HomeMy WebLinkAboutFERC - Informational Submittal, Renewed Request for Clarification and Public Process, and Comments - Project No. 2100 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
In the Matter of ) October 10, 2017
State of California )
Department of Water Resources ) Project No. 2100
New Major License )
Oroville Division, State Water Facilities )
"Oroville Facilities" )
INFORMATIONAL SUBMITTAL,
RENEWED REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION AND PUBLIC PROCESS,
AND COMMENTS
OF FRIENDS OF THE RIVER,
CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING PROTECTION ALLIANCE,
AMERICAN WHITEWATER,
AND SOUTH YUBA RIVER CITIZENS LEAGUE
Ms. Kimberley Bose, Secretary,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Via e-mail
Dear Ms. Bose:
Friends of the River, California Sportfishing Protection AIliance, American Whitewater, and
South Yuba River Citizens League respectfully submit their recently published report entitled
"The Oroville Dam 2017 Spillway Incident and.Lessons from the Feather River Basin" (Oroville
Spillway Incident Report or Report) for acceptance in the docket of the Oroville Facilities, FERC
No. 2100. The Report recommends construction of a complete lined emergency spillway on
Oroville Dam, repeating a recommendation the authors' organizations made over a decade ago.
The Report also makes dozens of additional recommendations, general and specific,that
highlight issues that directly or indirectly affect the operation of Project No. 2100. We submit
the Report as a separate document simultaneous to this letter.
On August 8, 2017,the authors of this letter joined numerous organizations and individuals in
the greater project area in requesting that the Commission delay issuance of"until the parties and
the licensee can better understand the causes of this incident and how it may change the
1
underlying assumptions of the pending license."' Consistent with that request for delay, the
present Report recommends the licensee California Department of Water Resources (DWR)
conduct an analysis of impacts of the 2017 Oroville spillway incident to not only project
facilities but also to surrounding communities. We still await this analysis. In addition, the
authors of the Report are hopeful that we may soon have the opportunity to more fully discuss
our concerns with senior managers at DWR
On April 8, 2017,the authors of this letter, along with the Sierra Club, requested clarification on
the process by which the Commission will address dam safety issues at Oroville.2 In addition,
we requested clarification on how the Commission will engage the public in providing
confidence that project facilities are Oroville are adequate to meet the project's mission,
including flood control and public safety.3 We still await such clarification. The Report makes
numerous specific recommendations on how the Commission might respond to the specific and
general need for clarification of the relationship between issues of dam safety and the licensing
or relicensing processes for hydroelectric projects. Among those recommendations are on page
32 of the Report. They include:
FERC needs to modernize the relicensing process so that it evaluates project effects in the
context of present and future climate variation. FERC relicensing proceedings do not
currently require study and mitigation of hydrological conditions under changed climate
conditions. The events at Oroville should motivate FERC to change this policy.
At present, FERC relicensing presents one of the few opportunities for the public and
resource agencies to advocate for improvements to dam operations. FERC needs to
expand its existing relicensing process to include consideration of dam safety and flood-
control operations. Within this expansion, FERC needs to sort through how it will
meaningfully allow discussion and evaluation of dam safety and flood control in
relicensing in the context of CEII constraints.
These recommendations remain relevant and timely, both in the relicensing of Project no. 2100
and more broadly in terms of the default treatment of infrastructure issues in the relicensing
process. As we re-state the focus of our April 8, 2017 Request for Clarification on page 42 of
the Report: "FERC needs to clarify the procedure for Oroville Dam relicensing and dam-safety
proceedings given that these multiple proceedings may affect area communities. At Oroville,
more than anywhere else, there must be a clear roadmap for meaningful public involvement."
' Assemblyman James Gallagher et al.,Comments on Pending License Issuance,Project No.2100,eLibrary no.
20170808-5104.
z Request for Clarification and Public Process by Friends of the River,Sierra Club,South Yuba River Citizens
League,California Sportfishing Protection Alliance,and American Whitewater,Project No.2100,eLibrary no.
20170419-5231.
3 Friends of the River,Sierra Club and South Yuba River Citizens League explicitly disputed in their 2005
intervention the adequacy of project facilities to meet the project's mission consistent with"the Commission's
regulations(18CFR 4.51(8)(2))requiring relicensing applicants to `demonstrate that existing structures are safe and
adequate to fulfill their stated functions."' See Motion to Intervene of Friends of the River,Sierra Club,and South
Yuba River Citizens League,Project No.2100-052,eLibrary no.20051017-5033,p.9.
. . 2
Friends of the River, California Sportfishing Protection Alliance,American Whitewater and
South Yuba River Citizens League request that the Commission review and respond to our
Oroville Spillway Incident Report.
Specifically, in considering the new license for the Oroville Facilities, we request that FERC
respond substantively to the concerns about the infrastructure that we raise in the Report, prior to
issuance of a new project license. We also ask that the Report inform the substance of that
license.
More generally,we request that the Commission develop new protocols by which it will allow a
public evaluation of the fitness of project infrastructure to achieve the mission of every project as
it undergoes relicensing. This is particularly relevant as relicensing proceedings are now
beginning.4 We recommend that the Commission conduct a workshop at its Washington D.C.
offices to hear recommendations and discussion for the development and.substance of such
protocols. We stand ready to cooperate and inform any such workshop.
Thank you for the consideration of our Report entitled "The Oroville Dam 2017 Spillway
Incident and Lessons from the Feather River Basin," of or request for clarification and public
process, and of these comments.
Respectfully submitted,
FRIENDS OF THE RIVER
By /s/
Ronald M. Stork
Senior Policy Advocate
Friends of the River
1418 20th Street
Sacramento,CA 95811
rstork friendsoftheriver.or
CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING PROTECTION ALLIANCE
By /s/
Chris Shutes
FERC Projects Director
California Sportfishing Protection Alliance
1608 Francisco St.
Berkeley, CA 94703
blancapaloma0msn.co.m
4 See for example the September 18,2017 Scoping Document 2 for the relicensing of the Potter Valley Project,
FERC no.77,eLibrary no.20170918-3011,p.9:"The dam safety program at the Potter Valley Project and other
Commission projects is set forth in part 12 of the Commission's regulations and is independent of the relicensing
process." The beginning of a licensing process presents the most straightforward opportunity for the Commission to
correct course.
3
AMERCIAN WHITEWATER
By _/s/
Dave Steindorf
Special Projects Director
American Whitewater
4 Baroni Drive
Chico, CA 95928
dave americanwhitewater.ora
SOUTH YUBA RIVER CITIZENS LEAGUE
By /s/
Melinda Booth
Executive Director
South Yuba River Citizens League
313 Railroad Ave. #10 1
Nevada City, CA 95959
melinda@Vrel.org
cc:
Grant Davis, Department of Water Resources
Mayor Linda Dahlmeier, City of Oroville
Sandy Linville, Oroville Chamber of Commerce
Assemblyman James Gallagher
Curtis Grima, office of Assemblyman James Gallagher
Anne Sanger, office of Congresswoman Doris Matsui
Bruce AIpert, County Counsel, Butte County
Bill Connelly, Supervisor, Butte County
Doug Teeter, Supervisor, Butte County
Mike Inamine, Sutter Butte Flood Control Agency
Curt Aikens, Yuba County Water Agency
Geoff Rabone, Yuba County Water Agency
Kevin Zeitler, Stifel Financial Corp.
Tim Haines, State Water Contractors
Robert Bateman, Roplast Industries
Darin Gale, City of Yuba City
Don Rust, City of Oroville
Aaron Wright, California State Parks
Richard Roos-Collins, Water Power Law Group
Cindy Messer, Department of Water Resources
Joel Ledesma, Department of Water Resources
Michael Mierzwa, Department of Water Resources
John Leahigh, Department of Water Resources
Sharon Tapia, Division of Safety of Dams
Alicia Kirchner, Army Corps of Engineers
Leslie Gallagher, Central Valley Flood Protection Board
4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have a-filed this"Informational Submittal, Renewed Request for
Clarification and Public Process, and Comments," and, as a separate pdf file,the document
entitled "The Oroville Dam 2017 Spillway Incident and Lessons from the Feather River Basin,"
in the Commission's e-library for Project 2100, and have this day served this document on each
person designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding,via e-
mail or surface mail as directed on the service list.
Dated this 10th day of October 2017 in Berkeley, California.
lsl
Chris Shutes
FERC Projects Director
California Sportfishing Protection Alliance
1608 Francisco St.
Berkeley, CA 94703
5
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1
RON STORK, Friends of the River
CHRIS SHUTES} California Sportfishing Protection Alliance
GARY REEDY, Contracted Project Manager
KATRINA SCHNEIDER, River Science Consultant
DAVE STEINDORF, American Whitewater
ERIC WESSELMAN, Friends of the River
-10
W?"'
Oroville Dant Spillway, Feb.27,2017.
The Oroville dam main spillway after spill
flow releases ceased for repair inspec-
;11111fill'! 11, g111111111
tions.Oroville Dam is in the shadow on
Ell the upper right. Source:Dale Kolke, CA
Dept, of Water Resources(hereby DWR).
This project was funded through the California Hydropower Reform Coalition, and benefited
from the volunteer editing by Jeanne Scarmon, and formatting by Kathy Dotson.We thank
California Resources Agency staff for providing information on Oroville Dam.We appreciate
the many citizens who have shown resilience to the Oroville incident of 2017 and who stepped
up to contribute their concerns and knowledge to a positive aftermath.
Cover photo image:Aerial View of Oroville Reservoir and Spillways—emergency spillway on the right,and main spillway on the left—
Feb.27,2017. Photo taken earlier in the day while flow released down main spillway. Note workers and new material placed in
eroded emergency spillway zone. Source:Dale Kolke, DWR.
Oroville am rained
worldwide cittention
in February 2017
when crumbling spillways at the nation's tallest dam triggered one of the largest evacuations in California
history. The near catastrophe remains a socioeconomic blow to downstream communities.
While some repair work is moving forward at Oroville,significant issues remain to be addressed. This
incident is a wake-up call for action on several fronts at this facility and thousands of other high-hazard
darns in the United States to ensure a safe and reliable water system that protects communities and the
rivers that flow through them. A warming climate with changing precipitation patterns underscores the
urgency.
The Oroville Dam 2017 Spillway Incident.Lessons from the Feather River Basin calls for action on 18
recommendations, and dozens of sub-recommendations,to address California's aging dam infrastructure,
operate dams more safely and efficiently, advance multi-benefit flood management projects,and increase
transparency and public engagement.
A chief recommendation is the need for a complete emergency spillway at Oroville Dam. At this time,
there is no evidence that the Department of Water Resources plans to address this fundamental
problem. The report also identifies several other dams in California that require investment in
maintenance, repair,or reconstruction.
Improving dam operations is also critical to avoiding another incident like Oroville. This requires better
flood modeling and scheduled updates of flood-control manuals with opportunities for robust public
involvement.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission(FERC)should also address dam safety issues as
a part of relicensing hydropower projects. In the San Joaquin Basin,studies need to explore opportunities
to increase maximum controlled flood flows from facilities like Don Pedro Dam on the Tuolumne River.
The report has several recommendations to reduce downstream risk in the event of flooding or
infrastructure failure,through multi-benefit flood management projects.Funding the Central Valley Flood
Protection Plan is critical to implementing several of these projects,such as the expansion of the Yolo
Basin Bypass and the weirs that allow Feather River/Sutter Bypass and American River flood flows into the
Yolo Bypass.Expanding the floodplain in the Oroville Wildlife Area and implementing the Lower Feather
River Corridor Management Plan are also priorities in the Sacramento Basin. In the San Joaquin Basin,
reservoir-based floodwater management is far less reliable than in the Sacramento Basin. This problem will
only get worse as precipitation patterns shift with climate change. Key projects there include setback levees
and a small San Joaquin River floodwater bypass in the lower Delta.
Finally,the report calls for a shift in the relationship between out-of-area water project developers and
members of the local communities that house those projects. This relationship should be based on equality,
fairness, respect, and transparency. In the case of Oroville, and similar projects,this requires public
release of forensic investigations,new inundation maps, and Emergency Action Plans, combined with
comprehensive assessments of impacts and mitigation actions for communities like Oroville.
The main lessons from the Oroville Incident and a summary of recommendations are provided in the
following table.
Lesson Recommendations Summary
• Complete planned reconstruction of the Oroville main spillway and
relocation of powerline transmission towers and lines.
• Plan a real auxiliary/emergency spillway that does not risk large
P quantities of hillside soil and rock being eroded into the Feather
River.
• Conduct a thorough review of the Oroville Dam complex's physical
m a P deficiencies and undertake appropriate upgrades.
• Systematically inspect dams across California and the U.S.to meet
upgraded design and maintenance standards and procedures.
10
•5 « On NO
..3- vn °S c a'?<. • Update flood-control manuals for the Feather v
Fat er and Yuba River
,r 3y�. � ���.� Basins.
1
"
z.' `
Re-evaluate the duration and character of floods modeled to exist in
st ?"
the future an
F �,��. ;�2- ; d m
ake necessary modifications.
s. x_ z:t g � u; >' • Provide public involvement in the manual update process.
'� •
�����_>.$r%�,>�Y f�•^�er�`,, .:a h ; �-J ,. _ Require the Army Corps to review and update flood manuals for all
}T�•��r��,�y�, `��.��s�,L�,�'� �'�'�'����4;�6� A jurisdictional dams on a defined schedule.
"3y��*.aT'� °;x',� a fit: -�� ,�5•
.��'i�� Hv fir:->,�.. ;,"�;,�r•• a
' r �'}`,s` };���' y • Require FERC to include dam safety in:hydropower relicensing.
- -�n3P'��,�c y•����Nr<f�' � ,bks ;f�',�'-e, �'
e2 `
.v � f .,"°>'�w��.y.��.�. �..-'j��.Y.... ..........'{:'�3-sr�... 0.t.'�.iG."K�„'�r,'a,,.�Rz3%n',-�,�i,L??`�Cf7t`Y? �rrl�?3s.� �k?�, ` �.�"�.-.`.,' -'...�''�'•"+"�#:�r,� {r��"'..iiia"^n �"�.'+�.r�v%F�,c,. �^�'_�a..zki<Y Yf
• Fund and implement the Central Valley Flood Protection Plan.
P P • Assemble diverse stakeholders to define and plan floodplain
improvements.
• Evaluate and design multi-benefit floodplain projects(e.g.,setback
levees)that increase flood protection while creating more floodplain
habitat.
• Develop and implement plans to create greater floodway capacity in
the San Joaquin Basin.
P
;
• Complete forensic investigations at Oroville and release to the public.
• Conduct comprehensive assessment of impacts to the Oroville and
adjacent communities from 2017 spillway incidents.
Peot3 e a e1 • Establi s h new opportunities for mitigation and community
r
development.
commux ries
• Develop and make public new inundation maps and Emergency
matter
Action Plans.
• Reform the relationships between out-of-area water developers and
Iocal communities to create partnerships based on equality, fairness
and respect.
u
Introduction..........................................................................................................................................1
TheImportance of Oroville Dam.........................................................................................................2
Historical and Physical Context...............................................................................................2
Project Benefits and Impacts....................................................................................................4
OroviIIe and Flood Management.............................................................................................6
OroAleand FERC Relicensing...............................................................................................7
The Oroville Spillway Incident o£2017..............................................................................................10
The Events of February: On the Edge of Disaster...............................................................10
Consequences..........................................................................................................................14
OrovilleSpillway«Autopsies" ...............................................................................................17
Lessonsto be Learned..........................................................................................................................21
California's Dam Infrastructure is Aging and Needs to Meet Modern Standards................23
Dam Operations Need Periodic Reviews........................................................................28
Floodplain Capacity is Limiting Flood Protection,
Environmental Quality,and Local Economies.............................................. ...34
...............
Peopleand Communities Matter...................................................................................40
Endnotes .................................................................................................................................45
Oroville Dani was headli-ne
news across the world for
a few days in F ebrua.ry
Hundreds of millions of people saw images of two different spillway structures crumbling, and thousands
of Californians evacuated under the threat of an uncontrolled reservoir release. Seven months later,the
images from the Oroville Dam spillway incident are still fresh and relevant for the communities in the
Feather River Basin, and people are striving to respond to the damages with understanding and action.
The roar of the surging Feather River has subsided,but the questions still ring. How did this happen?
What actions will ensure that this never happens again?
Everybody affected by the emergency should have the opportunity to be heard. Eleven public meetings
hosted by the California Department of Water Resources(DWR), as well as many other town halls or
community gatherings,were commendable strides in outreach and public engagement,and more are
planned. Coalitions such as Oroville Strong have emerged to organize engagement of the community and
focus ideas into action. But it is not enough that people are heard and the spillways get fixed. Much more
needs to change.
The authors of this document have spent an average of nearly two decades working in regulatory processes
concerning dams, flood management, hydropower,and river flows. Our objectives in this work focus
mostly on improving the condition of rivers; however,we unquestionably support effective flood protection
for communities behind the levees, and we have experience and insight to offer to this common and
primary interest. We present this document to communities affected by the Oroville Emergency and to
other communities at risk as an opportunity to learn together and to rebuild and reorganize for a safe and
healthy future.
We begin with a review of Oroville Dam,its history,purpose,benefits, and impacts. Next,we look more
closely at flood-control operations and the role of its regulators. We devote a section to describing the
2017 spillway emergencies,from forensics(technical investigation of the incident)to consequences.
Finally,we present lessons-to-be-learned, both at and around Oroville and in other locations in California
where lessons from the
Oroville emergency
and response can help
prepare the way for better
management.
i•.
_F
Oroville Main Spillway
High Flows and Erosion,
Feb. 11,2017.
Aerial view from a DWR drone
shows a 55,000 cfs release
down the main spillway. Despite
existing damage to the main "
spillway,these high flows were .-
released as the reservoir level
exceeded 901 ft elevation, s
and water spilled at 5,000 to v
10,000 cfs over the Oroville
emergency spillway.
Source:Zack Cunningham, DWR.
Historical and Phvsical Context
Rising 770 feet, Oroville Dam is the tallest dam in the
United States. Oroville Dam is located on the Feather
River in the Sierra Nevada foothills. The dam lies 70
river miles upstream of the Feather's confluence with
the Sacramento River and is about four miles east of
the center of the City of Oroville.
Purpose of Darn
Oroville Dam was conceived in 1951 as the main
storage reservoir of the State Water Project(SWP)
and also as a multipurpose dam and reservoir with
aqueducts and pumping plants. Part of original
conception of the SWP included a peripheral canal
around the Sacramento— San Joaquin Delta to
transport water to central and southern California
destinations. The SWP faced strong opposition by
Northern California voters concerned that water that
fell in northern California rightfully"belonged" to
the north. Despite strong differences of opinion, the Oroville Dam.This aerial photograph was taken before 2017
and shows the dam on the right side,the concrete main
Burns-Porter Act to authorize the SWP was placed on spillway in the middle,and the emergency spillway on the
the November 1960 ballot, and voters approved it by left with a vegetated hillside below. Source:MR.
a very slim margin. Butte County,the eventual site of
Oroville Dam,was the only northern California county
in which a majority of votes favored the SWP.1
TI,
N,
III e
WWI,
MEN
ME:: mffmm
Construction of Oroville Dam began in 1961 and was completed in 1968. The reservoir, along with
smaller reservoirs upstream, stores runoff from the Feather River Basin. The California Department of
Water Resources(DWR)operates the SWP, including Oroville Dam, Oroville Reservoir, and adjacent
infrastructure(known collectively as the"Oroville Facilities").z Designated project purposes for the
Oroville Facilities include flood protection,water supply and storage,hydroelectric power generation,
Delta salinity control, fish and wildlife enhancement, and recreation.
(dour Warr is Moved
Feather River water is released from Oroville Reservoir and flows downstream through an afterbay/forebay
reservoir called the Thermalito Diversion Pool in the Feather River channel to the Thermalito Diversion
Dam. From there, the project either diverts water into the Thermalito facilities or releases water into
the"Low-Flow Channel"of the lower Feather River. Some of the water released to Thermalito rejoins
water in the Low-Flow Channel at River Mile 59, and the combined flow in the"High-Flow Channel"
moves down the Feather River toward the Sacramento River(Figure 1 inset). The lower Feather River
downstream of Thermalito flows into the Sacramento River,which flows downstream to the Sacramento-
San Joaquin Delta.
Water(regardless of its source)that reaches the Delta is either diverted for local(largely agricultural)
use, flows through Suisun, San Pablo, and San Francisco bays to the Pacific Ocean, or is diverted by the
Central Valley Project or the State Water Project(SWP). SWP facilities in the Delta include the North
Bay Aqueduct that diverts water to Solano County, The SWP's largest facility is the California Aqueduct.
Most of the water in the California Aqueduct is delivered to the San]oaquin Valley and Southern
California,but some is delivered to the southern Bay Area via the SWP's South Bay Aqueduct(Figure 1).
Releases from
_�. Lake 0mvUle _
Water to ThermaNto Afterbay (Hyatt w spit) .,.
1 t a River
La i0mift
J. x Lav F'lo%v Chamel
i+jeirJutfrdlrlTN$k f f Jvff I .
,. . h' Figure 1:Oroville Dam Facilities
and the CA State Water Project.
Map of the California State Water Project,
C1 with an overview of the Oroville Project
fps s t,r:� (inset). Inset photos are the Hyatt Power-
plant and raceways at the fish hatchery.
fy Source:Oroville Facilities:Det of Water
M .
Resources.SWP:USGS and Shannonl (creative
a commons)
7M.. "
FrOiect B netts and Impacts
The Oroville Dam and Reservoir complex was built for three primary purposes: (1)water supply for
the lower half of the state of California; (2) flood protection for the lower Feather River Basin; and(3)
hydroelectricity. Additional project purposes include Delta salinity control, fish and wildlife enhancement,
and recreation.
Benefits
Water from Oroville Reservoir
� k
' F h
contributes to the State Water
Project's delivery of water for the
irrigation of 755,000 acres in the
southern San Joaquin Valley and for m
a portion of the municipal supplies
for approximately 25 million people.3
DWR signed long-term contracts
with public water agencies,or the
"SWP Contractors," during the
1960s while the SWP was under
construction. These contracts
specify annual water contract
amounts through 2035.4 However, Sunrise over Oroville Reservoir, Butte County. Photo taken Feb.23,2017.
DWR bases actual allocations to Source:Brian Baer, M.
contractors in any given year on
water in storage and actual and predicted runoff;only in the wettest years do contractors receive substantial
parts of their full allocation.$
At the time it signed contracts for water deliveries to the State Water Project contractors, DWR signed a
separate series of contracts with senior water rights holders on the lower Feather River. These"Feather
River Settlement Contracts"specify amounts of water that DWR delivers to these water users whose use
pre-dated the construction of the State Water Project. The Settlement Contractors have priority over all
other water users served by the SWP and are guaranteed full deliveries except during droughts,unlike the
State Water Project contractors.6 Deliveries from Oroville Dam and"excess"water in the Delta to SWP
contractors and Feather River Basin Settlement Contractors have been averaging nine percent of statewide
water use. The Settlement Contractors use about one quarter of the combined deliveries.?
Hydroelectricity from the Oroville-Thermalito facilities furnishes much of the power needed for SWP
pumps on the California Aqueduct;8 however,while the generation capacity and output of the Oroville
Facilities are substantial,the State Water Project as a whole consumes more power pumping water than it
produces with its turbines.
The total cost to build Oroville Dam is estimated at$3 billion dollars in today's dollars.9 The State Water
Project was financed by various sources,the majority from the sale of general obligation and revenue bonds
to be repaid by the SWP contractors.10
Impacts
Despite the significant state and nationwide benefits that the Oroville Facilities provide11,the project
has also caused significant negative impacts in the Feather River watershed. Most notably, Oroville Dam
completely blocks access to 66.9 miles12 of high quality habitat for native anadromous fish,primarily
salmon and steelhead,upstream in the Feather River watershed.
Salmon, steelhead, and sturgeon are now restricted
to the lower Feather River,where the operation of
Oroville Reservoir for water supply purposes seriously
alters natural flows and where rivers have to endure they
hot Central Valley summers. In most years,winter-
spring flows in the lower Feather River are low,when 4
they would be naturally high. Summer flow releases
from Oroville are high in the period when they would
naturally be lower,in part to cool the summer water
temperatures in the Feather River on the Valley floor.
Except in very wet water years,spring conditions in the
Lower Feather River are particularly bad for salmon
rearing,sturgeon spawning, and steelhead spawning
and rearing. The Lower Feather River is designated as
critical habitat for Central Valley spring-run Chinook
salmon and steelhead trout.13 The operation of the
Oroville Facilities affects other native species as well.
Flow fluctuations and rapid stage reductions create poor
conditions for trees along the lower river,negatively
impacting riparian habitat for wildlife.
The construction of Oroville Dam has also had
significant impacts on the local community. The City
of Oroville sits below Oroville Dam. In the view of
many area elected officials,the City once took pride in Salmon smolt stranded during rapid flow decreasesin the Feather River,April 2017.
being home to the"tallest dam in America,"but now Source:J.Stone,Nor-Cal Guides&Sportsmen Assoc.
the City is"not so sure."14 Butte County Counsel
Bruce Alpert reminded DWR on April 13,2017 that
documents dating from before the dam's construction promised to replace resources in areas inundated by
Orovi Ile Reservoir.'5 Lost resources included a power plant at Big Bend,roads,historic sites, the entire
town of Las Plumas, and 41,000 acres of land that could have generated property taxes. Promised benefits
included creation of jobs,economic development, low-cost energy, and road maintenance for Butte
County,but these benefits never materialized.16 The perception of exported resources is a serious concern
for the City of Oroville,where the median income is$36,000 and almost 24% of the residents are below
the poverty line.17
Impacts of the SWP are not limited to local areas. For example,some of the lands that the SWP serves
in the southern San.Joaquin Valley accumulate salt when irrigated. This results in land retirements
and necessitates careful management of applied water to reduce adverse impacts to crops and
groundwater-influenced surface water quality.I s
Orov.111e ,a.nd Flood Management
One promised benefit of Oroville Dam and Reservoir was flood protection for the Lower Feather River
Basin. The U.S.Army Corps of Engineers(Corps)is responsible for regulating flood operations. It has a
flood-control manual for Oroville Dam that was created in 1970 and has not been updated.19 Operators
of Oroville Reservoir use the Oroville flood-control manual to determine how much space to leave in
the reservoir at specified times to sufficiently capture mountain runoff to prevent levee-break flooding
downstream. The manual dedicates as much as 750,000 acre-feet of the 3.5 million acre-foot Oroville
Reservoir as flood space during the height of the winter flood season. Floodwater flow releases from Oroville
Dam are limited to 150,000 cfs. This cap,when combined with releases from New Bullards Bar Dam on the
Yuba River,restricts downstream flows to amounts that the Corps judges to be safe for conveyance between
the levees along the Feather and Yuba Rivers.20
Levee Systern Challenges
Since their construction,the Feather River Basin dams have mostly limited releases as expected. The levee
systems have not performed as well. During a massive flood in 1986,peak inflow to Oroville Reservoir
reached 275,000 cfs, and peak flow releases reached 150,000 cfs.21 The outflow from Oroville Reservoir
combined with flows in the Yuba River to trigger a levee break along the Yuba River,quickly inundating the
towns of Linda and Olivehurst. This flooding occurred even though flows in the Yuba at the time were only
60% of the design capacity of the floodway formed by levees along the Yuba River. The 1986 floods damaged
more than 3,000 homes and destroyed 895 homes 22 in the off-channel flood basin that the levees that broke
were supposed to protect. Losses were estimated at$22 million,and flood concerns remained,despite U.S.
Army Corps and State efforts to
improve the area's levees.
The"New Year's flood"of January
1997, considered one of the largest
floods in the Northern California
record,23 set flood records in the
Feather River Basin.24 Weather
patterns from December 26, 1996
to January 3, 1997 brought warm
tropical precipitation to high snow-
covered elevations,with more than
.'
M�
40 inches of rain falling in 9 days in '
the Feather River Basin. In response
to forecasts, DWR made early flood
releases from Oroville Dam. As the
event proceeded outflows reached
150,000 cfs and then 160,000 efs.2'
As reservoir inflows spiked (briefly
up to a 3 02,000 cfs peak hourly flow), The Oroville Incident, Feb.2017. The west levee of the Feather River does its job
DWR operators believed that"pass east of Highway 99 and near Live Oak in Sutter County.Photo taken February 20,
through"operations were likely, and 1986. Source:Norm Hughes/California Department of Water Resources
the City of Oroville was advised to prepare to evacuate.26 In the end,there was no evacuation from Oroville
and the reservoir peaked at 13.8 feet below full,with more than two hundred thousand acre-feet of unfilled
flood-control space.27 However,based on their own criteria,the cities of Marysville and Yuba City ordered
evacuations as a precaution in case the high waters caused levee failures there.28
A little to the south,the precautions proved to be justified when the Feather River's left bank levee failed
downstream of its confluence with the Yuba River,carrying an at-capacity flood flow. This was not surprising,
since seven years earlier the Corps of Engineers had downgraded the expected performance of this levee
protecting this off-stream flood basin.29 The Feather River break was one of two serious levee breaks in the
Sacramento Valley;30 the other was along the Sutter Bypass west levee. Along the Feather,the 1997 flood caused
flood depths up to 30 feet in some areas. Three people died. Flooding destroyed 322 homes and seriously
damaged 407 more. Local damage from the 1997 floods was estimated to be more than$300 million.31
The Yuba-Feather Workgroup was formed following passage of the Costa-Machado Act of 2000
(Proposition 13)to evaluate environmentally sound methods of achieving greater California flood
protection. The Yuba-Feather Workgroup's efforts led to the 2010 completion of the Feather River Setback
Levee Project(see sidebox),which provides benefits for flood management,fish and wildlife habitat,water
quality,groundwater recharge, open space,and recreation.
x*� '2�:'i�]: y
?v Fssv is rt t+ yY 5 s� s 2
4 l"O %1 C Pl'O '{ `t1.11C
�rV�4� 3£Y y 4ti5 x w a 2
{, FERC Reficens*$
• Gh � .( t� �..�1"'RF^ yg
1 1110,
4 v> tate) }✓_:'a �`?'
J ,, CNC ""t SM1 5t9 ag
^f'�. !,
y6 �� o ,{���t ,€5;
a tt ,q � � x':
� � � ,1 r y i, �� �� t� In accordance with the Federal Power Act,
SE Yq �, t "y r F�.4S.t<�•/vGrC'+�;rLi
�� hydropower projects that are not owned by
G. � ' s f the federal government undergo relicensing
5I'Malemmaa`�n#�rr� � �� �► `� � g g g
s y z� 1,t +, n'ia��v5ksx4 f NTS res •s,•
RM Oroville
fiMx � e � 0 , of their facilities every 30 to 50 years. The
ulaty�rr h 1a, i!��Q ,� .
���s , � ,��,��^� �� ����"' ra r � �� �-����� Oroville Pro ect FERC Project No. 2100,32
asrphc1a � h�04�`iwat �b c Po�alc�¢ �
s �,, a i Es r k �r
�.,,�R- r,�
'3066
was originally licensed in February 1957
>n1t�oA�Orala�af ao Protection
c, 3• , w 'Y"9 0 4 't T
� � »�, •, y° �. -z,,,,., ��- v�� and began a Federal Energy Regulatory
ry eager' r, clra�a or�u� 1 Bio-iIueC,
x� k" � � �s _ Commission(FERC)relicensing process
33
>ff2`�'-.��;• ., �{.�" � .•' .��• °, in December 2
000,when DWRrequested
to use FERC's Alternative Licensing Process
€. Eli (Ap) 34
:.p:Q , • . E . J . The hopes and expectations of a new license
involve operational changes to benefit fish
?•< �; and wildlife, enhancements for recreation,
,Y
improvements to project works, and support
' - for local communities. In the Oroville
„•; relicensing,many of the ALP parties reached
and signed a settlement agreement in 2006.
FERC released a Final Environmental Impact
Statement in 2007. The National Marine
h Fisheries Service published a Biological
Opinion on December 5,2 016,3 5 at which
point there were no apparent remaining
procedural preconditions to issuance of a
new FERC license. Whether FERC will
now delay license issuance is unknown.36
Delay could be expected in light of the
> recent spillway incident and the significant
reconfigurations of the project as compared
to the project that the settlement agreement
envisioned.
r
a9
Settlement Agreement Draws Support and Critics
This long and intensive OrovilIe relicensing and associated processes saw dozens of studies,hundreds of meet-
ings,and hundreds of filings with FERC. The Oroville Settlement Agreement requires flow and water tem-
perature improvements in the Feather River downstream of the dam,habitat enhancement to accommodate
an estimated net increase in spawning habitat for 2,000 to 3,000 spring-run Chinook salmon with additional
benefit for steelhead,and$60 million in recreation and other benefits to the Oroville region. DWR estimates
recreation and other benefits to be$1 billion,including a$60 million Supplemental Benefits Fund to support
projects outside of the license but within the Oroville region.
However,the Settlement did not meet with j Oroville Hydropower
universal approval. The California Sportfish- Facilities. Located
ing Protection Alliance(CSPA)disputed the beneath Oroville Dam,
limitation of the geographic scope of the rel- the Edward Hyatt
Powerplant contains six
icensing,which severed operation for hydro- units,three to pump
power from the operation of the State Water water and three to
Project as a whole.3 7 Plumas and Butte : generate power for the
-_: operational needs of the
counties declined to sign and later initiated DWR facility.Source:
litigation against the Environmental Impact DWR. Ronald B. Robie
Report that DWR issued to support the Water 7hermalito Pumping-
Quality Certification,notably tailing out Generating Plant,
located at the Thermalito
DWR's failure to consider climate change in ;: `< r ti '`
Afterbay,at sunrise
evaluating project hydrology.38 .F 11/23/12. Source:
f Florence Low,DWR.
A number of parties to the relicensing sharply
disputed the suitability of the emergency spill-
way 39 on Oroville Dam—the spillway that
almost failed in 2017 and forced the evacuation
of 188,000 people in the Feather River Basin.
Friends of the River(FOR),the South Yuba
River Citizens League(SYRCL), and the
Sierra Club(collectively,FOR et al.)filed a
Motion to Intervene in the Oroville relicens-
ing on October 17,200540 The intervention
arose after several years of discussion in the
Yuba-Feather Workgroup of ways to improve
flood-safety in the Feather River Basin. These
discussions had been informed by a post-flood assessment with the Corps of Engineers in which it had become
clear that the Corps'Oroville Dam flood-control manual effectively required DWR to have the emergency spill-
way available for operational as well as emergency use 4t
In their intervention,FOR et al.argued that the unarmored and ungated emergency spillway did not have an ac-
tual concrete spillway and was thus in no condition to operate as envisioned in the flood-control manual. Indeed,
in 1997 DWR seemed understandably reluctant to use this emergency/operational spillway,presumably because
of the the danger of hillside erosion and the potential loss of the spillway's foundation that such use could cause.
This reluctance,in turn,could cause DWR to over-ride the manual and release more water than downstream
levees were designed to handle. Given its assigned mission and the damages that might be associated with its use,
FOR et al. argued the emergency spillway did not meet FERC's engineering guidelines and other requirements.
FOR et a].requested that FERC reclassify the emergency spillway as an auiliary spillway and require DWR to
armor this spillway with concrete.42 In their respective interventions,CSPA and American Whitewater(AW)
supported FOR et al.'s arguments relating to these needed flood facility modifications.43
The joint intervention of Sutter County,the City of Yuba, and Levee District 1 (Sutter County et a1.)raised
similar issues and concerns,when they argued that if Oroville Dam could not provide surcharge storage,then
the flood-control manual should increase flood space from 750,000 to 900,000 acre-feet 44
Butte County raised public safety and other issues during the relicensing proceeding,contending that DWR
had not adequately addressed significant public-safety risks associated with the Oroville Dam. Butte County
expressed concerns about heavy rainfall events bringing Oroville Reservoir to possible overflow conditions.45
The County criticized the Oroville Settlement Agreement for failing to address emergency operations,in-
cluding the need to relocate the County's Emergency Operation Center out of the path of a flood in the event
of dam failure or a large outflow from the reservoir.`
FOR et a1.,Sutter County et A,and Butte and Plumas Counties, among others,were unable to reach agree-
ment with DWR and did not sign the Oroville Settlement Agreement. Over the course of the FERC pro-
ceeding,DWR took the position that it is neither necessary nor appropriate to address specific issues related
to dam safety in relicensing.47 Neither DWR nor other entities responsible for the dam indicated how the
public could engage on dam--safety issues if not in relicensing. DWR argued that the geologic conditions at
the emergency spillway had been recently reviewed,and that the review had determined that the spillway was
a safe and stable structure founded on solid bedrock that would not erode.48 The State Water Contractors
and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California(MWD)took the position that"Intervenors'
Flood Control Arguments Are Misdirected and Unsup-
ported,"and that FERC'sdam safety office inSan Fran- FOR, SVRCL and Sierra Club argued
cisco and the Army Corps were the appropriate entities to
49 that the likely damages from use
address flood control.
The Government Responds
of the emergency spillway were
unacceptable. FERC licensing
On May 18,2006, FERC officials asked the San Francisco
Regional Office(SFRO)of its Division of Dam Safety staff proposed to relicense the
and Inspections to review the issues. SFRO issued a memo Oroville Facilities without spillway
that stated there was nothing wrong with the emergency
spillway and the emergency spillway could handle 350,000 modifications.
cubic feet of water per second. The memo further main-
tained that the emergency spillway"would perform as
designed,"and that sediment resulting from erosion would be insignificant.50 It is unclear whether SFRO
contemplated the range of circumstances in which the physical deficiencies of the Oroville Facilities would
be relevant,including the real-world effect of these deficiencies on operations and project lands and facili-
ties. SFRO's memo assured FERC's Division of Hydropower Licensing that"during a rare event[with] the
emergency spillway flowing at its design capacity,spillway operations would not affect reservoir control...."51
However, the memo acknowledged that"during a rare flood event,it is acceptable for the emergency spillway
to sustain significant damage...." FOR et al.,of course,had argued that the likely damages from use of the
spillway were unacceptable.
FERC licensing staff accepted FOR et al.'s characterization of the Corps'operational requirements(750,000
acre-feet of ordinary flood-control reservation,plus another 150,000 acre-feet of surcharge51 reservation);
however,they punted the issue of the emergency spillway's inadequacy to FERC's Division of Safety of Dams
and Inspections,which had already erroneously concluded that the spillway was adequate for its intended use.
FERC licensing staff thus proposed to relicense the Oroville Facilities without spillway modifications.52
The State Water Resources Control Board issued a water quality certification for the Oroville project on De-
cember 15,2010.53 The Board did not take up the request of FOR et al.that it address the water-quality impli-
cations of the use of an erodible hillside to conduct surcharge operations.54
The Events of February:
� i , r�,yv-�5
r� M xs, r2 T
C r13 l G 4
4n the Edge of Disaster �k�� `€ ,E _,� TES F
1 2U i f. / et ( }I.,IEIoLSec5 i }1t f- I �� "` ♦ �' � {5'fl �r 1,.t€'s���.f � 3ti� �-
�z 4 6�F f 5 L f L �Lsr 3 d S GfE zc k
� SFr �y f _J �i.,V:� ; r ����.p��ari�E✓f����,s4 ` :_,L ?�'
The 2017 water year(October 1,2016 through ..a� .s
September 30,2017)is the wettest year on record for
many of the state's important watersheds,allowing rivers and reservoirs to recover from the four preceding
years of drought. By mid-winter,DWR was making flood-control releases to maintain required space in
the reservoir. Between February 6 and 10,2017,almost 13 inches of rain fell in the Feather River Basin,
increasing inflow into Oroville reservoir from 30,000 cfs to over 130,000 cfs on February 7.
Feb a ry is The Mair? SpilkAlay Breaks
While releasing 54,000 cfs down the Oroville gated main spillway(hereinafter"the main spillway")on
February 7,2017,DWR identified an unusual flow pattern and stopped releases to discover a large crater
spanning almost the entire width of the dam's concrete-lined main spillway.55 The main spillway's concrete
lining was completely destroyed in one section,and water was escaping the concrete chute to the side into a
new and soon-to-be massive eroding gully.
Oroville Dam's Main Spillway at
100,000 cfs.An aerial view looking
eastward toward Oroville Dam and
Reservoir.The emergency spillway is
on the left(note eroded red dirt area)
and the damaged mainspillway left of
center.Oroville Dam is on the right.An
outflow of 100,000 cfs travelled down
the main spillway on Feb. 15,2017.
Source:Dale Kolke,DWR.
February 8 . 10: Testing the Broken Main Spillway While the Reservoir Rises
In consultation with FERC and other dam safety agencies,DWR ran test flows down the damaged main
spillway on February 8. On February 9,DWR increased releases down the main spillway,trying to strike a
balance between the rapidly increasing erosion of a gully to the south side of the spillway and risk of loss of
more concrete spillway versus rising reservoir levels and the prospect of using the dam's emergency spillway.
The increasing erosion immediately created a new problem:extremely muddy water entered the Feather
River Fish Hatchery just downstream of the dam and threatened to kill a year's production of over 8 million
juvenile salmon and steelhead. The rapid mobilization and creative action of staff from the California
Department of Fish and Wildlife(DFW)and other agencies were able to keep most of the young fish alive
and transport them to a nearby alternative facility.56
f
Because D4VR was not making releases that it would ordinarily implement,the reservoir flood reservation
continued to be more and more encroached. The reservoir was filling up. While maintaining that it would
not allow the reservoir to rise high enough to spill over the emergency spillway,but facing forecasts for heavy
rain in the watershed,DWR began preparing for possible use of the emergency spillway.57 Concurrent with
increasing concerns over the condition of the main spillway,reservoir inflows peaked at more than 190,000 cfs
from February 8 to 10.
rebruary '11 : Water Pours Over the 'Fmergency Spillway
The water level in Oroville Reservoir reached 901 feet late on Saturday February 11,causing the emergency
spillway to spill water for the first time in history. Once water began flowing over the emergency spillway,
hilltop erosion also began at a level much more severe than DWR expected. No more than 12,000 cfs
flowed over the emergency spillway at any time during its use;however,in less than a day,back-stepping
(headcutting)erosion of the hilltop immediately below the emergency spillway's concrete lip(see photo
below)threatened to undermine and collapse the concrete lip that forms the emergency"spillway."
According to estimates at the time,failure of this lip could have resulted in the sudden loss of the top thirty
feet of water in the reservoir,with catastrophic flooding to communities downstream of the dam.51 The true
amount of reservoir loss,however,could have been greater;it was limited only by the depth of permeable and
erodible rock and soil that formed the foundation of the emergency spillway.
February _ i• —,
%s �3$..sa7 h' '4 i-nE i e s9 ✓���,��' a�y�r'�,u-,1., i s<,: {
In view of the potential for imminent failure of
the concrete portion of the emergency
spillway and part of its foundation,the Butte
County Sheriff issued a mandatory evacuation
order on the afternoon of Sunday,February
' • 12,that included the cities of Oroville and
areas downstream. Downstream,officials
extended the evacuation order or advisories to
parts of Sutter and Yuba counties,including
i3 the cities of Yuba City and Marysville.59 The
evacuation orders covered 188,000 people.
In response to the erosion caused by use of the
;rte `Y emergency spillway,on February 12 DWR
further opened the gates to the main spillway
to allow 100,000 cfs to pass, despite severe
concerns about potential damage to the main
spillway's foundations upstream of the break and
the hillside erosion that using the main spillway
3 � would cause. The increased release from
the main spillway pulled the reservoir down,
reducing flows over the emergency spillway.
Emergency spillway flows stopped a few hours
after the evacuation order. DWR maintained
releases down the main spillway to relieve
Emergency Spillway Flows and Erosion.Water flows over the Emergency Spillway for the first time on Feb. 12,2017,eroding gullies
and destroying a roadway. Source:Kelly M. Grow, MR.
pressure on the emergency spillway foundations and to recover the required reservoir flood reservation
(required empty space in the reservoir to absorb flood inflows), into which high inflows had encroached
during the previous days. DWR implemented"around the clock"rough repairs to erosion damage below
the emergency spillway. The evacuation order remained in effect until Tuesday,February 14,when the Butte
County Sheriff changed it to an evacuation warning.
All of the Oroville Dam complex's outlets were compromised. The emergency spillway was unsafe to use.
The main spillway was broken and,although usable,was contributing massive amounts of sediment to the
Feather River/Oroville Dam power afterbay(Thermalito Diversion Pool). The powerhouse at the base of
Oroville Dam was unusable because of high water in its afterbay caused by debris in the afterbay and because
PG&E had de-energized transmission lines to the powerhouse,whose towers were vulnerable to erosion from
the use of either spillway. The river-valve outlets at the base of the dam were also not operational because of
afterbay backwater conditions.64
Oroville Spillway Timeline - February 2€17
February
4 5 6 7 0 9 10 11 12 13 14 1s 16 17 .18 19 20 . 21 22 .23 24 25
cubidfeet per second(cfs)
to lake Or -
oviife reach.
780,00 ri h rf 190,435cfs,srg pifr6ontly •- - '
_ tnffows
e �
t Be�rvr!ert
' Felt{uory•B t0 j. higher thon jorecasted
12BSnc es or o.�
t600 - •- �..OjHntheeRR�k.1c,... pndotpry _FlaadCantral ,.
River Bpsrn '� acu6ttan ;Spiffwuy
order r5 ouVoWsraised
° issued to 100,000 cfs to
740,0)0 ease Fresswe'.._.
' ® ori Emergency
44 ;spillvlay i........ ....., -_.:
120.01 0
j
100.0 to
3
oodCantmtLIL
s
+Sp ...
ao.o nspecnon r
O
6000
:u
400 1j1
( c
r
,6 >
2o:im
o
lahe level,in feel Q 0211212077.a3:00 am 907.59' s
9oQ 3
Q
830 ........ -
860
yr K
._._.... .... 0. ------
1W
?x
RL
4 5 6` 1 $, 9 10'` 11 12' 13 '-14� 1s i 16 17 16 p 19 '24 21 22 23 '2425
February owc.q:C0£C ,.�•i..: r; s
Source.DWR.
hitp://www.waterca.gov/orovi!!e-Spillway/pdf/202 7/Lake%200roville%20events%20timeline.pdf
DWR reduced flows in the main spillway on February 16 so that it could begin to clear debris(estimated
at 1.7 million cubic yards)61 from the main spillway. Hilltop efforts to stabilize the emergency spillway
continued. When the reservoir level dropped to 854 feet on February 18, DWR reduced flows in the main
spillway to 55,000 efs,and barges began removing debris from the diversion pool at the base of the
spillway.The reservoir elevation was down to 848.95 feet at 11 a.m.on February 20.
Fortunately,the spring weather that followed was not as severe as the early February storm sequence.On an
emergency basis,the erosion below the emergency spillway was filled in.Workers applied a rough concrete
layer over some of the hilltop downhill from the lip of the emergency spillway.Pauses in the use of the main
spillway allowed crews to shotcrete its foundations upstream of the break in order to reduce the likelihood of
further back-stepping erosion up the hill. The channel was dredged enough to resume powerhouse releases
as new transmission line connections were made.The river-valve outlets were made ready for fuller,though
still limited,use.62
2011' Recovery �ind Reconstruction
By late spring,the reconstruction began in
earnest,with the goal of reconstructing the
lower main spillway and its foundations and
making smaller repairs to the upper spillway
during the 2017 construction season. The
plan for the emergency spillway is to build
a cutoff wall by November 1 that would be
Iocated downhill on the hilltop to prevent
headcutting,if used. At a later time,the spillway
lip would receive a roller-compacted-concrete
buttress and a"splash pad"(or 4capron"),63
Transmission towers and powerlines are being
relocated out of harm's way.64
Oroville Dam Main Spillway Repair. Image date:August 9,2017.
Source:Rorence Low,DWR.
According to press accounts,DWR received formal permission to proceed with its 2017 construction
plans from its Division of Safety of Dams and from FERC on July 15 and 17.65 DWR had earlier received
a similar recommendation from its Board of Consultants on June 3.66 The announced follow-on
construction activities do not include a spillway from the hilltop cutoff wall to the Thermalito Diversion
Pool/Feather River downstream.
The reconstruction plans are dynamic,apparently responding to conditions encountered as construction
proceeds. The 2018 schedule may include reconstruction of the upper main spillway and the work described
above immediately below the emergency spillway.
Lessons [.earned?
There is no evidence that DWR has given any serious consideration:to construction of a complete
emergency spillway, although it maintains this is still an option.67 DWR spokespersons reminded citizens
during public meetings that FERC allows emergency spillways to sustain considerable damage when used.68
Damage,in the case of significant use,would involve massive hillside erosion into the downstream channel
with similar environmental and project operational impacts that occurred in 2017.
The Oroville Dam spillway incident demonstrated the legitimacy of concerns about the erodibility of the
hillside that underlies the Oroville Dam complex spillways,the danger of using the emergency spillway,and
the need for upgrades to the physical facilities of the dam complex so that they can be safely and confidently
used. The incident also demonstrated the consequences of not attending to these issues:major damage and
expensive repairs to the dam complex and the vulnerability of nearly 200,000 people in the Feather River
Basin when things go wrong at Oroville Dam.
Though FERC and DWR deemed the emergency spillway able to handle 350,000 cfs and predicted that the
emergency spillway"would perform as designed,s64 the emergency spillway nearly failed during a short-
term flow of only 10,000 cfs. Gross underestimation of erosion potential was not limited to the emergency
spillway. Erosion depths in the new gully alongside the main spillway were an order of magnitude larger
than DWR and SFRO had estimated were possible. No one was prepared for the extent of the damage to
the hillside and what lay upon it,despite years of dam-safety inspections.
Consequences
The 2017 Oroville Dam spillway incident
has gained worldwide attention as one
of the most noteworthy failures, or near
failures,of aCommission-licensed dam Mayor Whlmeler's letter b.,1hd1nef9yi,6nd Commerce
in FERC's history. The near failure of
Subcommittee Hearing(March 15 2x17} describes the following
the emergency spillway caused one of
€mpacts
the largest evacuations in California
history. 185,000 people were told to „ Oegiaded roads ftom thousands of truck taps
leave the Feather River Basin, completely brfnging material to.the dam site
disrupting the lives of people and
communities in the evacuation area and Decline[n real estate transactions and
those communities in the surrounding canceled escrows
area that
received the evacuees. ? i Severe Impa£tS to the Feather R1Verflsl7ery(one ofthe
Fortunately,the incident caused no known mosi important elements of the recreatror�al eeflnor�y} due to'mutl'
fatalities. '; and silt and to abrupt shutoff of flaw (from 50,Od0 cfs E
e to 0'm fust a few hours}
Consequences of the incident include
direct impacts to evacuated people and
communities,indirect effects to those communities,environmental
impacts to the Feather River,and the direct costs for repair and recovery.
Impacts to the residents and communities in the Feather River basin
following the Oroville Dam spillway incident include: (1)emotional
impacts(e.g.stress or trauma from evacuation order and prolonged fear
or reduced sense of safety in the region);(2)financial impacts(e.g.,lost
productivity and wages and potential reductions in real estate values
associated with lands downstream of the dam); (3)economic impacts from
the loss of recreation at Lake Oroville Reservoir and the lower Feather
River(e.g.,boat ramp closure,trail closures,diversion pool closure);and
(4)other regional economic impacts.
Removal of debris from Feather River diversimi pool. Source:aWR
While 2017 was.the wettest year on record, DWR held the lake level of Lake Oroville down
after the spillway incident to ensure that the spillway
s:wauld not be.used for the duration of.,
spring runoff and to allow necessary repairs to get underway. On July 4, 2017, Lake Orovill.e,
was 90 feet below full pool. On the`same date Lake Shasta,was only.10 feet from tete '
top..The reservoir is expected to be drawn down to 700 feet in elevation later this year, an
elevatiowsimilarto the:lowestlevels.durinA the recent drought. .
aril maybe indefinitely: This closure wi reduce.the ndrnber of boat ramp laries.available at
low water by 6O, it will also el[mlriate 400 boat;access parking spaces. 'his oat launch [s.
particularly popular for the bass tournaments that occur at.Lake Qroville Reservoir.
r`
This is an,;$5°! reductio.n in the trans available in the re.creatiori area These trails'_will,remain .
1.aEees.81ble as Tong as,access is closed across tine top of OroVille,Dam. m'sy have-became
very popular with;equestrians; mountain bakers and hikers
T� t
-
The`Diversian Poal offers some of the besf flatwater, non motorized paddling in Butte County
DHFR dust recently completed new,boating access fad!fitles that will„be unavaElable;to
f
A
E
1
1 t
rmany, years,the River{Ieflectfons RV Park has catered to anglers who come
to', is: tli"e
Law Flowf rvhanneln This ear, tts an lin book"in s are down 94% because of the oor fishin
sy l g g P g
canditrons;rn the feather.Rrver as a result of the spillway failures
f
l
Butte County described some of the local impacts in a February 15,2017,filing with FERC.7a Noting many past
warnings concerning dam safety at Oroville,Butte County requested that the Commission focus on public safety
to ensure that 2017"will be a one-time incident." The County noted the severe strain it had experienced
providing"massive levels of emergency response required to adequately address the myriad of public-safety issues
presented by the Oroville Project." Butte County additionally expressed concern about its costs in providing
emergency services. Noting that it had been denied cost reimbursement following the 1997 floods,71 the County
proposed that FERC require DWR to immediately establish and fund its own Public Safety Program for the
Oroville Project,including the necessary law enforcement and other personnel.72 Butte County added that if
DWR was unable to provide such services on its own,the County was willing to negotiate with DWR regarding
reimbursement for the County's costs for providing emergency services for the Oroville Project.73
DWR is well aware that Butte Oroville Mayor Linda Dahhneier sent a letter to the U.S.
House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee Hearing
County is obligated by law and on March 15,2017. She described how virtually all of
moral duty t0 protect the citizens
Oroville's residents were evacuated during the emergency,
and gave a sense of what that meant on the ground. "People
of the County from harm. DWR spent hours trying to flee just a few miles,not knowing if the
spillway would fail,taking them and their loved ones away.
also knows that providing such Had the spillway failed ... life as we know it in the state of
California would forever be changed. This disaster is one
protection and emergency of the worst nightmares any elected official could imagine
services comes at great cost to
for their community."74 Along with the direct costs for
repairs to the Oroville spillway,the Mayor cited incident
the County, and yet DWR, unlike costs that included degraded local roads,canceled escrows
and declines in real estate transactions, and severe impacts
other hydropower dam owners, to recreation,a core sector of the local economy that had
refuses to reimburse the County "come to a standstill.,75
for such costs. The Mayor also described the serious impacts to the
Feather River fishery, one of the important elements of the
Butte County,Filing to FERC, Feb.2017 local recreation economy. These impacts included habitat
buried under mud and silt and fish stranding following the
rapid decrease in flow releases(from 50,000 cfs
to 0 in a few hours). The rapid and extreme
flow reductions also caused massive sloughing
of river banks.
r
Mayor Dahlmeier requested a full analysis of
the impacts of the spillway emergency event
for Oroville and the surrounding areas that
includes the following:(1)the direct and
x,z
indirect impacts to services,infrastructure,
x
and local economies and(2)the impacts to
the Feather River and resulting recreational
impacts(both current and future)for the
region. Mayor Dahlmeier noted in her letter:
"The fact is that the benefits from the Oroville
project are immense. California does not exist Oroville Dam Spillway Erosion, Feb. 11,2017. Water and debris
in its current form without the water from this from the emergency spillway failure flow into the diversion pool just
project." downstream of the dam. Source:Dale Kolke, MR.
Qroville Spillway "Autopsies"
FkRU Det R
On February 13,2017,FERC's headquarters office of the Division of Safety of Dams and Inspections sent
a letter to DWR in response to the spillway incident. The letter required DWR to"initiate immediate
redesign of emergency repair." It also ordered DWR to appoint an independent board of consultants to
advise DWR on measures to weather the ongoing incident, design the reconstruction,and conduct a forensic
investigation on the incident's causes.77 In this letter and following communications,FERC's Division of
Safety of Dams and Inspections has assumed the role of regulator in charge of DWR's recovery efforts.78
Some or perhaps much of the day-to-day communications between DWR and the Board of Consultants
is unavailable to the public,classified under FERC's regulation that allows project operators to withhold
"Critical Energy Infrastructure Information"(CEII)from the public;however,some written communications
have been released to the public, although often in a redacted state or in only summary form.79 The Board
of Consultants'first memo was inadvertently released by FERC in full and gave some early insights that main
spillway foundation conditions were one of the failure mechanisms under consideration.80
C.oi l-is of FuIneers
The U.S.Army Corps of Engineers also briefed its senior management on the likely failure mechanisms,
going into more depth than other early reports. It also offered some speculation whether the problems would
have been discovered by Corps of Engineers inspection programs. The Corps also expressed concern that
its current dam-safety programs might not have caught and corrected some of the design and maintenance
problems that were likely causes of the spillway incident. The briefing was not intended for public release,
but a copy was found and published by the Sacramento Bee.81
# ' Dam S(,�Ifety Or aIti itions
J° The Association of State Dam Safety Officials
and the U.S. Society on Darns has also formed an
Independent Review Panel to work with DWR.82 It
has produced a list of twenty-four candidate physical
failure mechanisms for the main spillway and four
candidate mechanisms for the near failure of the
emergency spillway.83 Presumably,this Panel will
r/-
z ; w have access to CEII information,which it will have
` •k to remove from any public reports it may issue.
r
An aerial view of the diversion pool on the Feather River as
" outflow from the damaged Oroville Dam spillway was being
reduced from 50,000 cubic feet per second (cfs)to zero on
February 27,2017, Source:Date Kolke/California Department
of Water Resources
ii
Summary of Findings from R G Bea, Apnl 9.T 20I -
.�
�� `
KA
. m
d
The gated spillway fatlures are rooted in pervasive design
. ... sand haws dev01,,. by -wR an d include11,
K
• insufficient thickness of spillway base slabs for theYr ' Plli d
design hydraulic conditions (.,to 6 inches at min. . .� r
points) , ;,:�
z
�/ �
f
i' !a'`sr,n
•
Spillway base slabs are not�oined with continuous z
steel reinforcement to pre: lateral and vertical;. i lata s ,ii ay,deb: 27, o as owe decreases laws on the p
SGparatlonS p Ilwayto assess damages
damaged main s i
Source Bill Hus&,Ehico Enterprise Record
.... F..r. f .. t
• Lack of effective water stop barriers ernbeddirig irZ
base slabs to prevent.water intrusion under the 6 seI bs
• Spillway base slabs not designed with two layers of cont�nuaus steel reinforcement to proyEde
safficien flexural strength required for operating conditions
.::
• Ineffective �groiind' ai}chor,,far spillway base sl`al,s to prevent significant lateral and vertical
movements
` �ty -1 r ) v + �Z _s � t'z� '� ��Fyf3 ,f �1 k7�g it `r , rz
z t i J r� s, r M ! �1a ! s c
-e� ' i J I { f ; X J F M �"i z J J .,.,y f r i ,i ,• Y
11
Tho design defects'and flaws were prapagatetl by D1NR during consrbetion of the'spi3llway,and include
G-i(t F C 4- to\t F �'., < SSC"', "S' s. J 1
f y Failure to excavate the native sa)il`s and mcampetent rack ouerlyirig th'e'competent Pock f�undaaaiori
,rs + f s „ ; T �5 tf r , T t f - t e r k� ! !,u r-- t 3 �>c z,S - y� ;� i
r.I+,,• Failure to�reven�spreading gravel used asLpart afthe under slab drainage systerrts ai, ,v, Live'
y �\ ] y ."t F lKi- ,..5 h9. ':C� .� 1 E J- � f•; Y iF- 5 v<
r se�ls'to formextensiup`IKIblaI.I.nkets' ofipermeable mrj.aterials in wb'c�i wager co€tEd'collec and erode
Tk" ,� , E R -a [ r f `.7 ,My s f-.4 <i E ` r jv 9<; -^sic 1,'S j}7a
vc 'i '" tt--� r x 9 t T nii, t U �-}i 1 �7
- Sf�' �„ }S k j` 3 `i �, h i L Y L 4 ?�, i '� J Ft E
+ +�.3�t. f t < a�,;}t y. F i` _ -,- i - t -r.?� '.f�{ (rf [ -3f �, �L . {+ 3 i�, r� i S-
t }' {s �s- E s F ;+s .- 3 t i € li[a ':- -_.�- --�'. =EZ'K r `-f +4U E�-i �`',� �' rf - + ^+> --r
yfK, }!t - '�' k _} [ i2 y,11� w ,�:av�r E E 1 % , ..,.- � , s fi r:,' i a -':�, ,ort l -y r _ t �� }� i r 6 s r
'rhe design and construe iori'defects'and flava were propagated by DWR diAjhgmaMN uteri h 'E'aft e piilwar.y �
-.t t - j _ t 3 _ 3 - 1 'S
o hod include 5 V 1 5 s f i S5 t - � Y i 1 a _o a� P < s S�+' y.
\ ik: �,T_ir' F ] J <: 2 C� '[E 3 aF b1.
?,Y )' 32 F '{ P EH�7 �(k. �� ^S- fid G x eft,
• Repeated ineffective repairsTmade to cracks and�oTO,displacements to revent later stagnationr. and f" 11
r cavitation pressure intrusion under the base slabs wiles si bse vent erosion of the spillway subgrade '�i"
m .� z ; w -t T 2 y f r Y f
f * Allowing,,large trees fa grow a,.U Qe it to the spitlway walls whose roofs could intrude below the base slabsN�4
and intoytheysubgrade+drainage pipres r"IPesuiung in reduced--fib acid plugging ofthe di triage pipes >
2 s, s z E5 €
So�irce R G Bea,Center�o`r Catastrophic Risk Mr.anagement Aprr!17 2017 Pr`e!lmTnary Root Causes Anafysis of Fa1lui�es
of the Oroville Dam Gated Spilfway www dosume�tcloud oig/documenL�/3676G05 Robert Bea Oraville Spillwayatlure Root Cause htm(
_ ter_
.,,::�. ..,�:', i:,. ...., .,
U.C. Berkeley
A team from UC Berkeley is also conducting an independent review based on publically available information
and less official sources knowledgeable about conditions at the dam complex before the spillway incident.
Members of this team have already provided insight into why the country's tallest dam's spillway failed so
spectacularly in the winter of 2017. The team includes one of the country's foremost experts on catastrophic
engineering failures,Professor Emeritus Robert Bea. Bea is a founder of UC Berkeley's Center for
Catastrophic Risk Management and a reviewer of other high-profile disasters,such as Hurricane Katrina
and the BP oil spill; he produced an independent analysis of the dam spillway failure that reveals design and
construction flaws dating back to the 1960s. The first major report from the UC Berkeley group was the
78-page report titled Preliminary Root Causes Analysis of Failures of the Orovillc Dam Gated Spillway;
it consists mostly of photographs and diagrams illustrating his forensic assessments.84 The report's findings
highlight pervasive design defects in the gated spillway, flaws propagated by construction defects and
inadequacies in maintenance.
The Berkeley group has created two additional reports that have focused on the physical causes of the main
spillway failure and also highlighted possible additional and so-far-unaddressed physical problems at the
Oroville Facilities.85 The reports have also discussed institutional and cultural issues that have contributed to
the apparent failures.
Bea says that with every disaster he reviews,he sees a pattern of design,construction,and maintenance
shortcomings. He notes that by the time of the February 2017 spillway releases,the gated spillway had likely
become heavily undermined and its subgrade eroded by previous flood releases. Bea asks a key question in his
analysis: "Why did DWR and the responsible State and Federal regulatory agencies(DWR Division of Safety
of Darns and FERC)allow these root causes to develop and persist during the almost 50-year lifespan of the
gated spillway?"86 Using his experience analyzing past failures in infrastructure,Bea concludes that it is likely
that the"wrong standards and guidelines are being used to requalify many critical infrastructure systems for
continued service."87
x +.
Arm
pMow��wFolyt
tlrwk4
Oroville Forensics. Bea points out the many cracks on the surface of the spillway,as well as trees growing too close
to the edge of the structure in this 2010 satellite image(left). Bea believes a hidden drain pipe proved the critical
weakness along the spillway(right). !mage source:Bea,Root Causes Analysis, using GoogleEarthft and DWR images.
i.l r i � �?5^�r ii�rir F_�,tt. M1ti�L C `t i ' ,i1 HS
that Mlohit Merit More Review
The forensics groups that formed because of the Oroville spillways incident put a series of highly visible
spillway design and inspection problems into the national headlines,but there have been previous incidents
at the Oroville Facilities. In 2009,there was a serious incident in the river-valve outlet chamber.88 An
energy dispersion ring, designed by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and installed when the powerhouse
was constructed,had been damaged in 1968 and ultimately removed in the spring of 2009. The importance
of its presence for safe operations of the valve had been confirmed by U.C.Davis engineers in a D-VVR-
commissioned study that began in the early 1990s.89 In spite of this,later in 2009 workers were ordered to
test the system by fully opening the valves,resulting in vacuum pressures that detached a break-away wall,
seriously injuring one worker and endangering others in the chamber.90 The valve system and control
functions have been refurbished,but operating restrictions preventing its full design use indicate that a new
energy dispersion ring has not yet been installed. Downstream in November 2012,the Ronald B.Robie
(Thermalito)pumping/generating plant at the Oroville Facilities was destroyed by fire.91 It has not yet
been fully reconstructed.
u
c
The Oroville Incident, Feb.2017.As the Oroville Reservoir main spillwaycrumbles,mud,rocks and concrete flow in to the
Feather River on February 8,2017.Source:Bili Husa, Chico Enterprise-Record.
Currexltly constructed
flood and water
management systems
are built on lessons learned and relearned from
0 , the past. For example,the first failed dams in the
early 1900s on the Colorado River created the
77
incentive for engineering advances that led to the
construction of 726-foot-tall Hoover Dam in 1935. More recently,a levee breach on the Cosumnes River
created the"Accidental Forest"and,following research and education, revealed a wealth of benefits from
reconnected floodplain.
Analysis of the Oroville spillway incident will contribute its own expansion of knowledge and experience.
Insights from Oroville will be valuable,not only for understanding the causes of the spillway failures and
means to reduce such risks in the future,but for a variety of applications in water resources management and
community interaction with flood-control and hydropower projects.
The following four"take-away"lessons provide a framework for ongoing learning from the Oroville Dam
spillway incident of 2017.
`I
F
r
a
•r
Damaged Main Spillway, Feb.27,2017• An aerial view of the damaged main spillway and resulting debris field. Flows were
reduced from 60,000 efs to zero on Feb.27 to allow reduction of the water elevation in the diversion pool,removal of debris,and
re-initiation of power generation at the Edward Hyatt powerhouse. Source:Dale Kolke,DWR.
`,zY
Lesson Recommendations Summary
k 4, Complete planned reconstruction of the main Oroville spillway and
relocation of powerline transmission towers and lines.
Plan-a real auxili-ary/emergeDcy spillway that does not risk large
OM
quantities of hillside soil and rock being eroded into the Feather
'Z"
River.
Conduct a thorough review of the Oroville Dam complex's physical
deficiencies and undertake appropriate upgrades.
wm
Systematically inspect dams across California and the U.S. to meet
Pry y` u� ,.;US upgraded design and maintenance standards and es.
• Update flood-control manuals for the Feather and Yuba River
�i Basins.
W".
• Re-evaluate the duration and character of floods modeled to exist in
the future and make necessary modifications.
Provide public involvement in the manual update process.
Require the Army Corps to review and update flood manuals for all
Jurisdictional dams on a defined schedule.
Require FERC to include dam safety in hydropower relicensing.
Fund and implement the Central Valley Flood Protection Plan.
M D Assemble diverse stakeholders to define and plan floodplain
improvements.
al
Evaluate and design multi-benefit floodplain projects(e.g.,setback
levees)that increase flood protection while creating more floodplain
habitat.
ON
Develop and implement plans to create greater floodway and
floodplain capacity in the San Joaquin Basin.
• Complete forensic investigations and release to the public.
• Conduct comprehensive assessment of impacts to the Oroville and
adjacent communities from 2017 spillway incidents.
People and • Establish new opportunities for mitigation and community
• development.
conrimumues •
Develop and make public new inundation maps and Emergency
mal ter Action Plans.
• Reform the relationships between out-of-area water developers and
local communities to create partnerships based on equality, fairness,
and respect.
22
's.0 _ N..}SII s.:'
4-Ills
F R
in the Oroville Dam Complex's ability to accomplish its
missions safely. The shortfalls go back to design,increasing
A age,insufficient maintenance, and failure to re-examine the
m dam complex with a fresh and modern engineering eye.
A Although the forensic investigations have only reached
preliminary conclusions,most of the candidate failure
mechanisms(e.g.drainage problems,thin concrete,and
insufficient anchoring)go back to initial design and construction choices.And yet many of these problems
tend to get worse with time. Maintenance issues,such as incomplete repair of concrete cracks,can increase
vulnerabilities of the concrete to cavitation and can allow spillway flows to reach erodible foundations below
the spillway.
The main spillway break and the extent
of the hillside erosion near and below it
demonstrated errors in previous geotechnical
assessments. In the case of the emergency
spillway,erroneous assessments may have
nearly led to the catastrophic loss of the upper
n part of the reservoir. Yet post-assessment
1, commentary by geologists(and plant ecologists
looking at the generously vegetated hillside)
expresses a degree of bewilderment regarding
why this broken,battered,and weathered
geologic unit should have ever been expected
g
�
to resist energyhi hflassin over it.92
gows passing
Reconstruction on a Tight Timeline
Main Spillway Erosion:A view of the erosion cavity at the DWR has announced that it intends to
Oroville main spillway—an infrastructural failure combining
design,construction and maintenance issues.May 1,2017. rebuild the main spillway with an eye to
Source:Mike Burns,DWR. addressing all the identified candidate failure
mechanisms. This approach is necessary
because the results of the forensic reviews won't be complete until after most of the 2017 construction
season. The reconstruction of the main spillway and its foundations and work expected on the emergency
spillway hilltop require a fast pace so that the main spillway can be operational and a cutoff wall below the
emergency spillway in place before the next flood season. Tight construction deadlines are likely to lead
to compromises in the extent of foundation work,quality of roller-compacted concrete,and the various
concretes that are intended to be placed at the Oroville Facilities. Thus,shortcomings in design,inspections,
and construction quality may be inevitable.
As noted earlier,DWR's plans for improving the emergency spillway do not include a concrete spillway to
prevent mobilization of erodible hillside soil and rock.
}sX
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i- . NVitier View
The Oroville incident highlights the need to act now to maintain and upgrade California's and the nation's
dam infrastructure. The average age of the country's 90,580 dams is 56 years,with 15,500 dams deemed
"high-hazard potential dams."93 The American Society of Civil Engineers(ASCE)gave the country's dams
,
an average grade of"D"and estimated a
�
' funding need of at least$45 billion to repair
¢ y critical aging high-hazard dams.
Faced with the serious consequences
of neglect,California's dam operators
;,:
need to reinvest in maintenance,repair,
E
reconstruction, and management of existing
water and flood dam infrastructure. In
addition to making this infrastructure safer
and more resilient,there are numerous
opportunities for improvements to existing
infrastructure,such as the addition of low-
level spillways and other flood release works.
Isabella Darn on the Kern River gets a major seismic upgrade by the Improvements can address a number of
Army Corps of Engineers to reduce the risk of dam failure.
Source:www.wikiwand.com/en/lsabe!!a_Dam opportunities,such as the following: enhance
effective flood storage capacity,reduce peak
flood levels,mitigate environmental impacts, or provide a back-up insurance policy when existing project
works malfunction or fail.
Beyond Oroville
Oroville Dam is far from having the only aging dam infrastructure that has problems or is in need of
improvements. The U.S.Bureau of Reclamation's Folsom Dam is currently undergoing a$1.3 billion
upgrade. The authorized work at Folsom will:improve its seismic safety and flood-control performance;
increase its spillway capacity to handle modern assessments of hypothetical extreme floods("PMFs")that
are used in the U.S. and other countries to size spillways; address inadequacies related to static loading
(reservoir weight/pressure against the concrete dam structure); increase the effective size of the flood pool;
and install more effective powerhouse inlets that provide better water temperatures to downstream fisheries.
The Corps of Engineers recently(2 004)rebuilt the spillway infrastructure at Terminus Dam on the Kaweah
River so that the hypothetical flows in a newly assessed PMF there would not endanger the dam.94 The
Corps is also giving Isabella Dam on the Kern River a major seismic upgrade after imposing reservoir-level
controls to reduce the risk of dam failure.95
The Corps of Engineers has a webpage graphic devoted to its assessments of seismic,over-topping, and
seepage failure risks. Regrettably,the page does not appear to be regularly updated,but as of December
2013,ten of its dams(including Isabella Dam)in or affecting the Central Valley were conditionally,
potentially, or confirmed unsafe. Reconstruction of these dams is identified as high priority,urgent,or
urgent and compelling.96
Engineering judgments about seismic safety can vary with time,even prompting internal and public
controversy. The Corps'Success Dam on the Tule River is built on sediments that the Corps warned could
liquefy and cause dam failure,according to their own seismic analysis initiated in 1992. In 2006,the Corps
imposed locally unpopular operating restrictions on the dam to prevent it from filling. In 2014,on the basis
of another analysis,the operating restrictions were eliminated,and in 2017,the Corps even approved the
placement of sandbags on the spillway to allow the reservoir to overfill.47
It is important to note that there are also dams not owned by the Corps of Engineers that have known or
suspected serious potential problems(mostly seismic),but for which final engineering assessments have not
been completed.Thus,they have neither undergone refit nor had operating restrictions imposed to reduce
the risk of dam failure. These include the U.S.Bureau of Reclamation's giant San Luis Dam and DWR's
Clifton Court Forebay. Reclamation's giant Trinity Dam has outlet works that could be compromised by
landslides from seismic events. It also lacks an emergency spillway.98 DWR,as a result of an order from
Governor Jerry Brown,is conducting a spillway review of State Water Project facilities,beginning with
Pyramid Dam's gated spillway. The
'i' a
:5:�?F fir•'-^+' � .. y '�cv%il,'�..� 1•">E �tYn .
Governor has also proposed legislation
G :: •c:. = :T • ;• rc>
;#r?Mfi y �^•.u-
e level of inspections § �J h §
to increase
-he ;,s a G s!
- ,
for the some 1,200 dams under the �..�,: �016"
i��- �M _ �•'�' s
jurisdiction of DWR's Division of
Safety of Dams(DSOD). Mx—VU
Spillway reviews seem to be the current
focus. For example,although the
E
detailed orders and any findings are .�
unavailable to the
P ublic because theyr a n wmz� z <f f
. �•� �`i ,gym z �:f
�,��i� �YY
are classified as CEII,FERC's Division 3- , Y f� y
of Dam Safety and Inspections has ty S A U.1 � ��:�;°.�
been ordering a large number of dam
and spillway inspections throughout
California as a direct result of the
Oroville Dam spillway incident.100
DWR's Division of Safety of Dams has
ordered spillway inspections of 93 dams
after a preliminary review 101
t.
4
a
c
a � fir. 't rol qi
7 .3
rw
I
! R
9
7
i ��
Dam-safety Instl'tutions Matter
But a wider focus is also important. Dam-safety regulators need to confront and correct their failures at
Oroville Dam,and presumably at other dams across the country too. The Sacramento Bee reported a
noteworthy set of remarks at a conference of the American Society of Civil Engineers in Sacramento after the
spillway incident. According to the Bee, Regional Engineer Frank Blackett of FERC's Division of Safety of
Dams and Inspections:
listed the array of state and federal inspectors who visited Oroville Damn over the years. All of
them,he said,missed signs that could have foreshadowed the gaping crater forming in the
dam's concrete spillway in early February,eventually leading to the frantic evacuation of 188,000
people....
The Bee also noted that'[ijn 2014, an inspection"actually dismissed the plausibility"of failures arising from
erosion at the emergency spillway"or a failure of the concrete chute"in the main spillway,said Mark
Andersen, a DWR acting deputy director. "So clearly...we need to look institutionally at how we are doing
these inspections and what we're learning from them,"Andersen said.""'
Paying for It
And there is always the question of money. Owners of dams clearly have a responsibility to have the financial
wherewithal to undertake routine maintenance and inspections and to implement any necessary changes,
repairs,or even major reconstructions that are identified by the owners or dam-safety officials. Dams are
expensive to own and operate and,in some cases,very costly to remove responsibly. The beneficiaries
of dams need to recognize that with the benefits there are costs that they must assume. Unsafe dams are
unacceptable;so is a financial strategy of hoping that general taxpayers will assume the financial burdens of
dam maintenance,rehabilitation,reconstruction,and liabilities.
Finally, California's dam owners should also view the Oroville Dam spillway incident as a wake-up call
regarding the need to identify and implement a suite of necessary infrastructure improvements for their dams.
Dam owners can make some of these improvements as part of facility relicensing processes,as Yuba County
Water Agency has elected to do at New Bullards Bar Reservoir(see sidebox,previous page).
Contractors remove
sediment and debris
from the Feather River
below the damaged
main spillway.
Photo taken on March
9,2017.Approximately
715,000 cubic yards
of material were removed � s
from the debris ` '
pile by this date.
Source:[rale Kolke/
California Department of
Water Resources.
IS the F:llost
f
i n i
.C� �. ft , i/1.E1.�lC 1.1 t. L l,.l-nnt
in North America,with alternating periods of dry and wet
years and extreme cases of both.103 California's climate
}1 ,
fluctuations are anticipated to become even greater as global
temperatures rise from climate change. Higher temperatures
cause precipitation to arrive as rain instead of snow and cause
snowpacks to melt quickly.
Fortunately,planners designed Sacramento Valley dams and
reservoirs with flood-control responsibilities to handle very large runoff events. Many Sacramento Valley
dams,including Oroville,can successfully prevent damaging flood releases for runoff events greater than
those that have occurred in the historic record. And yet the trend of higher temperatures,which can mean
wetter storms,make a case for updating and optimizing flood-control operations.104
,f h farnia
{k illr[gln�Lail
._,,..�� .......�...� ., ,... ..... _.._ :. .�.:.. .......... ......._ ..._.�� Climate. Projections
C.ert?tdlhprrr$ivrra Cenka!"a�rra °autt3am$:rcre include Intensified
Aanl�n Sic#n NwtFsam Sierq
extreme precipitation
SNOW events,with more rain
SNOW ex and less snow,and
' �• Mmore rapid snowmelt.
ss
Source:CVFPP 2017
Update
Food Maflriak Matter
Minimum flood-control operations are usually governed by U.S.Army Corps of Engineers flood-control
manuals.lo5 These manuals prescribe the seasons of flood operations,how much and when reservoir empty
space in reservoirs is required,how much to release,and when to transition from managed flood-control
releases to dam-safety releases designed to prevent dam failure rather than to prevent levee-break flooding
downstream.
The use of the Oroville Dam emergency spillway and its near failure was not a failure of the Corps flood-
control manual. Rather,it resulted from the filling of the reservoir when DWR made an emergency
departure from the flood-control manual and limited releases while officials inspected the broken spillway.
Nevertheless,the Yuba and Feather River Basin manuals(one for New Bullards Dam,the other for Oroville
Dam)are in need of major updates. These manuals were created in 1972 and 1970 respectively and assumed
the construction of a major additional dam on the Yuba River. Operations for floods that could be regulated
and would have to use the emergency spillway get but one paragraph and one chart in the Oroville Dam
manual. Also,these manuals expect coordination with each other's dam operators but provide little direction
on how to do this.
Updates to the flood-control manuals for the Feather and Yuba rivers have been contemplated for decades,
but no obvious progress has been made.The following recommendations should guide the long-overdue
updates of these manuals.
a
n
The Oroville Dam manual should not assume that a Marysville Dam exists.The existing manual in large part
does, making the emergency spillway release diagram out of date.106
The new Oroville Dam manual's design flood should assume surcharge operations for the purpose of
controlling the Reservoir Design-Flood (the largest inflow the dam is expected to successfully regulate for flood-
control purposes) as it does now. 107
If surcharge operations remain unsafe because of lack of a full emergency spillway,the new manual for
Oroville should require interim operational mitigation measures such as a larger below-spillway flood
reservation.
The Oroville Dam Emergency Spillway Release Diagram and rules should carefully address transitioning from
reservoir design floods to dam-safety spillway design floods, especially if surcharge operations remain an
operational feature of the manual.108
The Oroville and New Bullards Bar manuals should address circumstances such as those that occurred in
1997 when levees in the system were known.to be unable to reliably accommodate their design flows.
The manuals should re-evaluate the duration and character of floods modeled to exist in the future and make
necessary modifications within the authority of the Corps and the dams'owners.109
Forecast-influenced operations for both reservoirs should implement early releases,such as those DWR made
in 1997,to more easily manage very high inflows.110
The two manuals should expect and provide guidance for coordinated operations between Oroville and New
Bullards Dams.
The manuals should emphasize the importance of competent physical works needed to accomplish
operational requirements.
The manuals should emphasize the importance of preserving flood=control space in the reservoirs.
Periodic (perhaps decadal) reviews should be required, and the Corps should revise or reissue manuals when
new infrastructure alleviates spillway constraints(e.g.YCWA's proposed new spillways at New Bullards Bar).
Environmental impacts of floodwater management operations should be reviewed and feasible mitigation
implemented.
A major Sacramento River Basin flood-control manual,the manual for Folsom Dam, is in the last stages of
completion. The manuals for Oroville and New Bullards Bar dams should draw on the new Folsom Dam
manual substantively and thematically as appropriate.
e
The operations of the reservoirs in the Yuba and Feather watersheds are not alone in needing review.
Forecast-influenced operations offer some promise of mitigating some of the impacts of a warming earth and
sky. If coordinated well with available capacity in downstream floodways,early releases can improve current
floodwater-management performance. Conditional storage in flood reservations can improve water-supply
performance and not impair floodwater-management performance if dam operators have the capability and
obligation to safely and reliably release excess water when meteorological conditions dictate.
San Joaquin Basin reservoirs,unlike Sacramento Basin reservoirs,manage two different kinds of floods:
rainfloods(from rain)and spring/early summer snowmelt floods. But it's rainfloods that have the planners'focus.
It is likely that in the future,very heavy rainfall will reach higher elevations than it has historically,increasing
the magnitude of immediate runoff 111 Unfortunately,unlike in the Sacramento River Basin, flood releases
from major reservoirs above the San Joaquin Valley are highly constrained by floodways that have capacities
much smaller than potential reservoir inflows.112 This is reflected in the physical infrastructure of the large
dams in the basin:their low-level outlet capabilities are limited,and their spillways can only make large
releases when reservoir levels are high. This means that many San Joaquin Basin dams cannot make an early
release much in excess of their constrained floodways before their flood pools are encroached,limiting their
capacity to take full advantage of forecast-influenced operations and increasing their chances of filling and spilling
large inflows.
The. Tale of Two Floods
,v
Governor Wilson's 1997 Flood
Emergency Action Team
recommended studies to increase
maximum controlled flood flows
in the lower Tuolumne River from
9,000 cfs to 20,000 cfs to better
control reservoir levels at Don Pedro 'x'`
Reservoir and reduce the frequency
and volume of spills from both
rainfloods and snowmelt floods.113
If all of its low-level outlets are
functioning, a 20,000 cfs outflow
is close to their capacity and easily
within the capacity of the spillway Flows leaving the damaged Oroville Main Spillway enter the diversion pool of the
gates if the reservoir has risen to Feather River,April 14, 2017, Source:Kelly M. Grow,DWR.
within thirty feet of the normal
maximum level. 114 The recommendation has not been implemented—until this year,although just as a trial.
The lessons of these two flood years are best described as the tale of two floods. In 1997, following the
existing manual,'15 operators were unable to prevent Don Pedro Reservoir from slowly encroaching into its
required flood-control space while they kept flows below the 9,000 efs target in Modesto. But that meant
that when heavy rains continued the reservoir filled and then spilled a damaging 50,000 efs.116 In 2017,when
reservoir operators were faced with a nearly full reservoir they expected to fall and spill,they requested and
received special permission from the Corps of Engineers to exceed the 9,000 cfs downstream flow target.
Operators released 18,000 efs, declining to 16,000 and 14,500 cfs for six days. Reservoir operators calculated
that without those special releases,the reservoir would have spilled over the unlined emergency spillway
hillside at 31,000 cfs.117 The trial worked. The 2017 flood release was less damaging than the one in 1997.
0
RisIdng 'it
There are also some cautionary lessons from the Oroville spillway incident and this year's operational
experience. Based on historical runoff events,the operators at the major dam to the south of Don Pedro,
the New Exchequer Dam,have proposed to reduce their flood-control space and to wall off much of their
emergency spillway since they calculate that neither is needed. They have not proposed to expand their
downstream floodway,something that could mitigate for their proposed loss of reservoir flood-control space.
They propose to route any flood flows that might have required the use of their emergency spillway through
their gated spillway based on the assumption that the gates will always operate properly.
These conceptual ideas have garnered much local popular support. However,they have not been presented
to flood-management and dam-safety officials,who are unlikely to find them prudent in confronting a
warmer world where infrastructure redundancy is an increasingly important requirement for dam safety.' S
roue Ch ices in the end, climate reality
Given the challenges of floodwater management in the will require floodplain
San Joaquin River Basin,it is fortunate that many cities,
such as most of Modesto, are on comparatively high management ...
ground and are not menaced by full reservoirs with high '
inflows. For lands and the few smaller communities in to accommodate
the basin not on higher ground,changes in reservoir
management can only offer limited protection since inevitable fIooding
operators of reservoirs with small downstream floodways
will still encounter weather conditions when they are N n the appropriate
unable to prevent these reservoirs from being significantly
encroached----and often For long periods—during the unpopulated places.
flood season.
Changes in reservoir management can be difficult. For
example,larger flood reservations are not popular with
the owners of San Joaquin River Basin dams,who can and often do place a higher priority on water deliveries
than better floodwater management. And dam owners usually avoid working for larger floodways and
dedicated floodplain,which involve costs and the necessity to work with governments with land-use powers
and many individual landowners.
Still,to mitigate the effects of climate change,DWR is modeling combinations of larger objective releases,
forecast-influenced operations,forecast-coordinated operations,and groundwater-recharge operations
accompanied by larger flood reservations.'19 For in the end,climate reality will require floodplain
management and land management actions in the San Joaquin Valley to accommodate inevitable flooding in
the appropriate unpopulated places.120
INO �
U
.7 c
FERC needs to modernize the relicensing process so that it evaluates project effects in
the context of present and future climate variation. FERC relicensing proceedings do
not currently require study and mitigation of hydrological conditions under changed
climate conditions. The events at Oroville should motivate FERC to change this policy.
At present, FERC relicensing presents one of the few opportunities for the public and
resource agencies to advocate for improvements to dam operations. FERC needs to
expand its existing relicensing process to include consideration of dam safety and
flood-control operations. Within this expansion, FERC needs to sort through how it
will meaningfully allow discussion and evaluation of dam safety and flood control in
relicensing in the context of CEII constraints.
The Army Corps should establish scheduled, recurring reviews of flood-control
operations at all its dams, with opportunities for public input and participation similar
to those that FERC relicensing provides. One option is for any new flood-control
manual to explicitly define within it the required substance, timeline, and process of
periodic reviews of the manual.
The Corps, DWR, and dam operators need to find a way to increase flood-space
requirements or practices in watersheds with limited flood reservations and as
recommended in the Central Valley Flood Protection Plan or its Basin-Wide Feasibility
Studies.
The federal government needs to advance weather forecast technology with applied
research and tools as a matter of public safety. The federal government should
increase funding to improve forecasting technology and should expand programs that
incorporate and develop climate research programs such as those at the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the National Weather Service.
San Joaquin flood managers should explore more formal adoption of forecast-influenced
operations, recognizing that floodway and downstream floodplain capacity constraints, as well
as the distance to the ocean, make revisions to manuals less beneficial than for Sacramento
Valley reservoirs.
Coordinated operations among reservoirs are important in this basin since the San Joaquin
River has, in a formal sense, less floodway capacity than its tributaries. Manuals should
provide guidance on such coordinated operations, including recommendations on how to
prioritize and make tough decisions.
As with manuals in the Sacramento watershed, the new San Joaquin manuals should provide
some direction on how dam operators should respond to impairments to downstream
infrastructure.
The manuals should re-evaluate the character of expected rain and snowmelt floods.
Provisions should be explicit for updating manuals as conditions change. Updates should not
be opportunities to reduce floodwater management performance of dams.
New manuals should consider provisions for making releases greater than current objective
releases to avoid reservoir-filling events that may result in still larger releases. The varying
degrees of vulnerable infrastructure downstream should help to provide a framework for
this kind of adjustments to manuals. Darn operators and owners must be sure that people
downstream understand the potential consequences of larger but necessary releases in the
future.
New manuals should emphasize the importance of the full range of darn outlet.
infrastructure (river outlets, powerhouses, gated and ungated spillways). Dam infrastructure
that historically has seen only rare or occasional use will likely see more use in a warmer
world.
Ao1. )Side theSacramento
'SCFa enth71'..
River and Feather [ Ver �v,.' 9,��w�f.,'� •,a>��:�,:�zv,. _��M'�`"�'r fi"`r;•�,��-
,
are low-lying lands that are a relict from the low sea
y' g E d _ _
INR
levels of the ice ages. These basins are the backbone of Y
the Sacramento Valley's flood-control system,including
what flood-control engineers call bypasses, and they areff WTO,
accommodating far more flood flows than the Sacramento @ _-
River itself.
But some of these flood basins are also places located
behind the Valley's extensive levee system,where farms
and cities are situated. Although some of these basins can be protected,the geographic reality is that they
will always be vulnerable to some risk of catastrophic flooding. Planning for recovery from flooding(both
financial and how best to rebuild or relocate)should be part of the way of life for these areas.
There has been an additional cost to the"reclamation"of the Valley. Functional floodplains provide an example
of how nature functions as a series of inter-related systems. Floodplains do much more than provide storage
areas for high flows. While holding high floodwaters,floodplains recharge groundwater,provide exceptional
fish habitat,generate healthy riparian forests,and filter water for measurable water quality benefits.
Today, levees disconnect many of our rivers from their floodplains. Reduction of natural seasonal floodplain
inundation has resulted in serious impacts to ecological communities. Disconnecting floodplain has
contributed to the extinction risk for native fishes and has vastly reduced the regeneration of the sycamore and
valley oak trees that historically grew in expansive groves.
The Corps of Engineers and the Central Valley Flood Protection Board(formerly the Reclamation Board),
along with local reclamation and levee districts,other local governments,and ultimately,the taxpayers,are
responsible for the design,maintenance,rehabilitation, and improvements of the Sacramento and San Joaquin
River Basin flood-control systems.
Increasingly, the state's Central Valley Flood Protection Board and DWR have become responsible for
planning in this system,rather than the Army Corps of Engineers. Major improvements are planned in
the Sacramento Valley,with the centerpiece being an expansion of the Yolo Bypass and the weirs that allow
Feather River/Sutter Bypass and American River flood flows into the Yolo Basin Bypass. This is expected to
lower flood flow stages(water levels)significantly in the Feather River Basin,in addition to augmenting the
capacity of the Sacramento River flood-protection system. Habitat improvements within the footprint of the
Valley flood-control systems are also contemplated.
rvkg
al
)0
Floodplain Benefits.Two images showing some of the many floodplain benefits,including food sources for:
(1)Snow geese over Sacramento valley wetlands. Source:Brocken lnaglory, ftimedia Commons. (2)"Floodplain fatties"—juvenile
Chinook salmon from the Feather River(top)and Knaggs Ranch floodplain habitat(bottom)Feb.23,2014. Source:CafTrout.
Feather River Basin. - A Leader
Levees surround both the Feather and Yuba rivers;but unlike the levees along the rivers in the San Joaquin
River Basin and along much of the Sacramento River,the levees along the Feather and Yuba are set back from
the river channels. Setting back levees protects them somewhat from erosive flows and allows the Feather
and Yuba rivers to convey volumes of floodwater that could otherwise overtop Qroville and New Bullards Bar
dams.
That said,river flows found their way through or under the levees in the great floods of the last half of the
twentieth century. In response,local,state,and federal agencies have worked together,often in collabora-
tion with environmental groups,to modify the system. Indeed,this is the only basin where significant
relocations of"project"levees have occurred.121 Two river bends,Star and Shanghai, have been widened
(straightened). The lower Bear River levees near the confluence with the Feather River,along with levees
along a reach of the Feather River,have been set back.
1 j In addition,many miles of levees have been stabilized
�,
U V e will never be able with slurry walls,drainage systems, and supporting
embankments. This work has increased system
to restore endangered reliability.These levee and other flood-control
improvements didn't come about without major
salmon populations engagement among flood-control officials,interested
environmental groups, and the commitment of public
if we d o n{t f rst recto re and sometimes other funds.
the f l o o d p l a i n s which A good example of collaboration followed the
1997 flood and involved engagement by flood-
feed
ood-
feed them. control agencies,DWR, CALFED agencies, and
environmental groups to examine how to improve
Jacob Katz, Central Valley Senior Scientist,Ph.D., CalTrout flood control along with the river environment.
Known as the Yuba-Feather River Workgroup,it
l
The Bear River Setback Levee provides 625 acres if restored floodplain area.Source Eric Ginney/Zeke Lnnder.
cast the net wide: it evaluated dam improvements,levee setbacks,and shoring up existing levees. All the
improvements that have been constructed and most of those still on the drawing boards were identified,
probed, and discussed at the workgroup. The physical deficiencies at Oroville Dam were not left out of the
discussions either.
The Workgroup faded away as projects shifted to more intense planning,design,and construction,and when
some participants were unsuccessful in persuading others to recognize and fix the problems at Oroville Dam.
But the working relationships among these and other parties have continued through the years,particularly
as the Central Valley Flood Protection Board fashioned its 2012 Central Valley Flood Protection Plan and
its 2017 update. These
plans feature multi- r �'
N
benefit projects(flood
protection,recreation, _y
groundwater recharge,
and environmental)to
improve the backbone of
the mainstem river levee
and bypass system.
In considering m
recommendations for
flood control, floodplain
improvements,and
land-use planning,the
difficulty is as much
in defining the actors
that need to make these
improvements as what „
the improvements must Inundated orchard in the Feather River floodplain and new sediment deposits,
be. DWR is the entity March 2017. Source:J.Stone, Nor-Cal Guides&Sportsmen Assoc.
that needs to repair and
improve the spillways
at Oroville Dam. However,in the floodways downstream,there are overlapping jurisdictions,diverse
landowners,and wide-ranging interests. While some individual entities have defined roles and responsibilities
in the floodways,there would be substantial benefit and efficiency if multiple entities acted together in
coordination to define and implement improvements.
Flood-protection and environmental problems require long and persistent personal engagement. When
regulatory roles and responsibilities are not clearly defined,it is often individuals with longstanding personal
relationships that conceive, design and implement projects. Whether a new forum or venue for coordination
defines itself as a successor to the Yuba-Feather Workgroup,there are many opportunities for productive
collaboration in the watershed. Recent pilot experiments in rearing juvenile salmon in the upper Yolo Bypass
should be of particular interest to environmental and fisheries advocates working on the Feather and Yuba
rivers.122
Floodphuns Provide Multiple 'Benefits
Restoring"natural flood protection infrastructure"by reconnecting rivers-and floodplains also restores
myriad other key benefits like recharged groundwater,wetlands for native species,recreational space,and
clean filtered water. Examples of such multi-benefit flood-management solutions include:
The Yolo Bypass
The recent events at Oroville
dam highlight the vital role of the
Yolo Bypass for the Sacramento
area. Managed as a designated
flood basin since 1926 when the
Sacramento Weir was completed,
the Yolo Bypass is a 59,000-acre
floodway that includes 70,000
acres of farmland and wildlife
areas. Releasing Sacramento River
water into the bypass,which can
take up to 80% of flood flows,
diverts floodwaters around the city of Yolo Bypass, Feb.23,2017, Source:Steve Matarano, USFWS.
Sacramento. Instead,floodwaters
flow towards undeveloped farmlands. Flooding of these lands results in vast wetlands whose massive plankton
and insect blooms feed diverse waterfowl and native fish species.. The 16,600-acre Yolo Bypass Wildlife Area
is a haven for waterfowl,shorebirds,wading birds,neo-tropical migratory birds,raptors,invertebrates,snakes,
turtles,toads,and bats. During winter floods,juvenile salmon and splittail thrive in the productive habitats of
the Yolo Bypass.
Feather River
77,
Setback Levees
The Feather River Setback Levee
helped further local Yuba County
flood-management goals and
larger regional flood protection
by widening the Feather River
floodway and creating nearly 1,500
acres of riparian floodplain habitat
for fish and wildlife. Completed
in 2010,the levee improvement
projects consist of three different
segments,with the bulk of the The Feather River Setback Levee. Source:Eric Ginneyl Zeke Lunder.
project's$192 million cost paid by
DWR($13 8.5 million),and Yuba County. Yuba County Water Agency,Reclamation District 7 84,and
one local landowner partnered to provide$5 3.3 million in local Ending.
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"I"he l icier View - "I'lae San Joag1.1iD. 'Basifi
Floodway corridors in the San Joaquin Basin are small fractions of their natural corridors. This is because of
the relative rarity of very large rainfloods in the San Joaquin River Basin,the desire to reclaim for agriculture
the greatest amount of ground possible,and the relative absence of large cities exposed to riverine flooding
from the larger rivers. In major rain years with large inflows to reservoirs,flood-control reservoirs in the San
Joaquin Basin have difficulty maintaining their flood-control reservations because downstream flood releases
are so constrained(once full,they take a long time to empty). This inability to maintain flood reservations
means that reservoir-based floodwater management in the San Joaquin Basin is far less reliable than in the
Sacramento Basin.124
Consequently,the San Joaquin system is generally designed with smaller flood corridors and accommodates
large floods in low-lying floodplains. These floodplains recharge groundwaters while they slowly move
downriver,past the Delta cities to the state and federal pumps or into Suisun Bay.
The environmental benefits of these flood-prone lands have been recognized by state and federal wildlife
agencies,which have created wildlife refuges or hold development easements on these lands. Non-governmen-
tal organizations,from environmental groups to private hunting clubs,also hold interests in these lands. Clearly
there are multiple benefits to land uses that keep people and damageable property out of harm's way.
Potential improvements in the San Joaquin Basin
i vary just as the river reaches vary. The Central
Valley Flood Protection Plan recommends a levee
l e p e setback and new ring levee to protect the City
of Firebaugh. It also recommends a small San
Joaquin River floodwater bypass in the lower Delta
to improve conveyance in the mainstem. These
recommendations are more important in light of
3 1•
4
the lessons from Oroville.
Oroville and the Feather River Basin demonstrate
the importance of generously-sized floodways.
In comparison to the San Joaquin River Basin,
Oroville Dam's operators had a lot of flexibility to
shut off flood releases and then make huge flood
releases with relatively little concern that high
releases could not be accommodated downstream.
As a result,the reservoir recovered from
encroachment in several days, something that in
the San Joaquin Basin could take weeks to months.
i �
From the perspective of improved floodwater
management,enlarging the small floodways in
the San Joaquin would be a desirable focus in
many watersheds here.125 Although the Central Valley Flood Protection Plan does not focus on expansion
of tributary flow capabilities to the mainstem San Joaquin River for cost reasons,its Basin-Wide Feasibility
Study does demonstrate the floodwater-management value in the ability to make more competent flood
releases.126
Other relevant lessons from Oroville applicable here include the realization that dam infrastructure can
fail even if it passes periodic inspections.Also,having emergency spillways that work safely is an important
backup,even if used rarely.
In the first two months following
the Oroville spillway incident, Ad .
1
local public representatives expressed frustration over "
the amount and quality of information provided to
ommumties,
explain the causes of the incident and the plans for
repair and remediation. At some meetings,citizens p
pe to e
res ondd the public-relations efforts of project ` "
p ,. . :.
officials with anger and distrust. Beginning in
late April,DWR hosted a series of eight town hall
meetings throughout the affected region,during which
a large panel of staff and experts presented extensive information and spent up to three hours responding to
people's questions and concerns.
This effort of public engagement opened the possibility for a resolution among community members and
the agencies responsible for the incident. However,any such resolution will require continued and sincere
public engagement by project officials. It will not be enough to provide the public with updates. As with
other projects of great impact to communities, a successful outcome will require transparency of information,
accountability for all impacts,meaningful actions to mitigate for those impacts,and the actual hard reality
that reconstruction decisions ensure that the Oroville Facilities can and will meet the full range of their
operational,environmental,and public-safety responsibilities.
For a soccessul '��� ��� �, z
technology, reality1 :
must take precedence �-
over public relations,
E �
for nature cannot
be fooled.
Richard Feynman,Nobel Laureate, Feather River Basin Community. Hundreds of local residents attend
Challenger Disaster investigation member the Gridley community meeting on April 27,2017.
Source:Kelly M. Grow,DWR.
The tallest dam in the United States should have first-class engineering behind it,something that a healthy,
proud,and secure local community deserves. As the spillways are reconstructed,the desired social and
economic condition can be created or restored. This need is best represented by the coalition of community
groups,local governments,and businesses organizing to interact with authorities in the aftermath of the
spillway incident.127 To succeed,DVVR and its regulators must practice transparency of information and
sincerely pursue mechanisms for community development.
x "Oroville spillway conditions negatively affect our communities downstream,
t,
communities that are composed oflow-income, minority and economically
x depressed constituencies. In the City of Oroville for example, 24% of the
population lives in poverty just downstream in Marysville, the poverty rate
is nearly 24%. The benefits of the Oroville Dam project are significant
throughout the state,providing water to 24 million people in California. But the
extreme danger and burden of flood water is shouldered by our disadvantaged
' communities alone. We view this as a social, economic and environmental justice
issue that must be addressed."
Letter to Governor Brown and Secretary Laird signed by Assemblyman Gallagher, Senator Nielsen
and 40 community and business leaders. www orovlllestrong.org
Transparency
Transparency of information is often thwarted by
institutional barriers. Since 2003,FERC licensees have '
been encouraged to classify documents that describe project
works as"Critical Energy Infrastructure Information" ��
(CEII)that is then exempt from the Freedom of
Information Act. While such provisions may at times be
necessary to reduce risk of potential terrorist threats,there
is no clear line between legitimately sensitive information
and information that is inconvenient to make public or
simply embarrassing. In depriving the public of access to
information and access to operations personnel,FERC
license holders often make their facilities and the public less
safe. The authors of this report have seen dozens of cases
where local residents are the first to provide a heads-up
to hydropower project operators that some part of project
facilities is not working properly. In its communications
with the Commission last year on proposed CEII
regulations,the Hydropower Reform Coalition(HRC) _
wrote: "Mhe HRC believes that informed public
participation and citizen oversight of power producers Y
have an important role to play in the protection of energy
infrastructure as it relates to maintenance and normal
operations for both power and non-power purposes." 328
Damaged Oroville Main Spillway.
In 2005,when FOR et a1.intervened in the licensing Mud and debris tumble down the newly eroded channel
proceeding and made the case for a real emergency alongside the Oroville main spillway on Feb.8,2017.
spillway for the tallest dam in the U.S.,FERC's licensing Source:Bili Husa,Chico Enterprise-Record.
officials referred the matter to FERC's dam safety officials.
The conclusion of those officials was wrong—and nearly disastrous. It was also made behind the scenes.
As FERC's Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Oroville relicensing noted,such dam-safety
deliberations are CEII,effectively off limits to even official parties to the licensing proceeding. This created a
condition of complete non-accountability to those seeking to understand the basis for FERC's conclusion that
the safety infrastructure the intervenors proposed was unwarranted.
DWR and the other forensic teams need to complete their investigations on what led to the largest
evacuation in California history. This is as much an investigation into decision-making culture
as an inquiry into the engineering and geotechnical reasons for the failure. The results of these
investigations need to be made public.
The forensic examiners must look at other relevant infrastructure and operational safety issues
with the dam that were not involved with the spillway incident but need to be addressed.
DWR, forensic teams, and dam regulators need to provide periodic updates to the public on their
assessments, recommendations, and decisions, Such updates should provide the opportunity for
meaningful dialog.
DWR, or other authorities if necessary, should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the
spillway incident's impacts to the local community, including evacuations, environmental
impacts, property values, and other economic impacts.
DWR should team with local officials and other appropriate stakeholders to evaluate and mitigate
the impacts of the spillway incident and to facilitate community recovery and development.
Solutions must be effective, and DWR must support their implementation with appropriate
mechanisms and adequate resources. The local community should emerge stronger than before
DWR and other responsible agencies should develop and publicly share Emergency Action Plans
and floodplain inundation maps.
FERC needs to clarify the procedure for Oroville Dam relicensing and dam-safety proceed-
i
ings given that these multiple proceedings may affect area communities. At Oroville, more
than anywhere else,there must be a clear roadmap for meaningful public involvement.
FERC should more greatly circumscribe the use of the CEII classification. The public must
have confidence that CEII classification does not conceal potential physical and operational
deficiencies and constraints. FERC's Division of Dam Safety and Inspections must find a way to
allow for and define more public processes. " ,yTs
The state needs to assess whether the Division of Safety of Dams should remain a division of ;> ;
DWR.
,y :egra:;��j>C`o,' •�}};,,
� iJ
l
Even toda after such a spectacular demonstration of the erodibiliry of the spillway hillside during high
flows,DWR does not appear to have plans to construct an emergency spillway,the use of which would keep
the hillside from tumbling into the water below. The reason for this apparent decision might be revealed
ON
some day,but perhaps a day too late to object.
The implication of the CEII policy is that the even involved members of the public have no real business
P P cY
in shaping the project that can affect their very lives. The public is compelled to trust the people who are
nj 'fir' n lexbehind the CEII wall,in man cases the same people who assured licensing Parties that the spillway cot
was on solid ground and safe. It was not.
t{
There must be a dam-safety decision-making culture that does not fail so spectacularly. There must be a
decision-making culture that is not afraid of sharing information with the affected public in ways that are
meaningful. Decision-makers must provide confidence that reconstruction decisions are well-founded and
that Oroville Dam in the future has the infrastructure to operate well and safely.
The Wider View
There needs to be an overall culture shift in how water and power projects and the people who work for
them interact with the communities that house them. Dam owners have an affirmative responsibility to the
^ public that goes beyond meeting"regulatory constraints"or`obligations." Water managers must develop
• partnerships with the people whose communities and resources water developers tap. These partnerships
z must be founded on equality,fairness,and respect.
vq The orovilie Dam
One can rightfully see many water developments across
rural California as,in significant measure,battlefield �} ~�
monuments to historical conquests by outside forces. spillway incident of 20 1
In competing for water,rural areas and their residents
have often been out-maneuvered,out-lawyered,and is a textbook case of
outspent. Past attitudes of out-of-area developers
generally ranged from indifferent to awful. Only how a legal victory
recently,and far too sporadically,have water agencies
and utilities whose beneficiaries and decision-makers at FERC t o keep t h e
are far away begun to treat the areas of origin more
equitably and with more respect. emergency Spillway out
Neither the priority system of water rights in of relicensing was in fact
California nor the acumen of engineers in siting water
infrastructure has been kind to rural communities. no victory at all.
In most California watersheds,water is already over-
allocated. Most rivers are thoroughly dammed. While ' s
t it is sometimes unfortunately true that local entities
would like to compete with out-of-area developers to repeat water-development attitudes and mistakes of the
past,new reservoirs today are rarely a feasible option.
Water and power regulators have not often encouraged improvements in the way project operators treat local
communities. FERC,in particular,has an established policy that license holders are not obligated to local
authorities to provide public services. The hydropower dockets at FERC are littered with denied requests for
help from economically limited towns, cities,and counties.
The hydropower relicensing industry that has developed over recent decades does not limit its efforts on
behalf of licensees to deny assistance with public services. The consultants and attorneys that represent
a�S
i'
licensees have done a very good job of limiting the
obligations of their clients. Their approach is not simply to Water managers need
argue that it is a bad thing to pay for police,or consider how to recognize h a t how
a reservoir relates to when and where it delivers water,or
whether a dam needs an emergency spillway. The approach, (� �.,
rather,is to say that it is not their problem or FERC's they `"o = a
problem,at least not at this particular time. The Oroville important a s t h e
Dam spillway incident of 2017 is a textbook case of how a
legal victory at FERC to keep the emergency spillway out {� ti
of relicensing was in fact no victory at all. FERC needs business l h e o.
to re-evaluate how it narrows the scope of oversight and
mitigation in relicensing proceedings. d
In recent years,a few forward-thinking water agencies have begun to change their relationships with other
water agencies and with organizations that represent environmental and recreational interests. Sometimes, a
when the old bully and litigate model fails,water agencies choose instead to see discussion and consultation
with public advocacy groups as opportunities to do outreach and improve outcomes on the front end. Surely '
the people who manage water agencies and power projects can start to do the same for the communities
whose resources they share.
Better regulation is only part of the answer. No one foresaw the failure of Oroville's main spillway any
more than anyone foresaw the partial collapse of the upper deck of the San Francisco Bay Bridge in the
Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989. After 1989,hundreds of volunteer architects and structural engineers
intensely reviewed
building codes and
recommended whole
classes of buildings
for retrofitting. Dam of �i u, l°a3L3 3a �r a" t
5'
owners across California ,§R
and the country similarly
need to both re-evaluate _ =
Ar
construction and
maintenance standards
and reassess the safety
and reliability of their
water infrastructure.
,f
Water managers
need to understand
community needs and
see them as their own.
More decision makers
for water and power
Feather River Fishing.Steelhead fishing below Oroville Dam. Source:Lance Gray, Fly Fishing Guide
companies need to live
in the communities that
house their facilities. Those decision makers need to involve local communities in decision making and have
a regular and positive presence with local decision-making bodies.
Water managers need to recognize that how they do business is as important as the business they do.
+•,fiX ,k� � .� 3 �i Y. �E, y< C r� � � �a � f
1 http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/history.cfm
2 See"Oroville Facilities Overview"at http://water.ca.gov/swp/facilities/Oroville/index.cfin
3 http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/
4 http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/contractor_intro.cfm. As the State Water Project(SWP)was constructed during the
1960s,long-term contracts were signed with public water agencies, known as the SWP contractors. They receive annual
allocations,specified annual amounts of water, as agreed to in their contracts,which will expire in 2035. In return,the contrac-
tors repay principal and interest on both the general obligation bonds that initially funded the Project's construction and the
revenue bonds that paid for additional facilities. The contractors also pay all costs,including labor and power,to maintain and
operate the Project's facilities.
5 DWR shows its annual allocations on this web page:http://www.water.ca.gov/swpao/deliveries.cfm
Before the 1994 Monterey Agreements,municipal water contractors had priority access to SWP supplies. Since that time,ac-
cess priority has been more equal, and market mechanisms and Kern County ground-water storage(now mostly owned by local
agencies,some of whose groundwater storage was formerly owned and controlled by DWR)have been used to buffer supply
shortages to urban customers.
https://californiawaterimpactnetwork.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/monterey-amendments-a-history-carolee-2-2 8-10.pdf
6 See http://www.water.ca.gov/swpao/wc_b.cfm. Even in severe drought conditions in 2014,Feather River Settlement
Contractors received full deliveries(869,403 acre-feet). See Bulletin 132-15,p. 178 at
http://www.water.ca.gov/swpao/docs/bulletins/bulletin 13 2/Bulletin 13 2-15.pdf
7 2013 California Water Plan Update. Depending on the period, export SWP deliveries average 2.5,2.6, or 2.8 million
acre-feet. DWR Bulletin 132 lists deliveries to Feather River non-SWP agencies,typically around 900,000 acre-feet. The
U.S.G.S.estimated California water use in 2010 at 42,600,000 acre feet.Maupin,M.A.,Kenny,J.E,Hutson, S.S.,Lovelace,
J.K.,Barber,N.L.,and Linsey,K.S.,2014,Estimated use ofwaterin the United States in 2010: U.S. Geological Survey Circu-
Iar 1405,p.9.
http://dx.doi.org/10.313 3/cir 1405
$ http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/benefits.cfm
9 This estimate was derived by UCLA Professors Alex Hall and Associate Vice Chancellor Mark Gold using the contract
builders'cited total price tag for dam construction at$439 million(1968 dollars)and applying an inflation calculator to trans-
late this value in to today's dollars(personal communication,Prof.Alex Hall,April 7,2017).
to http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/swptoday.cfm
11 The State Water Contractors(an organization of the State Water Project contractors)estimate that the SWP provides
$400 billion in annual benefits to California's$2.5 trillion economy.
https://web.archive.org/web/2 013101605102 9/http://www.swc.org/issues/state-water-proj ect/histo ry-of-the-state-
water-project
12 SWRCB Water Quality Certification, ORDER WQ 2010-0016,FERC Project 2100.p. 1.
http://www.water.ca.gov/orovillerelicensing/docs/401cert/401certification.pdf(SWRCB 2010 Water Quality Certification).
13 .Id.,p. 2.Document notes:
In 1999 the Central Valley Spring-run Chinook Evolutionary Significant Unit(ESU)was listed as threatened under the
federal ESA and under the California ESA.National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration(NOAA)Fisheries con-
cluded that the hatchery produces spring-run Chinook salmon that are genetically more similar to fall-run.In March of
1998,naturally spawned Central Valley steelhead was listed as threatened under the Federal Endangered Species List
(ESA).
14 Letter from Mayor Linda Dahlmeier to Congressman Upton, Chair of the Energy and Commerce Committee
(Energy Subcommittee),March 15,2017 Hearing on"Modernizing Energy Infrastructure."
https://www.americanwhitewater.org/content/Document/view/documentid/l 62 3/
45
15 Chico News and Review,`Broken Promises,"April 13,2017.
https://www.newsreview.com/chico/broken-promises/content?oid=240943 07
16 Id According to original plans,the DWR was also supposed to develop a lodge and other recreation facilities,
including a tram to Kelly Ridge,to help draw an estimated 1 million visitors each month.Alpert said FERC ordered the DWR
to make millions of dollars'worth of improvements in a 1994 revised recreation plan that also haven't been done.
17 See note 14.
18 A Management Plan for Agricultural Subsurface Drainage and Related Problems on the Westside San Joaquin Valley,Final
Report of the San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program,September 1990,U.S. Department of the Interior, California Resources
Agency.
19 Ormille Dam and Reservoir,Feather River, California,Report on Reservoir Regulation for Flood Control,August 1970,
Department of the Army, Sacramento District, Corps of Engineers, Sacramento, California(Oroville Reservoir Regulation
Manual).
20 Snowmelt floods are a trivial challenge for Oroville Dam and its downstream flood corridor. The manual, therefore,is de-
signed to manage rainfloods. Maximum reservoir flood space ranges between 350,000 to 750,000 acre-feet depending on the
preceding rainfall conditions. In most flood seasons,the full reservation is required. The Oroville Dam flood-control rule
curve is available at:http://www.friendso£theriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Oroville-rule-curve-use.pdf.
21 http://www.enrfc.noaa.gov/storm-summaries/feb1986storms.php. For perspective on the 1986 flooding,this NOAA,site
reports that the precipitation gage at Bucks Lake(5,750 feet elevation in the No. Sierra Nevada)received 55.72 inches of pre-
cipitation,mostly in the form of rain,during the 10-day period of the 1986 flood event(Feb. 11-20, 1986).
22 http://wwwbepreparedyuba.org/pages/prepare/historyaspx
23 http://cepsym.org/Symprol997/Roos.pdf. Flood records begin in 1906.
24 http://www.cnrfc.noaa.gov/storm-summaries/janl997storms.php. Details on the NOAA site show that when the Dec. 1996
and Jan. 1997 precipitation is combined and averaged over 8 precipitation gages,the 47.84 inches observed sets the record for
the wettest back-to-back precipitation.months.
25 Lake Oroville Operations,feather River,Final Report, Governor's Flood Emergency Action Team,May 10, 1997. (FEAT
Report) This page represents hourly operations.
http://www.water.ca.gov/floodsafe/docs/Governor%2 7s-Floo d-Emergency-Action-Team-FEAT-May 10-1997-OCR.p df
26 "In 1997,it[was] believed that Oroville storage was almost to a point where 300,000 cfs of inflow was going to pass through
the reservoir. DWR was making plans to evacuate the power plant.The 300,000 cfs would have topped the levees and put 10
feet of water into the town of Oroville."DWR Oroville Facilities Relicensing, Engineering and Operations Work Group—
Issue Sheet Development, revised May 21, 2001.(EE56).
27 Maximum 1997 pool elevation from Technical Memorandum on Controlled Surcharge of Lake Oroville forAdditionaIFIood
Control,Yuba County Water Agency,August 2012, p.H-8.From this data,the"Area Capacity Table,"Chart 16,from the
Oroville Reservoir Regulation Manual,shows 215,000 acre-feet of unused flood reservation in 1997 floods.
http://www.friendsoftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/YCWA-0roville-Surcharge-iMemo-excerpts-ocr-
highlighted-Aug-2 002.pdf
28 http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/PAGE-ONE-FLOODWATERS-RISE-THOUSAI\'DS-FLEE-2861037.php.
29 http://cepsym.org/Symprol997/Roos.pdf. Roos notes in his 1997 summary that at one point forecasters thought the inflow to
the reservoir would fill and spill to about 250,000 cfs,but rains eased up sooner than expected,and Oroville was able to con-
tain the runoff.
The Feather River Arboga levee break occurred in an area identified in 1990 with levee foundation problems,meaning that
this portion of the Feather River floodway could only reliably accommodate 268,000 cfs,rather than the 300,000 cfs design
flow.(ACE,Sacramento River Flood Control System Evaluation,Phase II-MarysviIIe/Yuba CityArea,EA/Initial Study,
April 1993, p.6). This new floodway-competence assessment was not reflected in ACE or licensee Oroville Dam operation.
30 http://cepsym.org/Symprol997/Roos.pdf. "Inflows to Oroville reservoir reached more than 331,000 cfs,yet flood releases
from the dam were maintained at 170,000 cfs—within the 210,000 cfs channel design capacity of the channel from the Ther-
mahto Complex to the Yuba River confluence but exceeded the Oroville Dam objective release of 150,000 cfs for perhaps half
a day."
31 http://www.bepreparedyuba.org/pages/prepare/historyaspx
32 For relicensing,DWR changed the project name to"Oroville Facilities."
46
33 https://www.ferc.gov/resources/processes/hydro-proj.asp. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission(FERC)is an
independent regulatory agency that regulates the transmission and sale of electricity and natural gas, among other respon-
sibilities. One of FERC's major hydropower activities is relicensing existing projects whose licenses are due to expire. Staff
prepares either an Environmental Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement and bases recommended license condi-
tions on these reviews.
34 http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/hr/print/volume-27/issue-3/feature-articles/fere-licensing/a-retrospective-on-the-
oroville-facilities-relicensing-making-collaboration-work.html. According to the source,the alternative licensing process
(ALP)was chosen over the traditional licensing process(TLP)for two primary reasons:(1)the ALP encourages greater public
involvement,enabling the licensee and stakeholders to collaboratively design the consultation process and jointly propose
license terms and conditions; and(2)the ALP permits the licensee to complete the applicant-prepared environmental assess-
ment,allowing DWR to utilize its own internal expertise.
35 http://www.water.ca.gov/orovillerelicensing/
36 Representative Doug LaMalfa, for example, has asked FERC to delay issuance of the Oroville Facilities new license until
various matters related to the spillway incident have been sorted out.
http://eastvalleytimes.com/lamalfa-requests-delay-oroville-dam-relicensing/.
https://Iamalfa.house.gov/inedi a-center/press-releases/lamalfa-re quests-delay-in-oroville-d am-relicensing.
A group of local governments and organizations led by the Oroville Chamber of Commerce has also requested a delay in
licensing for similar reasons. See"After 10 years of delays on dam relicensing,these groups want more time"at Oroville Mer-
cury Register:
http://www.orovillemr.com/general-news/20170720/after-I 0-years-of-delays-on-dam-relicensing-thes e-groups-want-more-
time. https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/file—list.asp?accession—num=20170808-5104
37 CSPA,Motion to Intervene and Comments on Draft EIS of CSPA, December 19,2006,FERC eLibrary no.20061219-5016,
pp.2-3.
38 The Superior Court ruled against the complaint of Plumas and Butte,and the case is now before the State Court of Appeals.
39 The ungated spillway at Oroville Dam has been characterized in many ways. Older documents refer to it as the emergency
spillway. DWR officials during the Spillways incident refer to it as either the emergency or auxiliary spillway. Friends of the
River ct al.in their FERC filings argue that because of uses assigned to it by the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers,it should be
characterized by FERC as an auxiliary spillway. A precise characterization would be that it has an operational use in conduct-
ing surcharge flood-control operations and an emergency use when dam-safety is the priority. In 20I7,it provided an emer-
gency use when DWR was reluctant to use the broken main service spillway. It is probably most simply described as a
dual-purpose auxiliary/emergency spillway. However,for editorial simplicity in this report,we will usually use the simpler
term, emergency spillway.
40 Motion to Intervene of Friends of the River, Sierra Club,South Yuba River Citizen's League, Project No.2100-052 (filed Oct.
17,2005),FERC eLibrary no.20051017-503 3 (FOR et al.Intervention). The general link for the FERC eLibrary is
https:Helibrary.fere.gov/idmws/search/feregensearch.asp
41 http://wwwfriendsoftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/MBK-Oroville-ops-manual-Itr-to-DWR-April-17-2001.pdf
42 FOR et.al.Intervention, p.9.The groups specifically requested FERC to require DWR to"armor or otherwise reconstruct
the ungated spillway and to make any other needed modifications so that the licensee(DWR)can safely and confidently con-
duct required surcharge operations consistent with the Corps of Engineers Oroville Dam Reservoir Regulation Manual."
43 CSPA Motion to Intervene, op cit,p.2.Motion to Intervene of American Rivers,American Whitewater and Chico Paddle
heads,March 31,2005,eLibrary no.20060331-5090,p. 5.
44 Amended Motion to Intervene of the County of Sutter,the City of Yuba City,and Levee District No. 1 of Sutter County,March
24,2006,FERC eLibrary no.20060324-5069,p. 8.Sutter County,the City of Yuba,and Levee District 1 (Sutter County er
aI.)asked,in part,the Commission for the following:
A relicensing order should be issued, consistent with the Commission's duty under section 10(a) of the Federal Power
Act, which directs the licensee to investigate the adequacy and structural integrity of Oroville Dam's ungated auxiliary
spillway that may currently pose a risk to the Project facilities and downstream levees in Sutter County in the event
extreme flood releases are required, as recently experienced in flood release events of 1986 and 1997, and to take all
necessary actions to correct any identified deficiencies,in this regard.
45 Submittal of Butte County,Report:Operational Impacts of the OrovilIe Project Facilities on Butte County, February 15,
2006,FERC eLibrary no.20060217-0010,pp. 15, 50. Butte County noted on p. 15:"When heavy rains bring the Lake
Oroville level to possible overflow conditions,it triggers major flood management operations at Oroville Dam.... Scenarios
generated by DWR in its flood plain analysis indicate a large geographic area below the Dam would be inundated if the Dam
failed."
47
46 Butte County,California, Comments in Opposition to and Contest of the California Department of Water Resources'Settle-
ment Agreement for Licensing of the Oroville Facilities and Request for Evidentiary Hearing,April 26,2006, FERC eLibrary
no. 20060426-5060,pp. 4,47,48. Butte County states on p.48:
DWR must be directed to work with the County to address these potential risks,including the provision of additional se-
curity at the Oroville Dam.... It is beyond dispute that warnings alone are insufficient to address the great risk posed to the
County and its over 210,000 residents,particularly where the Project has rendered the County's [downstream] emergency
coordination facilities functionally ineffective to respond to flood emergencies.
In a June 29,2007 filing entitled Comments of Butte County California on Legal and Factual Errors in in the Final Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement for the Oroville Facilities Project,the County highlighted the situation during the 1997 floods.
During these floods, DWR warned Butte County to evacuate its Emergency Operations Center due to an imminent flooding
threat. Butte County responded that the Emergency Operations Center could not assist with the evacuation of the City of
Oroville if the Center was evacuated or preparing to evacuate at the same time(Butte County, FERC cLibrary no.20070629-
5083,pp. 18-19).
47 Response of the CA Dept.of Water Resources to Recommendations,Terms and Conditions,Prescriptions, and Settlement
Comments,pp.96-97,May 26,2006,FERC eLibrary no.20060526-5039. (DWR Response).Arguments include:
• [I]t is neither necessary nor appropriate to address specific issues related to dam safety in the relicensing context.
• DWR is in full compliance with FERC's dam safety regulations and the State of California's dam safety program,and noth-
ing in the record supports Friends of the Rivers'speculation regarding the potential for flood impacts in the event of dam
failure.
• Mhe Oroville Dam,including its appurtenant facilities,has repeatedly been found safe and adequate for its intended pur-
poses,which include emergency spillway operations.
• The last five years of the [the Department's] Division of Safety of Dams'inspection reports all state: "From the known
information and the visual inspection,the dam,reservoir, and the appurtenances are judged satisfactory for continued use."
• DWR recently reviewed the geologic conditions at the emergency spillway and concluded that the spillway is a safe and
stable structure founded on solid bedrock that will not erode.
• The [Department's] Project Geology Section determined that there are only one to four feet of erodible top soil in the
downstream area,and that erosion would not compromise the stability of the emergency spillway.
48 Letter from DWR Acting Deputy Director,Raphael Torres to FERC regarding Project No.2100-CA,Review of Seventh
Independent Consultant's Safety Inspection Report for Thermalito Diversion Dam at"DWR Oroville Em Spillway Soil depth
ltr 1-3-2006 highlighted(ocr)." http://www.friendsofrheriver.org/our-work/rivers-under-threat/feather-threat/.
49 Response of the State Water Contractors and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California to Interventions,Recom-
mendations,Terms and Conditions, Prescriptions,Settlement Comments,pp.56-60,May 26,2006, FERC eLibrary no.
20060526-5069.
50 Memo from John Onderdonk, Senior Civil Engineer, San Francisco Regional Office,Division of Dam Safety and Inspections
Emergency Spillway Safety Questions related to Intervention Motion,Proj.No.2100,Letter to John Mudre,FERC Division
of Hydropower Licensing,July 27,2006,FERC eLibrary no. 20060801-0158. (Onderdonk Memo).
51 In circumstances of a full reservoir and very high inflows,the Corps'flood control manual for Oroville requires DWR to
surcharge the reservoir rather than make releases that would overwhelm downstream levees. Surcharging is accomplished by
allowing water to reach a height as high as ten feet above the lip of the emergency spillway while backing off the releases from the
main spillway so that the combined release from both spillways is no more than 150,000 efs. Surcharge storage,measured as the
height of flow over the emergency spillway and across the reservoir,could add 144,000 acre-feet of reservoir storage and allow
control of larger storms.
http://www.friendsoftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2 016/01/MBK-Orovife-ops-manual-ltr-to-DWR-April-17-2 001.pdf
52 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Oroville Facilities Project Docket No.
P-2100-052,May 18,2007, FERC eLibrary no.20070518-4001. ("FERC Oroville Facilities FEIS or FEIS").
53 SWRCB 2010 Water Quality Certification, op cit.
54 Joint comments of Friends of the River, Sierra Club,and South Yuba River Citizens League on Oroville Facilities Relicensing,
FERC Project 2100, draft EIR,August 20,2007.http://www.friendsoftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/FOR-
Sierra-Club-SYRCL-comments-Oroville-relicenisng-EIR-text-recoghighlighted.pdf
55 http://www.water.ca.gov/oroville-spillway/pdf/2017/Lake%200roville%20events%2Otimeline.pdf
According to this DWR timeline, reservoir levels peaked at 902.59-foot elevation on 02/12/2017:03:00 a.m. One of the more
complete discussions by DWR on Oroville Dam spillway incident operations can be found at"Responses to April 19, 2017
Oroville Spillway Questions from Assemblymembers E. Garcia and Gallagher,DWR,"pp. 7-9,May 9,2017.
http://www.friendsoftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/D WR-Response-ASM-WPW-Oroville-Questions-Responses.pdf
48
56 Los Angeles Times,"Downstream from the stricken Oroville Dam,the Feather River Fish Hatchery manages to save millions
offish",February 17,2017, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-oroville-fish-hatchery-20170217-story.html- Fish
Sniffer,"CDFW rescues 8 million young salmon, 1 million steelhead on Feather River", February 10, 2017,
http://fishsniffer.com/index.php/2017/02/1 0/cdfw-rescues-8-million-young-salmon-l-million-steelhea d-on-feather-river/.
57 DWR was obviously cutting it pretty close. Indeed,on the same day,the Sacramento Bee ran two different stories in its elec-
tronic versions,one claiming the reservoir would not fill and spill, the other that it would.
http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/water-and-drought/article 131941279.html
http://www,sacbee.com/news/state/tali forma/water-and-drought/article 13 212 3 804.htn►l
58 Based on the elevation/reservoir-volume tables in the Reservoir Regulation Manual,453,000 acre-feet of the reservoir would
be lost if 30 feet of reservoir containment was lost. If this volume were lose in twelve hours,the average outflow would be
roughly 450,000 cubic-feet per second(cfs),although the outflow would be unlikely to be even,meaning instantaneous flows
part of the time would be larger,perhaps much larger. If the loss of reservoir volume was over a briefer period,outflows in cfs
would be larger. These flows could be expected to cause catastrophic downstream flooding.
59 Butte County Sheriff Evacuation Order.
https://www.facebook.comlbcsonews/posts/781255845358029.
"Evacuation Orders Intact As Water Officials Analyze Oroville Dam Emergency Spillway," CBS News Sacramento.
http://www.newslocker.com/en-us/region/sacramento/evacuation-orders-intact-as-water-officials-analyze-oroville-dam-
emergency-spillway/view/
"No Word on When Evacuation Order will be Lifted,"Sacramento Bee, February 12,2017.
http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/water-and-drought/article 1323 3 2499.html
60 "The River Valve Outlet System(RVOS)was available for use prior to February 7.It was flooded during the spillway incident
with resulting damage to some of the operating and control components and had to be taken offline in February 2017. It was
repaired in May 2017 and is currently available at a tested safe capacity of 4,000 cfs." June 7,2017,Letter from DWR Chief
Deputy Director, Cindy Messer.
http://www.fri endsoftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2 016/01/Final-Signed-D WR-Response-to-Coalition-Letter_linked.pdf
61 https://ww2.kged.org/news/2017/03/23/engineers-assess-spillway-problem-at-oroville-dam/
62 "The outlets are now judged to be able to run for limited times at as much as the 4,000 cfs of their rated 5,000 cfs of their
rated capacity.This is an increase from 2,000 cfs."DWR response to FERC,June 5,2017. FERC eLibrary no. 20170605-
5228. See also DWR presentation on drought emergency operations,February 17,2015 at
http://www.friendso ftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2 016/01/River-Valve-Outlet-System-RVOS-DWR-2 015.pdf
63 Oroville Spillway Recovery:Plans Under Design,DWR,April 6, (revised May 24)2017.
http://www.water.ca.gov/orovi lle-spillway/pdf/2 017/a 3186%2 00roville%2 OSpwy°/u 2 ORecovery_v6.p df
http://www.water.ca.gov/oroville-spillway/recoveryplans.cfin
"While DWR does not intend to operate the emergency spillway,the emergency spillway will be able to pass 30,000 cfs by
November 1 by placing a concrete cutoff downstream of the emergency spillway.Work will continue on the emergency spill-
way after November 1 which will continue to increase the capacity until it meets the previous design capacity of over 400,000
cfs." Responses to April 19,2017 Oroville Spillway Questions from Assemblymembers E.Garcia and Gallagher,DWR,p. 13.
http://www friendsoftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/DWR-Response-ASM-WPW-Oroville-Questions-Responses.pdf
64 High Voltage Transmission Line Relocation, DWR letter to FERC,May 17,2017. FERC eLibrary no.20170517-5093.
"PG&E to fly poles as it re-routes power lines near Oroville Dam Spillway,"Gridley Herald,May 26,2017,
http://www.gridleyherald.com/article/20170426/NEWS/170429740
65 https://mavensnotebook.com/2017/07/27/oroville-update-final-2017-construction-plans-for-lake-oroville-spillways-project-
approved-with-video/
66 http://wwwwater.ca.gov/oroville-spillway/pdf/2017/June%203%202017%20Oroville%20BOC%20Letter%20-%20Final.pdf
67 http://www.capradio.org/100137
http://www.capradio.org/articles/2 017/08/07/cutoff-wall-but-no-chute-this-year-for-oroville-dam-emergency-spillway/
68 For example,testimony of Dave Gutierrez, former Chief of DWR's Division of Safety of Dams,before CA legislative over
sight committee hearing,May 10,2017.
69 OnderdonkMemo, op cit
70 Butte County, California,Emergency Petition of Butte County,California to Require Licensee to Correct Safety Deficiencies
and Establish a Public Safety Program, February 15,2017,FERC eLibrary no.20170215-5102 (Butte Emergency Petition).
71 County of Butte, CA v. Calif.Dept.of Water Resources, 128 FERC T 61,068(2009).
49
72 Butte Emergency Petition,pp. 7--8. Butte County requested that the Commission:
(0)rder DWR immediately to establish its own Public Safety Program,including providing for the necessary law enforce-
ment and other personnel in lieu of the Butte County law enforcement and other personnel that have been,and continue
to be,devoted to ensuring public safety in the face of threats attributable to the Oroville Project(including not just flood
hazards but also fire, crime, and other emergency services), as delineated in numerous filings with the Commission over the
years, as well as providing a myriad of other necessary public works services related to the oroville Project.
73 id.,p. 8.
74 Mayor Dahlmeier,March 2017, op cit,p.2.See note 14.
75 ibid.
76 id.,p. 3.
77 FERC Division of Dam Safety and Inspection,Letter to California Department of Water Resources regarding the emergency
repair and Board of Consultants for the Oroville Dam Spillway under P-2100,FERC eLibrary no 201702.13-3006.
78 DWR FAQ:Who approves construction design? http://www.water.ca.gov/oroville-spillway/fags.cfin
79 http://www.water.ca.gov/oroville-spillway/bocreports.efin
$o http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/water-and-drought/article0l439907719.html
S1 "What went wrong at Oroville Dam?Analysis points to drainage,problematic soils,"Dale Kasler, Sacramento Bee,April 25,
2017. http://www.sacbee,com/news/state/california/water-and-drought/article146789099.html
"Preliminary Lessons Learned from Oroville Incident,"Memo to Eric Halpin,Deputy,U.S.Army Corps of Engineers,Insti-
tute for Water Resources,Risk Management Center.
http://www.friendsoftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Army-Corps-Briefing-on-Oroville-Dam-April-7-2 017.p df
82 http://damsafety.org/article/media/oroville-investigation-team.
83 http://darnsafety.org/sites/default/files/Memorandum_050517.pdf
84 R.G.Bea,Center for Catastrophic Risk Management.April 17 2017. Preliminary Root Causes Analysis of Failures of the
Oroville Dam Gated Spillway,p 1. (Bea,Root Causes Analysis).https://www documentcloud.org/documents/3676605-Rob-
ert-Bea-Oroville-Spillway-Failure-Root-Cause.html.
85 Legislative Testimony Report,Oroville Dam,R.G.Bea, Center for Catastrophic Risk Management,U.C.Berkley,April,May
11,2017. https:Hdrive.google.com/open?id=OBzlllmlutSEnvmozRUSYNFllY2c.
Root Cause Analysis of Oroville Dam Spillway Failure and other Developments,R.G.Bea,Tony.Johnson,Center for Cata-
strophic Risk Management,U.C.Berkley,July 20,2017.
https://drive,google.com/open?id=OBzll l mIutSEnbFJuVUJZWWNI\T'AU
86 Bea,Root Causes Analysis,p.2.
87 Bea,Root Causes Analysis,p. 3.
88 "Investigators seek cause of accident deep with Oroville Dam,"Sacramento Bee,July 23,2009.
http://wwwfriendsoftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2 016/01/Investigators-seek-cause-of-acci dent-deep-in-Oroville-Dam.pdf
89 "River Valve Outlet System(RVOS)DWR,2015."
http://www.friendsoftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2 016/01/River-Valve-Outlet-System-RVOS-DWR-2 015.pdf
90 "Oroville RVOS accident report OSHA2-10" (January 21,2010).
http://www friendsoftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/O1/Oroville-RVOS-accident-report-OSHA2-10.pdf
91 http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/hr/print/volume-34/issue-3/articles/investigation-re-creation-indicates-hkely-
ignition-point-of-thermalito-fire.html
https.//conferences.wsu.edu/forms/hrs/HRS 14/2014HRS/Lectures/Thermalito.pdf
92 https://ww2.kged.org/science/2017/04/07/how-incompetent-rock-led-to-the-oroville-dam-crisis/
93 American Society of Civil Engineers(ASCE)2017 Infrastructure Report Card.
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/cat-item/dams/
94 http://www.waterpowennagazine.com/features/featurethey-night-be-giants-terminus-dam-s-new-fusegates/
95 "Isabella Lake Dam Safety Modification Project,"USACE.
http://www.spk.usace.army.mil/Missions/Civil-Works/IsabeUa-Dam/
50
96 Dam Safety, Reducing Flood Risk in California's Central Valley,Modernizing Our Aging Dams,USACE.
http://www.spk.usace.army.mil/Portals/12/documents/civil works/dam_safety/Dam_Safery_Infograph_12DEC 13.pdf
97 "Success Dam Modification Study,"USACE.
http://www.spk.US2Ce.army.miUMissions/Civil-Works/Success-Dam/
98 For San Luis and Trinity Dams,see,https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060054182. For another news piece on Trinity Dam,
see, http://www.redding.com/story/news/local/2017/06/07/officials-worried-trinity-dam-safety/373015001/. Clifton Court
Forebay(the facility used to send SWP water into the California Aqueduct)has underseepage issues(Suzanne Womack,before
the State Water Resources Control Board in the WaterFix Change Petition Hearing)and does not appear have been designed
to withstand accelerations used by the DWR Division of Safety of Dams in need of an in-depth seismic analysis. (DWR
Bulletin 200 says it was design for 0.15g.)Table 5 of the seismology technical memo for the Delta Risk Management Strategy
estimated peak ground accelerations of 0.40g at the Clifton Court Forebay for a 1-in-500-year event(10% in 50 years).
99 Responses to April 19, 2017 Oroville Spillway Questions from Assemblymembers E. Garcia and Gallagher,DWR,p. 14,May
9,2017. DWR Response ASM WPW Orovi Ile Questions-Responses May 9,2017. http://www.friendsoftheriver.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/01/DWR-Response-ASM-WPW-Oroville-Questions-Responses.pdf
100 See, for example, the Letter to Merced Irrigation District re the new focused spillway assessments for the McSwain Dam
under P-2179.FERC,May 1,2017,FERC eLibrary no.20170615-0215.
According to a May 21, 2017 Sacramento Bee report,FERC Division of Dam Safety and Inspections Regional Engineer,
Frank Blackett, told an American Society of Civil Engineers gathering in Sacramento that FERC has sent letters to the na-
tion's dam operators ordering them to conduct thorough on-site inspections of their spillways,re-evaluate their construction
and design plans, and try to envision scenarios to determine"how that structure could fail."..."We want all of our licensees to
focus on these features and determine if they have a potential Oroville waiting to happen."The article continues:
Earlier this month,FERC asked Pacific Gas and Electric Co.to perform inspections on 3 3 spillways the power company
oversees and compile a report on the state of their spillways by the end of the year,said PG&E spokesman Paul Moreno.
The largest of the PG&E dams is on Lake Almanor, a reservoir whose releases drain into the same Feather River water-
shed as Oroville.Almanor is about one-third the size of Oroville.
On the Yuba River,which drains into the Feather below Oroville Dam, FERC inspectors are meeting this week with the
operators of New Bullards Bar Dam for an annual inspection,said Curt Aikens,the general manager of the Yuba County
Water Agency.New Bullards Bar is slightly smaller than Folsom Lake.
http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/water-and-drought/articie 151889912.html
101 "California orders closer look at these 93 dams after Oroville crisis"Sacramento Bee,July 17,2017.
http://www s acbee.com/news/state/californ.i a/water-and-drought/article 16402132 7.html
http://www.modbee.com/news/articiel 64067777.html
102 The San Jose Mercury News was able to obtain records of the 2014 Probable Failure Mode Analysis under a Public Records
Act request.The resulting article reported that failure of the main and emergency/auxiliary spillways were considered for
analysis but dismissed as too unlikely to be considered. The article also noted that water underflow problems were known to
DWR and that the main spillway had undergone"top to bottom"repairs in 1977, 1997, and 2009.
https://ww2.kged.org/news/2 017/0 8/09/oroville-d am-spi Ilway-ferc-safety-review-2 014-ruled-out-spillway-failure/
103 "Historical and Future Relations Between Large Storms and Droughts in California,"Mike Dettinger,Ph.D.,Research
Hydrologist,National Research Program, U.S. Geological Survey, Carson City,NV, California Extreme Precipitation Con-
ference,July 11,2017. http://cepsyrn.org/proceedings_2017.php
104 Climate Change and Flood Operations in the Sacramento Basin,California(2011)Ann D.Willis,Jay R.Lund, Edwin S.
Townsley, and Beth A.Faber. San Francisco Estuary and Watershed Science.July 2011.
https://watershed.ucdavis.edu/shed/iund/papers/W lbsetalpaper2 011.pdf
105 Army Corps of Engineers flood-control manuals are more formally known as reservoir regulation manuals.In California,
with its Mediterranean climate, the more formal title is misleading because the manuals only regulate flood season operations.
106 The Friends of the River et al.FERC filings describe the nature of the coverage and lack of coverage of the Oroville Dam
flood-control manual as it applies to operations with inflows that might require the use of the emergency spillway. The
Emergency Spillway Release Diagram in the manual is for use with a Marysville Dam in place. There is no Emergency Spill-
way Release Diagram in the manual for the present circumstances of no Marysville Dam. See"MBK Oroville ops ltr to DWR
April 17 2001"at http://www.friendsoftheriver,org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/MBK-Oroville-ops-manual-Itr-to-DWR-
April-17-2001.pdf
51
107 As used here,"reservoir design flood"refers to the size(usually an inflow hydrograph, a graph that displays inflows on the
y-axis and time on the x-axis)that a reservoir can accommodate without exceeding design flood-control outflows(150,000 cfs
in the case of Oroville Dam).In contrast, a"spillway design flood"refers to an inflow hydrograph that can be contained with-
in the reservoir while making full use of the dam's spillways(nearly 600,000 cfs).The latter is a dam-safety operation rather
than one for flood control.
108 "Technical Memorandum on Controlled Surcharge of Lake Oroville For Additional Flood Control," (YCWA Technical
Memo)Yuba County Water Agency,August 2002,p II-8.http://www.friendsoftheriver.org/wp-coiitent/uploads/2016/01/
YC WA-Oroville-Surcharge-Memo-excerpts-ocr-highlighted-Aug-2 002.pdf
109 Bills have been introduced in the Congress(H.R. 5247 Costa,Garamendi &H.R. 813 Huffman, 114th Congress)directing
the Corps to undertake revisions to improve water-supply operations of reservoirs with Corps flood-control manuals. Re-
visions to these manuals should also be directed to increase the flood-control operations to these reservoirs given the likely
increase in flood magnitudes in the future.
110 DWR began making releases of 50,000 cfs before the flood-control manual required making any flood-control releases on the
basis of the 1997 New Year's Day Flood weather forecasts. See Final Report, Governor's Flood Emergency Action Team,
May 10, 1997 (FEATReport).
http://www water.ca.gov/floodsafe/docs/Governor%27s-Flood-Emergency-Action-Team-FEAT-May10-1997-OCR.pdf
111 Draft Basin-Wide Feasibility Study, San joaquin Basin, DWR,October 2016,p. 2.31.
112 "The San Joaquin Valley is also rimmed with dams,but floodway capacities in this system are small and designed for manag-
ing snow-melt flooding.Unregulated rain-flood flows from many dams are quite foreseeable(and occurred in 1997),in part
because major reservoir-flood-space encroachments can occur from storms that may have happened days,weeks, or even
months earlier."A California Challenge—Flooding in the Central Valley, DWR Independent Review Panel on Central
Valley Flooding, October 15,2007,pp. 11-12.
http://www water.ca.gov/news/newsreleases/2 008/101507challenge.pdf
113 FEAT Report,op cit.,p. 119. The report makes...",op.cit.Its most substantive and specific recommendation was the targeted
study on increasing the size of the Tuolumne River floodway.
114 "Don Pedro Lake,Tuolumne River,California, Pertinent Data,"Don Pedro Lake,Tuolumne River, California, Reservoir
Regulation for Flood Control,August 1972,Department of the Army, Sacramento District,Corps of Engineers, Sacramento,
California.
115 Id. at"Flood Control Diagram,""Emergency Spillway Release Diagram,"and FEAT Report.
116 "Don Pedro swallowed hard,stemmed flow to the end,"The Modesto Bee, Special Report Flood Watch 1997, Sunday,
January 12, 1997.
117 "Real-Time Modeling During Flood Control Operations,"Wes Monier,Manager, Strategic Issues and Planning Dept.,
Turlock Irrigation District,Turlock,CA,Norman H.Crawford,Ph.D.,President and Founder,Hydrocomp,Inc.,Menlo
Park, CA, California Extreme Precipitation Conference,July 11,2017.
http://cepsym.org/proceedings-2017.php
118 The Merced Irrigation District has floated a series of ideas to wall off much of its 1,070-foot-wide emergency spillway and to
reduce the size of New Exchequer Dam's flood reservation. See,
http://www.friendsoftheriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Merced-R-ws-threat-£act-sheet-4-5-26-3016.pdf
119 Basin-Wide Feasibility Study,San Joaquin Basin,DWR,March 2017,section 4.2.
http://www water.ca.gov/cvfmp/docs/2017/BWFS-SJR-Rpt-M2rch2Ol 7.pdf
120 "Risk management approaches in the San Joaquin basin are largely the official recognition of flood-plain flooding and some
relatively minor levee improvements and setbacks." A California Challenge—Flooding in the Central Valley,DWR Inde-
pendent Review Panel on Central Valley Flooding,October 15,2007,pp. 11--12.
http://www.water.ca.gov/news/newsreleases/2 008/101507 challenge.pdf
121 "Project levees"is a term for levees that have been federalized one way or another in the sense that modifications to these
levees require permission from the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers.
122 http://caltrout.org/tag/knaggs-ranch/;http://www.multibenefitproject.org/floodplain-scientific-and-management-research-
pro jects/knaggs-ranch/
123 The Lower Feather Raver Corridor Management Plan(produced by AECOM for DWR in 2014;
http://www.water.ca.gov/
floodmgmt/fmo/msb/lfremp)evaluates are variety of potential actions and proposes implementing actions that maintain
flood-control facilities,enhance habitat and ecosystem functions,and support agricultural and recreational activities.
.S2
124 "In contrast to the Sacramento Valley,in the San Joaquin Valley,the effectiveness of daze operation for modification
of rain-generated floods is substantially limited by the Valley's minimal floodway capacity.The first flood fills the reservoir,
and evacuation of the water is limited by the downstream channel capacities.This makes the likelihood of spilling large flood
flows from the reservoir much greater during subsequent flood events."A California Challenge—Flooding in the Central
Valley, DWR Independent Review Panel on Central Valley Flooding,October 15,2007,pp. 11-12.
http://www.water.ca.gov/news/newsreleases/2 008/101507challenge.pdf
125 "Expansion of floodways in tributary streams would be very helpful for dam operations during floods if the water could be
either safely routed through the Sacramento/San Joaquin River Delta or into valley-bottom floodplains."Ibid.
126 Draft Basin-Wide Feasibility Study, San Joaquin Basin,DWR, October 2016,section 4.
127 Coalition efforts include a letter to Governor Brown and Secretary Laird signed by Assemblyman Gallagher, Senator Nielsen
and others.https://www.orovillestrong.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/OroDamLetterSigned.pdf
128 Hydropower Reform Coalition, "Comments on Proposed Rulemaking-Regulations Implementing FAST Act Section Docket
No. 61003 –Critical Electric Infrastructure Security and Amending Critical Energy Infrastructure Information(FERC
Docket No.RIM16-15-000),"p.2. FERC eLibraryno.20160818-5218.
.S3
Back cover photo image: Crews continue the placement of rebar panels for the new side walls on the lower chute of
the Lake Qroville flood control spillway in Butte County,California.Photo taken September 5,2017.
Source.Ken lames/California Department of Water Resources,
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