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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCalifornia Bills SB10-AB42 Costs to Counties Menchaca, Cliarissa From: Snyder, Ashley Sent: Friday, May 26, 2017 8:23 AM To: BOS Cc: Menchaca, Clarissa Subject: FW: California Bills SB10 - AB42 Costs to Counties Attachments: Cover Letter to Supervisors 5-23-17 (3).docx; Costs -Counties -SB10 - AB42 -5-16-17,doc; Cost Driver(CA Bail Reform).doc;ACJ 5-9-17 AB 42 Letter to Asm Bonta.pdf; Bail Reform Will Imperil Califronia's Justice System- Law 360.pdf; CA Distict Attorneys Assn, opposition letter-AB 42 (Bonta).pdf,, CA District Attonreys Assn - Opposition Letter -SB 10 (Hertzberg),pdf, GSBAA AB 42 (Bonta)-oppose-Asm Pub Safety.cloc Please see the below board correspondence and attachments. AsKeu N. Souccer Assistant Clerk of the Board Butte County Administration 25 County Center Drive Suite, 200, Oroville,,..CA 95965 T: 530.538.2867 1 F: 530.538.7120 Twitter I Facebook I )LouTube I Pinterest From: Haley Lohleit [mailto:haley@gregpadillabailbonds.com] Sent:Thursday, May 25, 2017 2:28 PIVI To:anika.campbell-belton@acgov.org; ttremayne@alpinecountyca.gov;jburns@amadorgov.org; Snyder, Ashley <ansnyder@buttecounty.net>; dseve rud @coca lave ras.ca.us; cocolusa@countyofco,lusa.org; Assess.Appeal@cob.ccounty.us; karmosino@co.del-norte.caus;jim.mitrisin@edcgovus; bseidel@co.fresno.ca.us; sthur@countyofglenn.net;Tdamico@co.humboldt.ca.us; blancaacosta@coimperial.ca.us; kcarunchio@inyocounty.us; aabderk@co.kern.ca,us; cventure@co.kinigs.ca.us; boardclerks@saccounty.net Subject: California Bills SB10-AB42 Costs to Counties As you may know there are two bills in the California legislature that are aimed at eliminating the bail bond industry and replacing that industry with a government run and funded program. We have compiled some very pertinent information with regard to the some of the date and misinformation that is being used to move these bills. The bills SB10 and AB 42, both, are expected to pass through appropriations and go to their respective floors very soon. These bills will be unfunded mandates that just like other criminal justice reform matters that have been passed by our legislature and two that came through ballot initiatives have not had the promised funding. Can you please distribute or forward the attachments to each of your supervisors. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me. cc� ?)DG nL+ Thank you, Topo Padilla President, Golden State Bail Agents Assoc. topo@gregpadilla.com Office: 916-446-2663 Cell: 916-425-0980 2 M sIZR `C)< E3/\IL AGENTS /\SSCDC1AT1CDN May 23, 2017 Dear County Supervisor: As you may know, there are two bills in the California Legislature, SB10 (Hertzberg) and AB42 (Bonta) known as the "Bail Reform bills." In reality these bills are aimed at eliminating the bail bond industry. Both authors have publicly stated that it is not right that people should have to pay to be released from jail. As a trade organization that represents bail agents throughout the State of California, we know that we provide a Constitutional right that is guaranteed in the U.S. and California Constitutions. Taking away this right would subject people who are arrested to a government run and taxpayer funded program. Currently the bail industry has over 300,000 people out on bail at any given time at no cost to the taxpayers. Currently the bail industry through premium tax, court costs and payments of bail bonds funds the State at a sum of over $200 million dollars annually. These legislative bills are unfunded at this point and are conservatively projected to cost over $1.5 billion annually. We have attached several documents that outline costs, objections and other unintended consequences that many in the criminal justice system are very concerned about occurring in our communities throughout California. Both bills are currently in the Appropriations Committee and are in suspense status. Regardless of the outcome, this is a national conversation underway and the public safety community including judges, district attorneys, crime victims, taxpayers, the bail industry and law enforcement unions and management alike need local governments to be an integral part of the discussion. We have several collective suggestions that can modernize our system and provide safe communities so we ask you to indicate your willingness to participate with us. Should you have any questions, please feel free to reach out to me. Additionally, please refer to our Keep California Safe website at www.keepcaliforniasafe.com. Sincerely, Topo Padilla President, Golden State Bail Agent's Association P.O. Box 391 Sacramento, CA 95814 (866) 333-6551 Office m (866) 946-9330 Fax www.gsboa.org COST DRIVERS, CALIFORNIA AB 42 AND SB 10 Jeffrey J. Clayton, M.S., J.D., American Bail Coalition April 25, 2017 1. Summary These bills implement a version of the New Jersey bail system and the Washington. D.C. bail system, without expanding preventative detention, which is expanding detention with no bail. These bills largely eliminate monetary bails including private bail agents and friends and family posting such bails and replace it with supervision including electronic monitoring and other services at the expense of the California general fund. The New Jersey Attorney General issued a study of implementing bail reform and indicated there was no idea to estimate how much it costs until after it is implemented.I In one jurisdiction in New Jersey, the jail population was reduced significantly, due largely to citing and releasing rather than jailing low level misdemeanor offenses, and yet the local officials still could not say how much bail reform costs and whether there would be any savings net of costs to the county, not including in any way the costs to the State in the calculation.2 In addition, these bills require much more from local jurisdictions in terms of the services and robustness of the program that will make California's per capita costs much larger than either of these two states. The best conservative guess right now on the total annual costs of New Jersey's system is $300 million annually (the Towson University Study conducted by Dr. Irani originally estimated $379 million annually, which was later adjusted up to over$500 million), which would be $1.27 billion in California based on costs per capita. Washington, D.C.'s system would cost $3.8 billion in California based on costs per capita.' If arrests are used as a metric, D.C. has roughly 10,000 arrests annually and California has roughly 1.2 million arrests annually, then the annual cost would be as high as $7.8 billion annually. Finally,the Commission on State Mandates, in addition to every county in California, will be left to sort out all of the costs and make a budget request reflecting the same.4 This process alone will take years to sort out and will put immense pressure on every county to first implement and outlay resources with a speculative chance at savings, only then to determine the 1 http://www.nl.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/12/ag we have no idea how much massive ni bail overha.html The original cost estimate is here:http://www.n*leg.state.ni.us/2014/Bills/51000/946 E2.PDF An additional cost estimate from Towson University is here: htti)s://www.dropbox.com/s/155h5nrdm7lpzb6/Towson/20RES1%20NJCJR%20Economic%20impact%20County%2 0and%20State.pdf?d l=0 2 http://www.nl.com/hudson/index.ssf/2017/03/post 884.html 3 The D.C. pretrial program budget is$65.287 million in FY 2017: http://www.csosa.goy/a bout/financial/budget/2017/FY17-PSA-Budget-Su bm ission.pdf 4 http://csm.ca.gov/docs/brochure.pdf 1 net costs. Then Counties are required to file a test case against the State before the Commission, who then must make a determination as to the costs for each county within the State of California. The State will be required to pay for whatever portion of the total is the State's share immediately, but will not have to pay local governments back until they ask for and prove the costs of implementing the legislation. This process guarantees the Counties the ability to seek reimbursement after the program is implemented in each County by local officials. This is exactly what occurred in New Jersey—either services had to be cut by the Counties or property taxes raised.' Because of restrictions on property tax increases, many Counties had to cut services to pay for bail reform. While it is probably not possible to determine the precise costs of this program,there is no reason to suspect it will cost any less on a per capita basis as the D.C. program's cost to California of$3.8 billion. There is also room to be suspicious of the savings since several studies have shown that the persons who would become bailable would be quite small due to other holds and serious charges on the remaining offenders. One study found only 12% of persons would theoretically be bailalble in one of California's largest jail s,6 and another found that 85% of persons in local jails either are being held on a felony charge or felony conviction.7 Total jail savings will need to hit a to-be-determined point to break even. In fact, California's average daily county jail population is roughly 75,000 inmates.8 Even under the flawed methodology of daily average cost of a jail bed, if the program reduced the average daily population by 5%at an assumed cost of$150 per day,the annual savings would reach $205 million. Yet,there are also fixed costs and other issues that caution against simply taking the average daily jail cost and multiplying it by the theoretical number of jail day stays by a certain class of defendants. It is clear that jail populations would probably need to be reduced by as much as 50%to achieve $2 billion in savings even under this faulty methodology. It is also worth noting that the jail cost savings estimated by the Governor for the implementation of Proposition 47 were much lower than forecast, coming in at only $29 million annually {although the Legislative Analyst's Office found that the savings could be as high as 5 The New Jersey Association of Counties filed a suit against the State alleging and unfunded mandate and demanding compensation. The Council on local Mandates found that the Constitution commanded the county governments to pay,and thus the counties must pay. In AB 42 and SB 10 there is an affirmative command that the State will eventually pick up any costs as part of the Commission on State Mandates process. http://www.a p p.co m/story/news/I oca l/courts/2016/12/06/mon mouth-ocea n-cou n ti es-n i-b a i I-reform- law/94820698/ 6 See page 25-26:https://www.aclu.org/report/evaluation-current-and-future-los-angeies-county-iail-population This report has been criticized as being prior to Proposition 47,but 47 ratcheted down many felonies which should have had the effect of increasing the risk and average criminal history profile of the defendants held in California's jails. 7 http://www.ppic.org/main/publication show.asp?i=1061 http://www.bscc.ca.pov/down loads/4Q1$%20J PS%20Fu I1%20Report%206.24.16.pdf 2 $129 million annually}.9 Of course, savings at these levels mean that the Proposition saved as little as 4% and as much as 32% of what was originally forecast in terms of jail cost savings.10 Thus,net of the savings, these bills will likely cost California somewhere between $1.27 and $3.8 billion annually. II. Specific Cost Drivers 1. Loss of Premium Tax Revenue this legislation allows for unsecured and 10% bails that will virtually eliminate bail agents. In addition, the court is required to find that a defendant has a"present ability to pay" and that it will not create "substantial harship" prior to imposing a monetary bail. Defendants who are unable to post a bond and even those for whom a bond is posted do not themselves have the present ability to pay, and thus the use of bail will almost completely go away. It also put many other hurdles to the imposition of financial conditions of bail. Bail surety insurers pay annual premium tax to the State of California that will be lost. 2. Loss of tax revenue from bail agents. All taxes paid by bail agents to state and local governments will be eliminated when they are eliminated. 3. Forfeiture revenues and other filing fees to local governments and the State— when bail bonds are forfeited, state and local governments are compensated for that. All forfeiture revenue will be lost from the current use of surety bonds. The state will not collect unsecured bails or 10%to the Court bails when they forfeit. The City of Philadelphia was owed over $1 billion in uncollected 10%to the Court forfeited bails. If the State is otherwise required to collect, there will need to be an increase in resources to civilly collect this bail debt. 4. Elimination or dramatic reduction in funding to the California Department of Insurance for enforcing laws related to bail licensing. 5. Everyone who bails out or released today without having to see a judge will spend up to two days in jail prior to seeing a judge. For all who would have been out of jail anyway, this will mean an increase in jail time for a Iarge class of offenders. This will severely offset any jail savings. 6. Section 7 repeals bail schedules in California. This means all bails in California will have to be set by a judge in open court and courts will not be permitted to pre-set bails to facilitate the speedy release of persons from jail. This will also mean a prosecutor must review the case including the risk assessment, and potentially present evidence in favor of a certain bail or set of conditions. Public Defenders will be needed to make bail arguments in all cases whatsoever. The Legislature is designating bail setting as a"subordinate"judicial duty, but the Courts will still have to hire any number of Court Commissioners to handle the e http://www.lao.ca.gov/Reports/2015/3352/fiscal-impacts-prop47-021216.pdf Ic'http://www.cica.org/uploads/­cici/­­documents/proposition 47 county estimates.pdf 3 hearings (in their discretion). There are roughly 500,000 felony arrests and roughly 760,000 misdemeanor arrests a year.l� The vast majority of misdemeanor defendants are released in California without having to post bail. There are certainly in-court appearances required in some cases now, e.g., violent felonies, that will not be additional. Yet this should be likely to cause, on the numbers, a substantial number of court hearings required statewide at cost that could be partially informed by the workload model of the Judicial Council. Of course, as noted elsewhere the individualized bail hearings will be much more labor intensive than the hearing required today. It will be difficult to isolate which bails were posted as a result of a bail schedule and which were later posted after a court set a bail. The vast, vast majority of such bails that were posted were probably set by a schedule and will now require a hearing. Also, it is assumed that defendants will need to be represented by council to advocate for their bail since they do not get a bail until these hearings occur. 7. Section 8 requires risk assessments to be used in a large percentage of cases (unknown) prior to a hearing to set bail. Local governments will have to hire staff to operate the risk assessment. Even the Arnold Foundation tool is staff intensive, requiring a person to plug the information into the tool, verify the information, and then prepare the report and deliver the report and recommendation to the Court. 8. Section 14 requires a judge who is not following the recommendation of the risk assessment to put the reasons for such deviation in the order. Section 15 then requires findings of fact and a statement of reasons as to why the court deviated. This means evidence will have to be presented in all cases whatsoever when the judge disagrees with the county pretrial agency or if there are particular disputes of facts. If a prosecutor or defense attorney wants a deviation from the report, they will have to put on evidence in all such cases in order to stop a release on a release agreement. There will be costs to prepare for these hearings and to conduct them properly. 9. Section 15 makes all nonmonetary release conditions free for all defendants. This means the entire costs of creating the pretrial agencies in each county, the costs of supervision, the costs of risk assessments, the costs of check-ins, the costs of "transportation assistance,"court reminder services, GPS units, drug screening, ankle-monitors, house arrest, substance abuse treatment, etc. will all be borne by county governments. Judges,being unconstrained from having to consider the costs to be borne by a county government or defendant, will be highly likely to order the supervision in addition to a litany of other services, to all defendants released. This is the intent and design of the program—to replace monetary conditions of bail with non-monetary conditions. Some assumption will have to ii https://oag.ca.goy/crime/cost/stats/arrests 4 be made based on the current costs, and then extrapolated based on the number of defendants. Some baskets of pretrial nonmonetary assessments on single defendants can be as high as $500 per month while on pretrial supervision and other conditions. In addition, a judge will order transportation assistance and each pretrial agency will have to install a robo-call court reminder system or make the reminder calls in person. Further,these services will be used not just on those who will get released under the new system, these services will be imposed because on all of those who would have been released on bail but are now instead released on a promise to appear because the additional services and conditions are free. Private companies will then seek contracts with local jurisdictions to do the GPS monitoring and other services, and staff will likely coordinate the cases as in parole or probation. 10. Section 27 requires each county to create a pretrial services agency, and specifies the required duties. When a court imposes a non-monetary condition, the county agency is required to implement that. This section also says the county pretrial agencies are responsible for referrals to medical and legal services and that they are also to coordinate services amongst non-profit agencies. This also includes the requirement of annual reporting. 11. Section 27 in requiring each county to create a pretrial services agency begs the question of whether such counties will now be able to seek reimbursement for the costs of their existing pretrial program since, while it was optional to create one prior to the law, it is no longer optional under state law to have one in operation that meets the standards of the law. Thus, these costs should be added to the total costs of the law, not subtracted, otherwise counties who currently have a pretrial program will be penalized and those that do not will get one for free. This will obviously be a point of law regarding this as an unfunded mandate: whether a county should be locked-in to a current Ievel service at a particular time. 12. Section 28 creates the , which is the State Agency that supervises and regulates the work of the county pretrial agencies. The costs of such agency should be quite large given the robust tasks the agency is being required to perform. The agency will have to prepare the budget, develop a statewide risk assessment process, study new risk assessment processes, review and analyze data and provide reports, provide technical and legal assistance, develop standards, and serve as an investigator as to any allegations of racial disparities in pretrial release, and be the statewide training agency on pretrial release issues for all stakeholders in the criminal justice system in order to implement the program. This will be akin to creating a state probation or parole department. Bail agents have roughly 300,000 people out on bail at any time, most of whom had to post a bail because they were high risk and charged with felonies. All of these will have to be handled by the programs in addition to any additional released from jails 5 (the population from where savings may accrue). In fact, the total probation caseload statewide was 263,531 in 2015, at a budget of$1.5 billion.12 This may be a good analogy in terms of population who will be monitored and the numbers since 83.9 percent of the 263,531 persons on probation are on probation for a felony. 13. Technology and other infrastructure needs. In New Jersey there was needed major improvements in court technology to be able to process this many people quickly. It is still not clear that they achieved said goal. Nonetheless, that required a major investment. What we have also discovered is that there are significant gaps in the quality of criminal history information used to inform the risk assessments tools that will require significant investment to guarantee their accuracy and will continue to require significant staff time to make sure the criminal history information is accurate. One report indicated that only 60% of criminal convictions were captured in 21 states in the National Crime Information Center. 12 http://www.poic.org/main/publication_show.asp?i=1173 6 Bail Reform Will Imperil California's Justice System -Law360 Page I of 4 LAw -,.007- Portfolio Media.Inc. 1111 West 19th Street, 5th floor I New York, NY 10011 1 www.law360.com Phone: +1646 783 7100 1 Fax: +1646 783 7161 1 customerservice@law360.com Bail Reform Will Imperil California's Justice System By Quentin Kopp Law360, New York (May 10, 2017, 11:53 AM EDT) -- With some ------- -=,1 exceptions, a criminal defendant in the state of California has a right to be released on bail by sufficient sureties. (Cal. Const., art. I, §§12, 28, subd. (e).) Every year more than 300,000 defendants ' y choose to be released on bail in California. However, two bills seek ,u, to take this constitutional right away from defendants and replace it ? ft4» with an expensive and onerous pretrial release system. Assembly Bill 42 and its companion legislation, Senate Bill 10, will abolish the current bail system and instead provide that: "Upon arrest and booking into a county jail, the pretrial services agency shall conduct a pretrial assessment on the person and prepare a Quentin Kopp report that contains recommendations for whether the person should be released without conditions or with the least restrictive condition or conditions." The bills also repeal Penal Code §815a, thereby eliminating the ability of a judge to set bail when issuing an arrest warrant. Failing to appear for court or violation of other terms of a defendant's pretrial release will be a matter of mere civil contempt. The bills further require a judge to release a defendant on a signed promise to appear, even if the pretrial services agency has failed to furnish a pretrial report to the judge indicating the likelihood the defendant will appear for future court proceedings or whether the defendant is a danger to public safety. Shifting more than 300,000 defendants from privately funded bail to taxpayer-funded pretrial release programs will undoubtedly strain California's already underfunded court system. Penal Code §825 requires that defendants in custody be arraigned in court within 48 hours of arrest. Since these bills repeal the bail schedule, the courts, and district attorney and public defender offices, will have to deal with 300,000 additional arraignments within 48 hours of arrest. Furthermore, these bills require that if the arrest occurs on a Wednesday and Wednesday is a court holiday, the defendant shall be arraigned no later than Friday, and if Friday is a court holiday, the defendant must be arraigned no later than Thursday. This will require the district attorney to review the police reports and make charging decisions within 24 hours of the defendant's arrest. Many more prosecutors and their support staff will need to be hired to perform this requirement. https://v;ww.law360.com/articles/922265/print?section=california 5/11/2017 Bail Reform.Will Imperil California's Justice System-Law360 Page 2 of 4 The bills' authors ignore the fact that judges hold hearings after arraignment of a defendant which includes sworn testimony, oral arguments by prosecution and defense attorney and judicial fact-finding on whether a defendant should be released without bail (i.e., on his or her own recognizance). No new bureaucracy must be created (as the authors would do) for judges to be such fact- finders. These bills demonstrate lack of fundamental knowledge of our criminal justice courts and existing practices. California Jail Population The majority of people in jail, pending trial, are in jail because of non-financial reasons. They are either serving a sentence on another case, subject to a probation or parole violation or facing an immigration or arrest warrant retention. In a 2012 study of the Los Angeles County jail system by the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU found that 87 percent of individuals who were in jail pending trial and unable to be released on bail were due to"non-financial holds." County and Judicial Costs In 2015, there were 1.1 million adults arrested in California. AB42 and SB10 contains an unfunded mandate requiring every county to establish a pretrial services agency that will have enough new employees and other resources to evaluate and prepare a pretrial risk assessment report for every defendant arrested, with certain exceptions. Because this is an unfunded mandate, the pretrial services agency will suppress funding for other county programs and agencies like the district attorney's office, the public defender's office, the sheriff's office and mental health services. Recently, New Jersey adopted a similar bail program, and its three-month old program is already estimated to cost over $450 million. AB42 and SB10 are based on the District of Columbia pretrial release system, which costs $65.2 million a year. It is important to note that New Jersey has a quarter of California's population (39 million) and the population of D.C. is only 670,000 people. If the D.C. system were used to serve California's population it would cost $3.78 billion per year. In addition to the cost associated with running a seven-day-a-week"pretrial system," there is also the cost of monitoring hundreds of thousands of defendants who will be released onto the streets, the cost to the courts when a defendant fails to appear, and the cost of finding and arresting those who fail to appear. A University of Texas study found the cost to the courts of each failure to appear in Dallas County was $1,775.00. (Morris, Robert G., "Pretrial Release Mechanisms in Dallas County, Texas: Differences in Failure to Appear, Recidivism/Pretrial Misconduct, and Associated Costs of FTA,"The University of Texas at Dallas (2013), p. 2-3). The California legislation's sponsors claim that"[tlhe savings from holding fewer people in jail would more than cover the cost" of their proposed "pretrial service agency"; however, the savings are based on an erroneous assumption that 63 percent of defendants are in jail because they cannot afford bail. In reality, most of these pretrial defendants are not eligible for bail or these bills` pretrial release programs because they have "holds" from other agencies or are serving a sentence for a previous conviction. The true number of pretrial defendants eligible for pretrial release is closer to 13 percent, according to the 2012 American Civil Liberties Union study https://www.law360.com/articles/922265/print?section=califomia 5/11/2017 Bail Reform Will Imperil California's Justice System-Law360 Page 3 of 4 of the Los Angeles County Jail system. Many such defendants are released through the current bail system. Therefore, the authors' claimed savings will not materialize, but the state and counties will be stuck with the high new costs of implementing their legislation. California's courts have already faced severe financial decreases over the past decade. The failure of adequate funding to cover costs has had a direct adverse effect on the public — longer wait times, reduced court hours and the closing of branch courthouses. Governor Brown's proposed 2017-18 state budget allocates $2.79 billion to support trial court operations, yet our courts need an additional $158.5 million just to preserve existing service levels. By most conservative estimates, these bills will cost the state and counties an additional $2 billion to $4 billion each year. AB42 and SB10 are Unconstitutional These bills violate the defendant's right to bail by sufficient sureties, which, as noted above, is guaranteed by the California Constitution. Bail by sufficient sureties means a defendant must have the option to secure release through a bail bond posted by a commercial surety. Several other high courts have considered identical phrasing in their state constitutions and have reached the same conclusion. State v. Barton 181 Wn.2d 148 (2014); State ex rel. Sylvester v. Neal, 140 Ohio St.3d 47, 2014-Ohio-2326; State v. Parker, 546 So.2d 186, 186 (La.1989); State v. Golden, 546 So.2d 501, 503 (La. Ct. App 1989); State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 352-53 (Minn.2000); State ex rel. Jones v. Hendon, 66 Ohio St.3d 115, 609 N.E.2d 541, 544 (1993)). This legislation will force 300,000 defendants who can afford bail to sit in jail or to agree to onerous pretrial release conditions in order to be released. Former United States Solicitor General Paul D. Clement commented last year on proposed changes to bail procedures in Maryland as follows: [E]liminating bail as a meaningful option, as this bill does, and substituting an invasive pretrial program which includes conditions like mandatory drug testing, GPS monitoring and onerous reporting requirements, would raise serious constitutional concerns, which are exacerbated if violations of pretrial conditions would create additional criminal exposure for the accused. The Ninth Circuit has held that, in some circumstances, such pretrial release conditions are unconstitutional. In United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2005), the defendant agreed to submit to home searches and drug testing in order to obtain pretrial release. But when law enforcement conducted a home search and drug test of the defendant, the Ninth Circuit suppressed the results because these searches could not pass Fourth Amendment muster`under any of the three [relevant] approaches: consent, special needs or totality of the circumstances.' Id. As an individual merely accused of a crime and presumed innocent, the defendant maintained Fourth Amendment rights that the government could not violate. Even the defendant's consent to the conditions of pretrial release could not render those conditions constitutionally legitimate because the government cannot impose 'unconstitutional conditions' in exchange for government benefits. Id. at 866 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994))." (Comments on Proposed Changes to Maryland Bail Procedures (Dec. 21, 2016).) https://www.law360.com/articles/922265/print?section=california 5/11/2017 Bail Reform Will Imperil California's Justice System-Law360 Page 4 of 4 Pretrial Services Have a Poor Performance Record According to "Not in it for Justice" by Human Rights Watch, Alameda County's pretrial services unit does a very poor job of locating and rearresting defendants released on their own recognizance, meaning without bail. Human Rights Watch analyzed Alameda County Jail data for 2014 and 2015. During that time, 12,166 defendants were released on bail from jail after being in for a median of one day, while the 3,848 defendants released on OR spent a median of four days in jail and Alameda County's pretrial services unit only had to process one-third the number of defendants as those released on bail. This is the system AB42 and SB10 would institute in all of California's 58 counties, where taxpayer-funded pretrial services will process one-third the number of defendants who spend four times longer in custody than under the current privately-funded bail system. It is irrational and dangerous. Quentin L. Kopp is a retired San Mateo Superior Court Judge who served 12 years in the California State Senate and 15 years on the San Francisco County Board of Supervisors. He tried criminal and civil cases from 1956 until 1998. He lives and practices law in San Francisco. The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the firm, its clients, or Portfolio Media Inc., or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice. All Content©2003-2017, Portfolio Media,Inc. h4s://www.law360.com/articles/922265/print?section—califomia 5/11/2017 CALIFORNIA 921 11 th Street,Suite 300 DISTRICT Sacramento,CA 95814 A"1-YO R N E YS 916.443.2017 ' ASSOCIATION www.cdaa.org OFFICERS President April 12, 2017 Stephen M.Wagstaffe San Mateo County The Honorable Robert Hertzberg First Vice President California State Senate Todd D.Riebe State Capitol Amador County Sacramento, CA 95814 Second Vice President Birgit Fladager �i: SB 10— Stanislaus County Oppose Secretary-Treasurer Dear Senator Hertzberg: Nancy O'Malley Alameda County On behalf of the California District Attorneys Association (CDAA), I regret to Sergeant-At-Arms Vern Pierson you inform that we are opposey d to our measure SB 10. This bill would El Dorado County dismantle California's longstanding bail system, replacing it with a costly and cumbersome alternative that we believe will have a negative impact on public Immediate Past President Y• e we g safety. While agree that California's bails stem should be reviewed and Patrick J.McGrath Y Yuba County opportunities for thoughtful improvement identified,this bill simply goes too far, too fast. DIRECTORS Mark Amador San Diego County As you know, Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye has put together a Pretrial Detention Reform Work Group to study current pretrial detention practices and J.Kirk Andrus Siskiyou County Provide recommendations for potential reforms. This work group is expected to report back to the Chief Justice with recommendations by December 2017. In Ryan Couzens light of that timeline, we believe that any legislative efforts to repeal and replace Yolo County the current bail system are premature. Cindy De Silva San Joaquin County California's current pretrial release procedures help to ensure that dangerous C.David Eyster defendants are not released to commit new crimes and harm victims and Mendocino County witnesses before trial. Under these procedures, the court already has wide Candice Hooper discretion to release a defendant on his or her own recognizance, or to reduce bail San Benito County for defendants that do not pose such risks. Whatever the deficiencies in the Janice L.Maurizi current system, it hardly seems prudent to take it apart and start from scratch. Ventura County Deborah Owen SB 10 focuses on the costs of incarceration and hardships to the defendant caused Imperial County by pretrial detention, but wholesale pretrial release has many other costs. When a defendant fails to appear, there is no bail agent with motivation to go find the JeannineC County defendant. The police have no additional resources to find and arrest defendants Monterey County who fail to appear—and even those who are apprehended after failing to appear Anne Marie Schubert are only be subject to a maximum five-da flash incarceration, following a civil Sacramento County Y � Y g contempt hearing. Ryan Wagner Contra Costa County There are also tremendous logistical problems with the proposed pretrial release CIEOscheme. Under the bill, when Friday is a court holiday, a Wednesday arrestee Mar must be charged b Thursday. So, when someone is arrested on Wednesday at Mark Zahner g Y Y• Y CALIFORNIA 921 11 th Street,Suite 300 DISTRICT Sacramento,CA 95814 A"1-FO R N E Y5 916.443.2017 " ASSOCIATION www.edaa.org 11:00 p.m.,the police must complete reports, present them to the district attorney on Thursday, and expect the district attorney to make a careful charging decision in time for an afternoon court arraignment. This compressed timeline will undoubtedly result in the release of dangerous individuals. Even when given a full two days before arraignment, SB 10 makes it extremely onerous to achieve pretrial detention for dangerous defendants. The district attorney must file a written motion at arraignment, containing myriad required allegations, and be expected to prove those allegations in a contested hearing—all of this within 48 hours of the arrest. The existing bail schedule system allows judges to exercise discretion to raise or lower bail for violent felons, in a sensible period of time. Changing the pretrial release system to address actual injustices is a laudable goal. However, these changes should be careful and measured, particularly for offenses greater than misdemeanors and low-level felonies. I greatly appreciate your consideration of our concerns. If you would like to discuss these issues further, please do not hesitate to contact me. Very truly yours, Arw- Sean Hoffman Director of Legislation How Will the Elimination of Bail Affect Counties? The authors of SB 10 and AB 42 claim the primary reason there is a need for bail reform is because poor people are in jail "just because they are poor". Collectively, California county jails house about 75,000 inmates. 63%of the inmates have at least one open case.The authors of these bills would like you to believe that the sole reason all 47,250 unsentenced persons remain in custody is that they can't afford bail.They ignore all the other reasons pretrial detainees remain in custody(holds from other jurisdictions, parole or probation violations, serious violent crimes committed, high-risk to public safety). A 2012 ACLU-funded study of the LA County jail system found that 13%might be eligible for pretrial release. The authors also ignore the fact that the judicial system already has the ability to deal with defendants who can't afford to bail. Judges can address these concerns"by adjusting bail amounts and releasing defendants on their own recognizance or on pretrial release under the appropriate circumstances" (quote from the Alliance of CA Judges letter date May 9, 2017). If passed AB 42 and SB 10 will:: • Cost counties collectively$3.8 billion per year(Washington D.C.system costs$65 million with a population of only 670,000 people). • Counties will be forced to apply to the Commission on State Mandates for Cost Reimbursement. This process alone will take years to sort out and will put immense pressure on every county to first implement and outlay resources with a speculative chance at savings, only then to determine the net costs. • Require every county to develop and staff a pretrial services department. The defendant cannot be charged any costs for services or ordered to reimburse the county, regardless of a defendant's ability to pay. • Will crowd out funding for other county programs and agencies like the district attorney's office,the public defender's office,the sheriff's office and mental health services. • More than triple the time that each person spends in jail pretrial because it completely eliminates a person's right to post bail. Instead, every arrestee will languish in jail until that person's case is reviewed by a judge. • Significantly increase the number of fugitives within the state and warrants for their arrest. (Presently there are approx. 1.7 million warrants in the system, at a cost of$1775 per FTA(Texas Study 2015) calculates to over$3 billion.) • Persons accused of committing a violent crime, including some misdemeanors,will not be reviewed for release. • Cause the incarceration of more pretrial defendants because it eliminates the bail schedule. • Cause the court to release high-risk defendants without bail ---bail provides defendants a financial incentive to appear in court, along with friends and family that cosign on the bail bond. • Take away the rights of the 300,000+defendants who choose to bail out in CA each year(at no cost to the taxpayers). 0Alliance of California Judges Directors May 9, 2017 Hon.Steve White President The Honorable Rob Bonta Hon.David R.Lampe Member of the State Assembly Executive Director State Capitol, Room 2148 Hon.Andrew Banks Sacramento, CA 95814 Hon.Julie Conger IRet.) Hon.Gregory Dohi Re: Assembly Bill 42 Hon,Mark R.Forcum Hon.Maryanne Gilliard Dear Assemblymember Bonta: Hon.Daniel B.Goldstein Hon.W.Kent Hamlin As President of the Alliance of California Judges, a group of more than Hon.Thomas E.Hollenhorst 500 judges and retired judges from across the state, I write to express Hon.Elizabeth A.Lippitt our strong opposition to Assembly Bill 42 and Senate Bill 10, bills that Hon.Susan Lopez-Gins would radically alter the current bail system. Hon.Kevin McCormick Our member judges make thousands of rulings on bail issues every day. Hon.John S.Somers We recognize that not everyone has the ability to post bail pending trial. Hon.W.Michael Hayes We address that concern by adjusting bail amounts and releasing Mon.John Adams defendants on their own recognizance or on pretrial release under Education Coordinator appropriate circumstances. We know that our current bail system needs further reform. But the proposals contained in these bills are simply too drastic, and the effects on public safety and court congestion could be catastrophic. We note at the outset that these bills run counter to the letter and the spirit of the California Constitution as amended by Proposition 8, the Victim's Bill of Rights, which passed with 83 percent of the popular vote in 1982. Prop 8, which the Legislature voted, with only one dissenting vote, to put on the ballot, added the following language to Article I, § 12: "In fixing the amount of bail, the court shall take into consideration the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing of the case." [Emphasis added.] If that constitutional mandate weren't clear enough, the voters passed Proposition 9, "Marsy's Law," in 2008. Prop 9 added the following language regarding bail to Article I, § 28 of the Constitution: "In setting, reducing or denying bail, the judge or magistrate shall take into consideration the protection of the public, the safety of the victim, the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous 1817 Capitol Avenue • Sacramento.CA 95811 • www.aIlianceofcaliforniajudges.com Alliance of California Judges 519117 Letter to Assemblymember Banta Page 12 criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing of the case. Public safety and the safety of the victim shall be the primary considerations. "A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court's discretion, subject to the same factors considered in setting bail." [Emphasis added.] The proposed bills strip judges of the authority to set bail in the majority of cases, and they substitute a different set of priorities for judges to follow in those cases for which they could still set bail. This new vision for bail cannot be reconciled with the Victim's Bill of Rights and Marsy's Law in our state constitution. We highlight just a few of the other serious concerns we have with these two bills: • The bills would heighten the risk to public safety. Those arrested for selling drugs, committing identity theft, vandalizing homes and businesses, stealing huge sums of money, or burglarizing dozens of businesses would all presumptively be granted pretrial release—without having to appear before a judge, post bail or submit to any conditions upon release. These bills also inexplicably exclude residential burglary from the list of crimes for which arrestees are not to be considered for release without judicial authorization. • These proposals would create more congestion in our busiestour courts. Under the proposed legislation, judges in most cases could set bail or impose pretrial release conditions such as electronic monitoring Only after a hearing. We can expect that prosecutors will be requesting lots of these hearings. Our arraignment courts—already the busiest courts in the entire judicial system---would become completely clogged with bail hearings. • The bills completely upend the way in which we handle arrest warrants, to the detriment of the court system and the arrestees themselves. By eliminating the judge's ability to set a bail amount when issuing a warrant, the proposed legislation virtually ensures that wanted suspects will not be brought to justice in a timely manner, if at all. Moreover, those arrested on warrants could not be released until a judge makes an individualized ruling that considers the arrestee's ability to pay. Arrestees who might otherwise simply pay their bail and be released from custody will instead languish until their cases can be heard. Alliance of California Judges 519117 Letter to Assemblymember Bonta Page 13 • The bills place an undue—and wholly unreal isticburden on the prosecution. The bills would require in some cases that the prosecuting agency be prepared for a contested hearing with live witness testimony in less than 24 hours, at risk of a dangerous felon being set free. The bills also create a presumption of release pending trial that law enforcement will seldom be able to rebut within the timelines contemplated by the bill, even when the court is faced with a violent criminal facing serious felony charges. • The bills inject the concept of the presumption of innocence into a context in which it simply doesn't belong. The proposed legislation would require judges to consider the presumption of innocence in making pretrial release decisions. This provision makes no sense. While the presumption of innocence is at the heart of our criminal justice system, it's a concept that applies at trial, not in the context of rulings on bail. Both the United States and California Supreme Courts have long maintained that the presumption of innocence "has no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun." (Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520, 533, see also In re York (1995) 9 CalAth 1133, 1148.) AB 42 and SB 10 are well-intended attempts to address the fact that the bail system affects persons of differing income levels differently. But nearly every county now has a pretrial services division in place to screen defendants and recommend their release on appropriate conditions, without bail, when doing so does not pose a serious danger to the public or a significant risk of non-appearance. A bill mandating a pretrial release program in every county, and perhaps providing some limited funding for that purpose, would be a sensible response to the problem. These twin bills go way too far, and their effect would be a near shutdown of the court system and a serious risk to public safety. We urge that these proposals be reconsidered and substantially amended. Sincerely. Nan. Steve White President cc: ACJ Board of Directors CA LI FCS R N I A 921 11 th Street,Suite 300 DISTRICT Sacramento,CA 95814 A'ITORNGYS 916.443.2017 ' ASSOCIATION Aww.cdaa.org OFFICERS President April 11, 2017 Stephen M.Wagstaffe San Mateo County The Honorable Rob Bonta First Vice President California State Assembly Todd D.Riebe State Capitol Amador County Sacramento, CA 95814 Second Vice President Birgit FladRE: AB 42—Oppose Stanislaus aus County ty Secretary-Treasurer Dear Assemblyman Bonta: Nancy O'Malley .Alameda County Vern On behalf of the California District Attorneys Association (CDAA), I regret to VePier Serra Pierson At-Arms inform you that we are opposed to your measure, AB 42. This bill would El Dorado County dismantle California's longstanding bail system, replacing it with a costly and cumbersome alternative that we believe will have a negative impact on public Patrick J.McGrath safety. While we agree that California's bail system should be reviewed and Yuba County opportunities for thoughtful improvement identified,this bill simply goes too far, too fast. DIRECTORS Mark Amador San Diego County As you know, Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye has put together a Pretrial J. Detention Reform Work Group to study current pretrial detention practices and S Kirk Andrus provide recommendations for potential reforms. This work group is expected to Siskiyou County p p g p � p report back to the Chief Justice with recommendations by December 2017. In Ryan Couzens light of that timeline, we believe that any legislative efforts to repeal and replace Yolo County the current bail system are premature. Cindy De Silva San Joaquin County California's current pretrial release procedures help to ensure that dangerous C.David Eyster defendants are not released to commit new crimes and harm victims and Mendocino County witnesses before trial. Under these procedures,the court already has wide Candice Hooper discretion to release a defendant on his or her own recognizance, or to reduce bail San Benito County for defendants that do not pose such risks. Whatever the deficiencies in the Janice L.Maurizi current system, it hardly seems prudent to take it apart and start from scratch. Ventura County Deborah Owen AB 42 focuses on the costs of incarceration and hardships to the defendant caused rmpenalCounty by pretrial detention, but wholesale pretrial release has many other costs. When a Jeannine Pacioni defendant fails to appear,there is no bail agent with motivation to go find the Monterey County defendant. The police have no additional resources to find and arrest defendants who fail to appear—and even those who are apprehended after failing to appear Anne Marie Schubert are only be subject to a maximum five-da flash incarceration, following a civil Sacramento County y � y g contempt hearing. Ryan Wagner Contra Costa County There are also tremendous logistical problems with the proposed pretrial release CEOscheme. Under the bill, when Friday is a court holiday, a Wednesday arrestee Mar g Mark Zahner y must be charged b Thursday. So, when someone is arrested on Wednesdayat az CALIFORNIA 921 11th Street,Suite 300 DISTRICT Sacramento,CA 95814 A"€TOR N F YS 916.443.2017 ' ASSOCIATION wrwu.cdaa.org 11:00 p.m., the police must complete reports, present them to the district attorney on Thursday, and expect the district attorney to make a careful charging decision in time for an afternoon court arraignment. This compressed timeline will undoubtedly result in the release of dangerous individuals. Even when given a full two days before arraignment,AB 42 makes it extremely onerous to achieve pretrial detention for dangerous defendants. The district attorney must file a written motion at arraignment, containing myriad required allegations, and be expected to prove those allegations in a contested hearing—all of this within 48 hours of the arrest. The existing bail schedule system allows judges to exercise discretion to raise or lower bail for violent felons, in a sensible period of time. Changing the pretrial release system to address actual injustices is a laudable goal. However, these changes should be careful and measured, particularly for offenses greater than misdemeanors and low-level felonies. I greatly appreciate your consideration of our concerns. If you would like to discuss these issues further, please do not hesitate to contact me. Very truly yours, kA*101-- Sean Hoffman Director of Legislation Z RAIL AGENTS ASSOCIATION March 28, 2017 Assemblymember Rob Bonta Position: Opposed California State Assembly State Capitol Building Location:Assembly Public Safety Committee Sacramento, CA 95 814 RE: AB 42 (Bonta)Bail: pretrial release(As Amended March 27,201.7) Dear Assemblymember Bonta: The Golden State Bail Agents Association(GSBAA)is a trade association representing the California bail industry. The purpose of the association is to promote the understanding of the bail industry's important role in California's criminal justice system and to protect the rights of its members. The Association is headquartered in Sacramento, California,but has members throughout California. • This bill will cost taxpayers more than $3.8 billion per year.The current bail system operates at no cost to taxpayers. On the other hand,the costs of the pretrial system proposed in this bill this will be enormous. According to the California Attorney General's Office,there were 1,086,889 adults arrested in California in 2015.' This bill mandates that each county create a pretrial services agency that will have enough staff and other resources to evaluate and prepare a timely pretrial risk assessment report for every defendant arrested, with certain exceptions. The cost of evaluating and preparing a ti. melt/pretrial risk assessment report for each of these defendants will be unaffordable. This bill is based on the pretrial detention system in use in Washington,D.C.The annual budget for the D.C. system is$65 million for a district with a population of only 600,000. Extrapolated on a per population basis, such a system would cost more than$3.8 billion per year to implement in California.2 • This bill will cause the incarceration of more pretrial defendants because it eliminates the bail schedule. Most counties do not have pretrial services agencies in place and the bail schedule is the only mechanism for recently arrested defendants to get released from jail before their arraignment. Therefore, defendants that could have bailed out of custody under the bail schedule will sit in jail for 48 hours or longer awaiting arraignment. • This bill is unconstitutional.This bill violates the defendant's right to bail by sufficient sureties which is guaranteed by the California Constitution.3 Bail by sufficient sureties means the defendant must have the option to secure release through monetary bail. Several other jurisdictions have considered identical phrasing Harris, Kamala D.,"Crime in California 2015"p.16.Available at: https://oag.ca.-Ov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/publications/candd/cd 15/cd l 5.pdV. Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia,Congressional Budget Justification and Performance Budget Request Fiscal Year 2017(February 2016),p, 6,Available at: http://www.psa,gov/sites/default/files/FY2017%2OPSA%2OCongressional%2OBudget%2OSubmission.pdf 3 Cal.Const.Art. 1, §12 5301 St., Sacramento, CA 95814 - 866-333-6551 - www.gsbaa.org in their state constitutions and have reached the same conclusion.'This bill will force defendants that could afford bail to sit in jail or to agree to onerous pretrial release conditions to get released. Eliminating bail as a meaningful option, as this bill does,and substituting an invasive pretrial program which includes conditions like mandatory drug testing,GPS monitoring and onerous reporting requirements,would raise serious constitutional concerns,which are exacerbated if violations of pretrial conditions would create additional criminal exposure for the accused.The Ninth Circuit has held that, in some circumstances, such pretrial release conditions are unconstitutional. In United States v. Scott,450 F.3d 863, 874(9th Cir. 2005),the defendant agreed to submit to home searches and drug testing in order to obtain pretrial release. But when law enforcement conducted a home search and drug test of the defendant,the Ninth Circuit suppressed the results because these searches could not pass Fourth Amendment muster"under any of the three [relevant] approaches: consent, special needs[,] or totality of the circumstances."Id.As an individual merely accused of a crime and presumed innocent,the defendant maintained Fourth Amendment rights that the government could not violate. Even the defendant's consent to the conditions of pretrial release could not render those conditions constitutionally legitimate because the government cannot impose"unconstitutional conditions"in exchange for government benefits.Id. at 866(citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374(1994)). • Criminal risk assessments have numerous problems including discriminating against black defendants. This bill mistakenly assumes that criminal risk assessment reports are somehow better than bail, but these reports have been widely criticized for discriminating against black defendants.' San Francisco recently adopted the Arnold Foundation's criminal risk assessment. This risk assessment tool was harshly criticized as unfair and racially discriminatory by San Francisco Public Defender Jeff Adachi: Even the data-driven part of the tool is suspect The algorithm inexplicably considers a person with 10 felony convictions to be lower risk than a person with a single felony and a single misdemeanor.6 However,bail agencies reduce discrimination against women and minorities because more than half of the bail agencies in California are small businesses owned by women and minorities.These agencies facilitate the posting of bail and subsequent release from jail for many that could not otherwise afford to post bail. They do so at a small fraction of the full bail amount.And,"[m]arket conditions among[bail agencies] may actually reduce discrimination against poor and middle-class defendants."While a judge's setting of bail may create an invidious discriminatory affect upon a defendant,"competition among[bail agencies] serves to lessen the impact of that judicial discrimination."' Furthermore, in the parole context,the California Inspector General found: The automated California Risk Assessment (CSRA) instrument inaccurately assesses a number of offenders; (2) the automated CSRA instrument uses incomplete conviction data; (3) the automated CSRA instrument inconsistently applies juvenile data when calculating 4 State v. Barton 181 Wn.2d 148(2014); State ex rel. Sylvester v.Neal, 140 Ohio St.3d 47,2014-Ohio-2926; State v. Parker, 546 So.2d 186, 186(La.1989); State v. Golden,546 So.2d 501,503 (La.Ct.App 1989); State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 352-53 (Minn.2000); State ex rel. Jones v. Hen don,66 Ohio St.3d 115,609 N.E.2d 541,544(1993). 5 Angwin,J., Larson,J.,Mattu,S.,&Kirchner, L. (2016). Machine Bias.There is software that is used across the county to predict future criminals.And it is biased against blacks.Available at:https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk- assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. 6 Adachi,Jeff,Daily Journal,"Bail algorithm falters on its promise"(August 18,2016),Available at: https://dailyjoumal.com/public/PubMain.cftn. 'Ayres, Ian&Waldfogel,Joel,A Market Test for Discrimination in Bail Setting,(1994)46 Stan. L. Rev. 987, 1047, Available at:h ://di italcommons.law. ale.edu/c i/viewcontent.c i?article=2526&context-fss a ers. 5301 St., Sacramento, CA 95814 . 866-333-6551 •www.gsbaa.org risk assessment scores; and (4) CDCR' s initial policy regarding juveniles convicted of serious or violent felonies was incorrect.e • No proof that pretrial release programs have better outcomes than bail.No studies published in peer reviewed journals have shown that pretrial release programs have higher appearance rates than commercial bail or that they have better public safety outcomes in an apples-to-apples comparison of the same risk class of defendant. However, professor Alex Taborrok,a highly respected economist,along with Eric Helland published a report in the University of Chicago's prestigious peer reviewed Journal of Law and Economics that focused on the difference in effectiveness between public law enforcement and what they termed"private law enforcement" in returning fugitives to justice. Professors Tabarrok and Helland use the term private law enforcement to describe bail agents responsible for returning absconded defendants to court.The authors conclude that "[djefendants,released on surety bond are 28 percent less likely to fail to appear than similar defendants released on their own recognizance,and if they do fail to appear,they are 53 percent less likely to remain at large for extended periods of time.9 • It costs$1,775 each time a defendant fails to appear in court. Professor Robert G. Morris of the University of Texas, Dallas conducted a study comparing different pretrial release mechanisms and the differences in failure to appear, recidivism/pretrial misconduct, and associated costs. Professor Morris found that"when comparing similarly situated defendants'probability of FTA for all case types,defendants released via a commercial bond were significantly and substantively less likely to fail to appear in court..." He then calculated the system-wide cost savings of fewer failures to appear.Using the assumption that the public cost per failure to appear was$1,775, Morris concluded that using surety bond releases saved Dallas County over $11.1 million.10 For the reasons stated above,we request your no vote on this bill. Sincerely, Greg"Topo"Padilla President cc: Mr. Daniel Seeman, Deputy Legislative Secretary, Governor's Office Ms. Sandy Uribe, Consultant,Assembly Public Safety Committee Mr. Gary Olson,Consultant,Assembly Republican Caucus Ms. Kathryn Lynch, Legislative Advocate Golden State Bail Agents Association $Office of the Inspector General. Special Report: California.Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's Supervision of John Gardner(2010,June), p.l.Available at: http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/ARCHIVE/BOI/Special%2OReport%20on%20CDCRs%2OSupervision%20oP/o2OJohn %20Gardner.pdf 9 Helland and Tabarrok,"The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping" (2004)47 J.L.&Econ. 93, 118,Available at: https:Hmason.gmu.edu/—atabarro/PublicvsPrivate.pdf. 30 Morris,Robert G.,"Pretrial Release Mechanisms in Dallas County,Texas: Differences in Failure to Appear, Recidivism/Pretrial Misconduct,and Associated Costs of FTA,"The University of Texas at Dallas(2013),p.2-3,Available at:h s://www.utdallas.edu/e s/cc's/d]/Dallas%20Pretrial°/v2ORelease°/a20Re ort%20-FINAL%2OJan%2020130. df. 530 1 St., Sacramento, CA 95814 . 866-333-6551 •www.gsbaa.org