption of any amendments to the CLUP. As noted above, the 180 day time line is set out in Government Code Section 65302.3. Again, being mindful of the requirement to read statutes in a manner so as to harmonize them, it would appear reasonable to infer that the authority of ALUC to require review of land use actions by the County should not begin until after the expiration of the 180 day time period set out in Government Code Section 65302.3. However, I also recognize, that from the standpoint of the public policy expressed in PUC Section 21670, there may be good reason to conclude that ALUC's authority to require review commences upon the adoption of any amendment to the CLUP which creates an inconsistency with the County General Plan. Unfortunately, my research and review of the law here did not provide any dispositive answer to this issue. Accordingly, I am at a loss to provide an opinion as to when this obligation arises. However, in any event, and referring back to the above discussion regarding an implied obligation on the part of ALUC to identify any inconsistencies between the two plans when the CLUP is amended, it is my opinion that ALUC could not reasonably exercise its authority to require the County to submit land use actions to it for review unless and until it finds that the general plan is inconsistent with the CLUP and identifies the inconsistencies. Messrs. Hennigan & Parilo May 13, 1999 Page 13 ' 1 It should also be noted that assuming that ALUC identifies inconsistencies between the CLUP and the County General Plan, under PUC Section 21767.5 (b), once the Board of Supervisors amends .4 the general plan or overrules ALUC's consistency determination (with appropriate legally adequate findings), ALUC's authority to require reyiew of pending land use matters expires, unless the County otherwise agrees to further review by ALUC. f I trust that the foregoing is responsive to your request. If the members of the Butte County Airport Land Use Commission have any questions or wish to discuss the issues addressed herein, I would be happy to attend their meeting to address same. Thank you for the opportunity to be of ' l service. Very truly yours, J es A. Curtis JAC:kbb P:UAC\Butte\ALUC-opn-fin.wpd •3 - i 1 1 • •I ' r l/ V Z GPO/ -BUTTE COUNTAIRPORT LAND USE CO ISSION + e 7 County Center Drive, Oroville, CA 95965 a (530) 538-7601 FAX (530) 538-7785 e April 6, 1999 James A. Curtis, Attorney at Law Shine, Compton and Nelder-Adams The Old Post Office 131 South Auburn Street, Suite 200 Grass Valley, CA 95945 Re: Request for Legal Opinion Regarding Vested Development Rights Dear Mr. Curtis; The Butte County Airport Land Use Commission (ALUC) has requested a legal opinion pursuant to the terms and conditions of your, legal services contract entered into on August 20, 1997. On October 21, 1998, the Butte County Airport Land Use Commission adopted an amendment to the 1978 Chico Municipal Airport Environs -Plan (CMAEP). There are several questions regarding regulations that-ALUC adopted concurrently with a new Overflight Protection Zone. To assist in your review, the following documents are attached: in Letter of October 22, 1999 - Notice of adopted amendments to the Chico Municipal Airport Environs Plan. - - ■ Overflight Protection Zone, adopted by ALUC on October 21, 1999 ■ Overflight Protection Zone, adopted by ALUC on October 21, 1999, with Existing Zoning The following paragraphs explain the nature of ALUC's actions: ALUC adopted a new Overflight Protection Zone (OPZ) which now surrounds the Chico airport. The OPZ is divided into subzones which are identified as "A", "Al" and `B." The restrictions of these zones are described below. In adopting the new OPZ, ALUC used Airport Map III -1 contained within the Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 150 Airport Noise Compatibility Program. The new OPZ is also based upon information contained within the 1993 Airport Land Use Planning Handbook and the 1978 Chico Municipal Airport Environs Plan. Text was added to the CMAEP specifying that new residential uses shall be prohibited in the area defined as Zone "A." The Airport Land Use Commission does not want single family dwellings to be permitted on existing legally created parcels in Zones "A' even though they are currently zoned R-1, R-2, R-3, S -R, SR -1, and SR -3. A legal opinion on this restriction within zone "A" is requested as follows: ■ Does ALUC have the authority to prevent single family dwellings on existing parcels within a CLUP? If so, can the Butte County Board of Supervisors override this provision of the CLUP? • Butte County • Airport Land Use Commission e• • s +BUTTE COUNTAIRPORT LAND-USE I I N US CO SS ® + •� • 7 County Center Drive, Oroville, CA 95965 • (530) 538-7601 FAX (530) 538-7785 0 } ■ If the Board-of Supervisors does not take action to either amend the General Plan or prepare. overriding findings within 180 days pursuant to Section 65302.3 of the Government Code and Section 21676 of the; Public Utilities Code, would ALUC: have the authority to•review single family building permits within the new CLUP? ~ ■ At what point do legally created parcels become "vested" such that building permits must be issued? I look forward to your response. If you require assistance, please contact David Doody; ALUC staff support and Senior Planner. He is available to, assist you should you require any additional documents or information. It is desirable to obtain your response'in time for ALUC's next meeting which is scheduled for April 21, 1991. Sincerely, Brian Larsen, Principal Analyst for + Tom Parilo a. Director of Development Services " f K:\ALUC\L.EGALOPUCURT.OPZ - • Butte County • Airport Land Use Commission • October 22, 1998 tachment No. 3 - _.utt Count e LAND OF 'NATURAL WEALTH AND BEAUTY AIRPORT LAND USE COMMISSION 7 COUNTY CENTER DRIVE • OROVILLE, CALIFORNIA 95965-3397 TELEPHONE: (530) 538-7601 FAX: (530) 538-7785 Thomas A. Parilo, Director -Butte County Department of Development Services 7 County Center Drive Oroville, CA 95965 Subject: Notice of Adopted Amendments to the Chico Municipal Airport Environs Plan Dear Mr. Parilo: On October 21, 1998, the Butte County Airport Land Use Commission (ALUC) adopted the' f following environmental findings and amendments to the 1978 Chico` Municipal Airport Environs Plan (CMAEP) as an interim measure until amore comprehensive update is , completed. These amendments became effective immediately following adoption. This, . notice, includes the ALUC's justification for the amendments, specific maps and tekt language adopted by the Commission, and a summary of subsequent local agency actions required by the California Government Code and Public Utilities Code. JUSTIFICATION: ' Section 21674.7 of the Public Utilities Code states that an airport land use commission that formulates, adopts or amends a comprehensive land use plan .shall be guided by information prepared and updated pursuant to Section 21674.5 and referred to as the Airport Land Use Planning Handbook published by the Aeronautics Program of the Department of Transportation. Section 21675(a) of the Public Utilities Code also states that, "the comprehensive land use plan (also known as the compatibility plan) shall be reviewed as often as necessary in order to accomplish its purpose, but shall not be amended more than once in any calendar year." i Mr. Thomas Parilo October 22, 1998 Page 2 It was found by the Commission that the standards within the 1978 Chico Municipal Airport Environs Plan are not compatible with the intent of the State Aeronautics Act (Public # Utilities Code Chapter 4, Article 3.5, Section 21670 (a) (1) and (2)) and the guidelines presented within the 1993 Airport Land Use Planning Handbook prepared for the Caltrans ' Division of Aeronautics. Amendments to the 1978 CMAEP approved .• by the Commission will prevent the development of new incompatible land uses and preserve the viability of responsible - airport operations at the Chico Municipal Airport. ENVIRONMENTAL FINDINGS: Section 15061 of the CEQA guidelines states that CEQA only applies to projects which have the potential for causing a significant effect on the environment. Where it can be ' seen with certainty that there is no possibility that the activity in question may have a significant effect on the environment, that activity,is not subject to CEQA. The ALUC has found that the adoption of the proposed -amendments to the Chico Municipal Airport Environs Plan meets this CEQA exemption because: 1. The adoption of proposed amendments to the Plan will not result in any substantial or potentially substantial adverse change in' any physical conditions within the project area including.land, air, water, mineral, flora, fauna, ambient noise, or affect objects of historic or aesthetic significance. 2.. All future development projects will require individual CEQA review for physical changes proposed within the project area. 3. Proposed amendments to the Plan will not increase the development potential for ' the affected area. ADOPTED AMENDMENTS: 1 Exhibit A -This map depicts the Overflight Protection Zone identified in -Exhibit III -1 of the FAR Part 150 Airport Noise Compatibility Program and Environs Plan for the Chico Municipal Airport. The four safety zones depicted on page 9-16 of the 1993 Airport Land Use Planning Handbook have also been overlaid onto this exhibit. The Runway Protection Zone (1), Inner Safety Zone (2), and Inner Turning Zone (3) are 3 all contained within the Overflight Protection Zone.. The only Caltrans Safety Zone Mr. Thomas Parilo October 22, 1998 Page 3 ' which the Overflight Protection Zone does not incorporate is the Outer Safety Zone } (4). The Commission adopted the Overflight Protection Zone and the Outer Safety Zone as Drawing CIC -14 of the CMAEP: 2) The following text was adopted to accompany Drawing CICA 4: Overflight Protection Zone In response to concerns regarding overflight activity, the development of new residential uses shall be prohibited in the areadefined.as Zone'A within the Overflight Protection Zone depicted in Drawing.CIC-14. This is the area that is subject to most low altitude overflight activity. Existing. residential uses shall be permitted to remain in Zone A, and infill of the existing residential area would be allowed only in the area designated as Zone Al. The area defined as Zone B is subject to less intensive overflight activity. In Zone B no new single family residential uses shall' be permitted. Any approval of multiple family residential uses in Zone shall contain conditions requiring the dedication of avigation easements to the airport operator and notification of potential tenants of overflight activity. Zone A and Zone B together represent the defined "Overflight -Protection Zone" (OPZ). When a development proposal is reviewed for compliance with the ' restrictions proposed for the Overflight Protection Zone, it is imperative . that the more restrictive criterion shall be applied to insure long-term ' protection for the airport and area residents. Note: There are areas within the Airport Area of Influence which have been assigned Compatible Land Use Zones (CLUZ) categories in the 1978. CMAEP. Some of those areas are' located outside of the Overflight Protection Zone (OPZ). Although the OPZ would supersede the CLUZ categories in areas where it is' applied, the CLUZ categories depicted on Drawing CIC -13 and conesponding policies will continue to apply to those '. areas outside of the OPZ. ' Outer Safety Zone Land use compatibility and density recommendations presented within the 1993 Airport Land Use Planning Handbook (pages 9-22 and 9-23) will apply within the Outer Safety Zone. These recommendations include: 9 Mr. Thomas Parilo October 22, 1998 Page 4 Density of Use - The types of land uses which represent concerns within outer safety zones are similar to those in the inner safety zones, but somewhat higher densities of use can be considered acceptable. For example, whereas shopping centers and multi -story office buildings are unacceptable closer to the runway end, small neighborhood shopping centers and two-story offices are reasonable within this more distant zone. Concentrations of people should be limited to no more than 60 to 100 per acre. Residential Land Uses - Typical subdivision -density residential development should continue to be avoided in this zone. Rural residential uses with lot sizes in the 2 to 5 acre range can be considered acceptable, however. Special Functions - Most special land use functions, particularly schools, hospitals, and so on, should be avoided in the Outer Safety Zone. 3) . Exhibit B - This map overlays the Overflight Protection Zone and Caltrans Safety Zones onto the future noise contours shown within the 1978 CMAEP. The map confirms the ALUC's utilization of the noise contours shown within the 1978 CMAEP until new contours are developed' and adopted as part of the CLUP update prepared by Shutt Moen Associates. The Commission adopted this map as Drawing CIC -15 within the CMAEP. 4) Exhibit - As part of the City of Chico's approval of Foothill Park East, modifications to the departure tracks for CDF Air Tanker flights were mutually agreed to by the City of Chico and the CDF Base. This figure depicts the agreed upon departure path for CDF Air Tanker flights and was adopted by the Commission as Drawing CIC -16 within the CMAEP to accurately reflect current traffic patterns. The same land use compatibility and density recommendations presented within the 1993 Airport Land Use Planning Handbook for the Outer , Safety Zone will apply to lands identified as the "Departure Clear Area" within this drawing. 5) Exhibits D and E - The 1993 Airport Land Use Planning Handbook contains maps depicting accident scatter characteristics based on information generated by Hodges and Shutt (1993) and the University of California Berkeley, Institute of Transportation Studies (1993). Exhibit D depicts an overlay of the UC Berkeley Study onto a map of the Chico Municipal Airport and surrounding environment. Mr. Thomas Parilo October 22, 1998 Page 5 Exhibit E depicts an overlay of the Hodges and Shutt data onto a map of the Chico Municipal Airport that was used during the adoption of the North Chico Specific Plan. These exhibits were adopted by the Commission as Drawings CIC -17 and CIC -18 within the CMAEP to identify'areas with particular safety related concerns. SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS REQUIRED'BY LOCAL AGENCIES: Government Code Section 65302.3 and Chapter 4, Article 3.5, Section 21.676.5 of the Public Utilities Code address the consistency of local plans with airport land use plans. 65302.3 Consistency with Airport Land Use -Plans (a) The general plan, .and any applicable specific plan prepared pursuant to Article 8 (commencing with Section 65450), shall be consistent with the plan adopted or amended pursuant to Section 21675 of the Public Utilities Code. (b) The general plan, and any applicable specific plan, shall be amended, as necessary, within 180 days of any amendment to the plan required under Section 21675 of the Public Utilities Code. (c) If the legislative body does not concur with any provision of the plan required under Section 21675 of the Public Utilities Code, it may satisfy the provisions .of this section by adopting findings pursuant to Section 21676 of the Public Utilities Code. Section 21676.5 Review of Local Plans (a) If the commission finds that a local agency has not revised its general plan or specific plan or overruled the commission by a two-thirds vote of its governing body . after making specific findings that the proposed action is consistent with the purposes of this article as stated in Section 21670, the commission may require the local agency to submit all subsequent actions, regulations and permits to the commission for review until its general plan or specific plan is revised'or the specific findings are made. If, in the determination of the commission, the action, regulation, or permit of the local agency is inconsistent with the commission plan, the local agency shall be noted and that local agency shall hold a hearing to reconsider its plan. The local agency may overrule the commission after hearing by a.two-thirds vote of its governing body if it makes specific findings that the proposed action is consistent with the purposes of this article as stated in Section 21670. 1f Mr. Thomas Parilo ' October 22, 1998 Page 6' (b) Whenever the local agency has revised its general plan or specific plan or has r overruled the commission pursuant to subdivision (a), the proposed action of the local agency shall not ,be subject to further commission review, unless the j commission and the local agency agree that the individual projects shall be reviewed by' the commission. Discussions with Caltrans Aeronautics Program staff,also indicate that any, revisions to a' City or County's general plan or specific plan that are made in response to the amendment of an Airport Land Use Plan must be submitted to the Airport Land Use Commission.'for"its - r review and consistency findings. If you have any questions regarding the Commission's actions orthe process described within Government Code Section 65302.3 and Section 21676.5 of the Public Utilities Code, , please call me at 533-1131'. " r Sincerely, - r Laura Webster ` ALUC Staff cc: Christa Engle, Caltrans Aeronautics Program t Butte County Board of Supervisors Butte County Planning Commission i Butte County Planning Division } el OU -44:96 .1 WV Exhibit A 77. • \`". - �.._�' -__. .� !' . _ - _ .• !- i _. i'• 1 �r�� .-/ � � ..1 � uS i:' ' ' '�'•� tri,-• J� ','•� - 1.: InfluepC L/r 1 _ - ti_. - __ _ ' •� ,� • Pte- �- : (- � •• �� - •..' �__._,� � <_. V. JI . _ '- 'off' -"`."moi.,. • Y• �'' . ` 1J 1.. joJ y - 4 •- •'� - - i 1 _' 1 .. .'Z ".: one- ti- 17� sit v� �'`•^- i/ ' ./� ;t -_ - ;yam , •per +• . , - — \ _ _ •_�: : �•� _�:�: , . - `% "`'. • � � t. .'• s '� . x' . is ; � j � F _F ' IF :: •h` M -` �.--CHICO iAUNICIRAlrA1RPORT __ � '' � =�' .r �e _'� 2;:. % � I may/%.1. ; ` � � ,c • t- `'''t► 7 �a SCAZE - ' , f _p. �-' \-. Tom:, !: ^� ,'i� ..t`• _ I` i;: a• _ ~ �. iw' ,M, •ir � /�/•� -��. \. -� FEET ^, •'1 ,� �- �... _ _ tom• � .. f.—� �'• `- � t, .r �. .`mar 'j .. ,�s ��_ _ �;".. :a, _ '♦ r.•� .t` 'i' < 1. .. i �`a, ,t:Fr•>� Gl 0 1000 3000 30 _ 00 A000 se%ey Zone Names Zone A - ` 3 1 �'' •-�•�rr''' _ �•='`:.i T �. i ,/ < f, . y `'� 1. •��.:� ' rii ;-f�i.' - } LEGEND '._/ ,` �` •qtr -�►' t /• ;��! �< f...:.:' '. > �. .; ' — 1 Ruway Protection Zone _ �.\ 'fir -- - ' :...a; f '`� ✓ : y - ' ' 2 :. — Aound <' n ' ._ /� .�.• i•. �. x i f: �,. �,.. - bort Beft 2 . Inner Safety Zone /"i a :.cr ..;' 0� �. "•'r:W�\i ` ; r`r ;� . r� ' f ;\i:` F • .i. ie. tWenc ! Chico Sphere of b e . - _ _ ?- .0 :` f: '� Z':•__ JyJT�i: j�/�-} : �.- % 7.- ' . tT" _ ~• ��'�::.;\< �t; ;3 Inner Turning Zone d ;', : 9 r�t!<•. ,c; '!�Zt t' <, lrj.: r • _•a, ; iceo.'_. _.-^ l0w_. Atri Influensi ce AreaZo Overfli ht Proteetton Zone ne c4 Outer Safety Zone \^. t.. Zone and Zone B together _ r� ,• - _ `'. _ _- _ s�� ��-;1'' r. �_ j -` 1 g re resent �� t•_��-.' ^ i l - _'', �:.: ` '�` =✓.•-^ ._� tom"<..i S ���.'. C. ;7 �..� _�. .:• ?t v "Overflight Protection Zone" (OPZ). r:.;lntlut,rtc� '� ,, _:: :�. , t'�.�� �:.. y I _ - .o•. Dlrawi 14 .A� ng CIC- I • • •r-i�� ,~ y. •, I ���; !`' • .,. , � � .. �... ` . ems— � -'�,1 .-_.• �.r )� -'�'�� ,• [s 1 .�`�Is J: ;.•� _ •'•r 1�.-' ... : t• /' �-� •I�� .1 �_ —_.� 1' / ♦! a ' ��i a .�,j`.y . . -��j •r ,�t f `1 � • •�" A _ 1 1