HomeMy WebLinkAbout02.08.21 FW_ Educate Thyselves
From:Snyder, Ashley
To:Paulsen, Shaina
Subject:FW: Educate Thyselves
Date:Monday, February 8, 2021 1:33:55 PM
Attachments:Asymptomatic transmission of COVID-19 didn’t occur at all study of 10 million finds News Lifesitenews.pdf
No PCR Testing Equipment.docx
To Our Local Lawmakers and Enforcers of Butte County and State Representatives.docx
worldwide viral fatality rates.png
masks dont work.docx
The COVID-19 PCR Test Is Key to the Pandemic Fraud Principia Scientific Intl..pdf
BOS Correspodence.
Ashley N. Snyder
Assistant Clerk of the Board
Butte County Administration
25 County Center Drive, Suite 200, Oroville, CA 95965
T: 530.552.3307 | F: 530.538.7120
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From: CitizensofButteCountyCA <CitizensofButteCountyCA@protonmail.com>
Sent: Monday, February 8, 2021 12:18 PM
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Subject: Educate Thyselves
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Thereisnopublichealthemergency.Masksandlockdownsdon'twork.Asymptomaticspread
doesn'thappen.PCRtestsarefraudulent.Youcannotsuppressthetruth.
CitizensofButteCounty
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Jun
Masks Don’t Work:A Review of Science
Relevant to COVID-19 Social Policy
By Denis G. Rancourt, PhD
Masks and respirators do not work.
There have been extensive randomized controlled trial (RCT) studies,
and meta-analysis reviews of RCT studies, which all showthat masks
and respirators do not work to prevent respiratory influenza-like
illnesses, or respiratory illnesses believed to be transmitted by
droplets and aerosol particles.
Furthermore, the relevant known physics and biology, which I review,
are such that masks and respirators should not work. It would be a
paradox if masks and respirators worked, given what we know about
viral respiratory diseases: The main transmission path is long-
residence-
blocked, and the minimum-infective dose is smaller than one aerosol
particle.
The present paper about masks illustrates the degree to which
governments, the mainstream media, and institutional propagandists
can decide to operate in a science vacuum, or select only incomplete
science that serves their interests. Such recklessness is also certainly
the case with the current global lockdown of over 1 billion people, an
unprecedented experiment in medical and political history.
(From Words from the Publisher: "We pledge to publish all letters,
guest commentaries, or studies refuting \[Rancourt's\]general premise
that this mask-wearing culture and shaming could be more harmful
than helpful. Please send your feedback
toinfo@rcreader.com.")\[UPDATE: August 12, 2020 Still No Evidence
Justifying Mandatory Masks\]
on www.youtube.com</a>, or enableJavaScript if it is disabled in your
browser.</div></div>
Review of the Medical Literature
Here are key anchor points to the extensive scientific literature that
establishes that wearing surgical masks and respirators (e.g., “N95”)
does not reduce the risk of contracting a verified illness:
Jacobs, J. L. et al. (2009) “Use of surgical face masks to reduce the
incidence of the common cold among health care workers in Japan: A
randomized controlled trial,” American Journal of Infection Control,
Volume 37, Issue 5, 417 –419.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19216002
N95-masked health-care workers (HCW) were significantly more
likely to experience headaches. Face mask use in HCW was not
demonstrated to provide benefit in terms of cold symptoms or getting
colds.
Cowling, B. et al. (2010) “Face masks to prevent transmission of
influenza virus: A systematic review,” Epidemiology and Infection,
138(4), 449-456.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/epidemiology-and-
infection/article/face-masks-to-prevent-transmission-of-influenza-
virus-a-systematic-
review/64D368496EBDE0AFCC6639CCC9D8BC05
None of the studies reviewed showed a benefit from wearing a mask,
in either HCW or community members in households (H). See
summary Tables 1 and 2 therein.
bin-Reza et al. (2012) “The use of masks and respirators to prevent
transmission of influenza: a systematic review of the scientific
evidence,” Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses 6(4), 257–267.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1750-
2659.2011.00307.x
“There were 17 eligible studies. … None of the studies established a
conclusive relationship between mask/respirator use and protection
against influenza infection.”
Smith, J.D. et al. (2016) “Effectiveness of N95 respirators versus
surgical masks in protecting health care workers from acute
respiratory infection: a systematic review and meta-analysis,” CMAJ
Mar 2016 https://www.cmaj.ca/content/188/8/567
“We identified six clinical studies … . In the meta-analysis of the
clinical studies, we found no significant difference between N95
respirators and surgical masks in associated risk of (a) laboratory-
confirmed respiratory infection, (b) influenza-like illness, or (c)
reported work-place absenteeism.”
Offeddu, V. et al. (2017) “Effectiveness of Masks and Respirators
Against Respiratory Infections in Healthcare Workers: A Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis,” Clinical Infectious Diseases, Volume 65,
Issue 11, 1 December 2017, Pages 1934–1942,
https://academic.oup.com/cid/article/65/11/1934/4068747
“Self-reported assessment of clinical outcomes was prone to bias.
Evidence of a protective effect of masks or respirators against verified
respiratory infection (VRI) was not statistically significant”; as per Fig.
2c therein:
Radonovich, L.J. et al. (2019) “N95 Respirators vs Medical Masks for
Preventing Influenza Among Health Care Personnel: A Randomized
Clinical Trial,” JAMA. 2019; 322(9): 824–833.
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2749214
“Among 2862 randomized participants, 2371 completed the study and
accounted for 5180 HCW-seasons. ... Among outpatient health care
personnel, N95 respirators vs medical masks as worn by participants
in this trial resulted in no significant difference in the incidence of
laboratory-confirmed influenza.”
Long, Y. et al. (2020) “Effectiveness of N95 respirators versus surgical
masksagainst influenza: A systematic review and meta-analysis,” J
Evid Based Med. 2020; 1-9.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jebm.12381
“A total of six RCTs involving9,171 participants were included. There
were no statistically significant differences in preventing laboratory-
confirmed influenza, laboratory-confirmed respiratory viral infections,
laboratory-confirmed respiratory infection, and influenza-like illness
using N95 respirators and surgical masks. Meta-analysis indicated a
protective effect of N95 respirators against laboratory-confirmed
bacterial colonization (RR = 0.58, 95% CI 0.43-0.78). The use of N95
respirators compared with surgical masks is not associated with a
lower risk of laboratory-confirmed influenza.”
Conclusion Regarding That Masks Do Not Work
No RCT study with verified outcome shows a benefit for HCW or
community members in households to wearing a mask or respirator.
There is no such study. There are no exceptions.
Likewise, no study exists that shows a benefit from a broad policy to
wear masks in public (more on this below).
Furthermore, if there were any benefit to wearing a mask, because of
the blocking power against droplets and aerosol particles, then there
should be more benefit from wearing a respirator (N95) compared to
a surgical mask, yet several large meta-analyses, and all the RCT,
prove that there is no such relative benefit.
Masks and respirators do not work.
Precautionary Principle Turned on Its Head with Masks
In light of the medical research, therefore, it is difficult to understand
why public-health authorities are not consistently adamant about this
established scientific result, since the distributed psychological,
economic, and environmental harm from a broad recommendation to
wear masks is significant, not to mention the unknown potential harm
from concentration and distribution of pathogens on and from used
masks. In this case, public authorities would be turning the
precautionary principle on its head (see below).
Physics and Biology of Viral Respiratory Disease and of Why
Masks Do Not Work
In order to understand why masks cannot possibly work, we must
review established knowledge about viral respiratory diseases, the
mechanism of seasonal variation of excess deaths from pneumonia
and influenza, the aerosol mechanism of infectious disease
transmission, the physics and chemistry of aerosols, and the
mechanism of the so-called minimum-infective-dose.
In addition to pandemics that can occur anytime, in the temperate
latitudes there is an extra burden of respiratory-disease mortality that
is seasonal, and that is caused by viruses. For example, see the
review of influenza by Paules and Subbarao (2017). This has been
known for a long time, and the seasonal pattern is exceedingly
regular. (Publisher's note: All links to source references to studies
here forward are found at the end of this article.)
For example, see Figure 1 of Viboud (2010), which has “Weekly time
series of the ratio of deaths from pneumonia and influenza to all
deaths, based on the 122 cities surveillance in the US (blue line). The
red line represents the expected baseline ratio in the absence of
influenza activity,” here:
The seasonality of the phenomenon was largely not understood until
a decade ago. Until recently, it was debated whether the pattern
arose primarily because of seasonal change in virulence of the
pathogens, or because of seasonal change in susceptibility of the
host (such as from dry air causing tissue irritation, or diminished
daylight causing vitamin deficiency or hormonal stress). For example,
see Dowell (2001).
In a landmark study, Shaman et al. (2010) showed that the seasonal
pattern of extra respiratory-disease mortality can be explained
quantitatively on the sole basis of absolute humidity, and its direct
controlling impact on transmission of airborne pathogens.
Lowen et al. (2007) demonstrated the phenomenon of humidity-
dependent airborne-virus virulence in actual disease transmission
between guinea pigs, and discussed potential underlying
mechanisms for the measured controlling effect of humidity.
The underlying mechanism is that the pathogen-laden aerosol
particles or droplets are neutralized within a half-life that
monotonically and significantly decreases with increasing ambient
humidity. This is based on the seminal work of Harper (1961). Harper
experimentally showed that viral-pathogen-carrying droplets were
inactivated within shorter and shorter times, as ambient humidity was
increased.
Harper argued that the viruses themselves were made inoperative by
the humidity (“viable decay”), however, he admitted that the effect
could be from humidity-enhanced physical removal or sedimentation
of the droplets (“physical loss”): “Aerosol viabilities reported in this
paper are based on the ratio of virus titre to radioactive count in
suspension and cloud samples, and can be criticized on the ground
that test and tracer materials were not physically identical.”
The latter (“physical loss”) seems more plausible to me, since
humidity would have a universal physical effect of causing
particle/droplet growth and sedimentation, and all tested viral
pathogens have essentially the same humidity-driven “decay.”
Furthermore, it is difficult to understand howa virion (of all virus
types) in a droplet would be molecularly or structurally attacked or
damaged by an increase in ambient humidity. A “virion” is the
complete, infective form of a virus outside a host cell, with a core of
RNA or DNA and a capsid. The actual mechanism of such humidity-
driven intra-droplet “viable decay” of a virion has not been explained
or studied.
In any case, the explanation and model of Shaman et al. (2010) is not
dependent on the particular mechanism of the humidity-driven decay
ofvirions in aerosol/droplets. Shaman’s quantitatively demonstrated
model of seasonal regional viral epidemiology is valid for either
mechanism (or combination of mechanisms), whether “viable decay”
or “physical loss.”
The breakthrough achieved by Shaman etal. is not merely some
academic point. Rather, it has profound health-policy implications,
which have been entirely ignored or overlooked in the current
coronavirus pandemic.
In particular, Shaman’s work necessarily implies that, rather than
being a fixednumber (dependent solely on the spatial-temporal
structure of social interactions in a completely susceptible population,
and on the viral strain), the epidemic’s basic reproduction number
(R0) is highly or predominantly dependent on ambient absolute
humidity.
For a definition of R0, see HealthKnowlege-UK (2020): R0 is “the
average number of secondary infections produced by a typical case
of an infection in a population where everyone is susceptible.” The
average R0 for influenza is said to be 1.28 (1.19–1.37); see the
comprehensive review by Biggerstaff et al. (2014).
In fact, Shaman et al. showed that R0 must be understood to
seasonally vary between humid-summer values of just larger than “1”
and dry-winter values typically as large as “4” (for example, see their
Table 2). In other words, the seasonal infectious viral respiratory
diseases that plague temperate latitudes every year go from being
intrinsically mildly contagious to virulently contagious, due simply to
the bio-physical mode of transmission controlled by atmospheric
humidity, irrespective of any other consideration.
Therefore, all the epidemiological mathematical modeling of the
benefits of mediating policies (such as social distancing), which
assumes humidity-independent R0 values, has a largelikelihood of
being of little value, on this basis alone. For studies about modeling
and regarding mediation effects on the effective reproduction number,
see Coburn (2009) and Tracht (2010).
To put it simply, the “second wave” of an epidemic is not a
consequence of human sin regarding mask wearing and hand
shaking. Rather, the “second wave” is an inescapable consequence
of an air-dryness-driven many-fold increase in disease
contagiousness, in a population that has not yet attained immunity.
If my view of the mechanism is correct (i.e., “physical loss”), then
Shaman’s work further necessarily implies that the dryness-driven
high transmissibility (large R0) arises from small aerosol particles
fluidly suspended in the air; as opposed to large droplets that are
quickly gravitationally removed from the air.
Such small aerosol particles fluidly suspended in air, of biological
origin, are of every variety and are everywhere, including down to
virion-sizes (Despres, 2012). It is not entirely unlikely that viruses can
thereby be physically transported over inter-continental distances
(e.g., Hammond, 1989).
More to the point, indoor airborne virus concentrations have been
shown to exist (in day-care facilities, health centers, and on-board
airplanes) primarily as aerosol particles of diameters smaller than 2.5
concentrations ranged from 5800 to 37 000 genome copies m . On
average, 64 per cent of the viral genome copies were associated with
hours. Modeling of virus concentrations indoors suggested a source
deposition flux onto surfaces o
Brownian motion. Over one hour, the inhalation dose was estimated
to be 30 ± 18 median tissue culture infectious dose (TCID50),
adequate to induce infection. These results provide quantitative
support for the idea that theaerosol route could be an important
mode of influenza transmission.”
to gravitational sedimentation, and would not be stopped by long-
range inertial impact. This means that the slightest (even momentary)
facial misfit of a mask or respirator renders the design filtration norm
of the mask or respirator entirely irrelevant. In any case, the filtration
virion penetration, not to mention surgical masks. For example, see
Balazy et al. (2006).
Mask stoppage efficiency and host inhalation are only half of the
equation, however, because the minimal infective dose (MID) must
also be considered. For example, if a large numberof pathogen-
laden particles must be delivered to the lung within a certain time for
the illness to take hold, then partial blocking by any mask or cloth can
be enough to make a significant difference.
On the other hand, if the MID is amply surpassed by the virions
carried in a single aerosol particle able to evade mask-capture, then
the mask is of no practical utility, which is the case.
Yezli and Otter (2011), in their review of the MID, point out relevant
features:
1Most respiratory viruses are as infective in humans as in tissue
culture having optimal laboratory susceptibility
2It is believed that a single virion can be enough to induce illness in
the host
3The 50-percent probability MID (“TCID50”) has variably been found
4There are typically 10 to 3rd powervirions per
5The 50-percent probability MID easily fits into a single (one)
aerolized droplet
6For further background:
7A classic description of dose-response assessment is provided by
Haas (1993).
8Zwart et al. (2009) provided the first laboratory proof, in a virus-
insect system, that theaction of a single virion can be sufficient
to cause disease.
9Baccam et al. (2006) calculated from empirical data that, with
influenza A in humans,“we estimate that after a delay of ~6 h,
infected cells begin producing influenza virus and continue to
do so for ~5 h. The average lifetime of infected cells is ~11 h,
and the half-life of free infectious virus is ~3 h. We calculated
the \[in-body\] basic reproductive number, R0, which indicated
that a single infected cell could produce ~22 new productive
infections.”
10Brooke et al. (2013) showed that, contrary to prior modeling
assumptions, although not all influenza-A-infected cells in the
human body produce infectious progeny (virions), nonetheless,
90 percent of infected cell are significantly impacted, rather
than simply surviving unharmed.
All of this to say that: if anything gets through (and it always does,
irrespective of the mask), then you are going to be infected. Masks
cannot possibly work. It is not surprising, therefore, that no bias-free
study has ever found a benefit from wearing a mask or respirator in
this application.
Therefore, the studies that show partial stopping power of masks, or
that show that masks can capture many large droplets produced by a
sneezing or coughing mask-wearer, in light of the above-described
features of the problem, are irrelevant. For example, such studies as
these: Leung (2020), Davies (2013), Lai (2012), and Sande (2008).
Why There Can Never Be an Empirical Test of a Nation-
Wide Mask-Wearing Policy
As mentioned above, no study exists that shows a benefit from a
broad policy to wear masks in public. There is good reason for this. It
would be impossible to obtain unambiguous and bias-free results
\[because\]:
1Any benefit from mask-wearingwould have to be a small effect,
since undetected in controlled experiments, which would be
swamped by the larger effects, notably the large effect from
changing atmospheric humidity.
2Mask compliance and mask adjustment habits would be unknown.
3Mask-wearing is associated (correlated) with several other health
behaviors; see Wada (2012).
4The results would not be transferable, because of differing cultural
habits.
5Compliance is achieved by fear, and individuals can habituate to
fear-based propaganda,and canhave disparate basic
responses.
6Monitoring and compliance measurement are near-impossible, and
subject to largeerrors.
7Self-reporting (such as in surveys) is notoriously biased, because
individuals have theself-interested belief that their efforts are
useful.
8Progression of the epidemic is not verified with reliable tests on
large populationsamples, and generally relies on non-
representative hospital visits or admissions.
9Several different pathogens (viruses and strains of viruses) causing
respiratory illnessgenerally act together, in the same
population and/or in individuals, and are not resolved, while
having different epidemiological characteristics.
Unknown Aspects of Mask Wearing
Many potential harms may arise from broad public policies to wear
masks, and the following unanswered questions arise:
1Do used and loaded masks become sources of enhanced
transmission, for the wearer and others?
2Do masks become collectors and retainers of pathogens that the
mask wearer would otherwise avoid when breathing without a
mask?
3Are large droplets captured by a mask atomized or aerolized into
breathable components? Can virions escape an evaporating
droplet stuck to a mask fiber?
4What are the dangers of bacterial growth on a used and loaded
mask?
5How do pathogen-laden droplets interact with environmental dust
and aerosolscaptured on the mask?
6What are long-term health effects on HCW, such as headaches,
arising from impededbreathing?
7Are there negative social consequences to a masked society?
8Are there negative psychological consequences to wearing a mask,
as a fear-basedbehavioral modification?
9What are the environmental consequences of mask manufacturing
and disposal?
10Do the masks shed fibers or substances that are harmful when
inhaled?
Conclusion
By making mask-wearing recommendations and policies for the
general public, or by expressly condoning the practice, governments
have both ignored the scientific evidence and done the opposite of
following the precautionary principle.
In an absence of knowledge, governments should not make policies
that have a hypothetical potential to cause harm. The government
has an onus barrier before it instigates a broad social-engineering
intervention, or allows corporations to exploit fear-based sentiments.
Furthermore, individuals should know that there is no known benefit
arising from wearing a mask in a viral respiratory illness epidemic,
and that scientific studies have shown that any benefit must be
residually small, compared to other and determinative factors.
Otherwise, what is the point of publicly funded science?
The present paper about masks illustrates the degree to which
governments, the mainstream media, and institutional propagandists
can decide to operate in a science vacuum, or select only incomplete
science thatserves their interests. Such recklessness is also certainly
the case with the current global lockdown of over 1 billion people, an
unprecedented experiment in medical and political history.
Denis G. Rancourt is a researcher at the Ontario Civil Liberties
Association (OCLA.ca) and is formerly a tenured professor at the
University of Ottawa, Canada. This paper was originally published at
Rancourt's account on ResearchGate.net. As of June 5, 2020, this
paper was removed from his profile by its administrators at
Researchgate.net/profile/D_Rancourt. At Rancourt's blog
ActivistTeacher.blogspot.com, he recounts the notification and
responses he received from ResearchGate.net and states, “This is
censorship of my scientific work like I have never experienced
before.”
The original April 2020 white paper in .pdf format is available here,
complete with charts that have not been reprinted in the Reader print
or web versions.
RELATED COMMENTARY: An Unprecedented Experiment:
Sometimes You Just Gotta Wear the Stupid
Endnotes:
Baccam, P. et al. (2006) “Kinetics of Influenza A Virus Infection in
Humans”, Journal of Virology Jul 2006, 80 (15) 7590-7599; DOI:
10.1128/JVI.01623-05https://jvi.asm.org/content/80/15/7590
Balazy et al. (2006) “Do N95 respirators provide 95% protection level
against airborne viruses, and how adequate are surgical masks?”,
American Journal of Infection Control, Volume 34, Issue 2, March
2006, Pages 51-57. doi:10.1016/j.ajic.2005.08.018
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.488.4644&r
ep=rep1&type=pdf
Biggerstaff, M. et al. (2014) “Estimates of the reproduction number for
seasonal, pandemic, and zoonotic influenza: a systematic review of
the literature”, BMC Infect Dis 14, 480 (2014).
https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2334-14-480
Brooke, C. B. et al. (2013) “Most Influenza A Virions Fail To Express
at Least One Essential Viral Protein”, Journal of Virology Feb 2013,
87 (6) 3155-3162; DOI: 10.1128/JVI.02284-12
https://jvi.asm.org/content/87/6/3155
Coburn, B. J. et al. (2009) “Modeling influenza epidemics and
pandemics: insights into the future of swine flu (H1N1)”, BMC Med 7,
30. https://doi.org/10.1186/1741-7015-7-30
Davies, A. et al. (2013) “Testing the Efficacy of Homemade Masks:
Would They Protect in an Influenza Pandemic?”, Disaster Medicine
and Public Health Preparedness, Available on CJO 2013
doi:10.1017/dmp.2013.43
http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1935789313000438
Despres, V. R. et al. (2012) “Primary biological aerosol particles in
the atmosphere: a review”, Tellus B: Chemical and Physical
Meteorology, 64:1, 15598, DOI: 10.3402/tellusb.v64i0.15598
https://doi.org/10.3402/tellusb.v64i0.15598
Dowell, S. F. (2001) “Seasonal variation in host susceptibility and
cycles of certain infectious diseases”, EmergInfect Dis.
2001;7(3):369–374. doi:10.3201/eid0703.010301
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2631809/
Hammond, G. W. et al. (1989) “Impact of Atmospheric Dispersion and
Transport of Viral Aerosols on the Epidemiology of Influenza”,
Reviews of Infectious Diseases, Volume 11, Issue 3, May 1989,
Pages 494–497, https://doi.org/10.1093/clinids/11.3.494
Haas, C.N. et al. (1993) “Risk Assessment of Virus in Drinking
Water”, Risk Analysis, 13: 545-552. doi:10.1111/j.1539-
6924.1993.tb00013.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-
6924.1993.tb00013.x
HealthKnowlege-UK (2020) “Charter 1a -Epidemiology: Epidemic
theory (effective & basic reproduction numbers, epidemic thresholds)
& techniques for analysis of infectious disease data (construction &
use of epidemic curves, generation numbers, exceptional reporting &
identification of significant clusters)”, HealthKnowledge.org.uk,
accessed on 2020-04-10. https://www.healthknowledge.org.uk/public-
health-textbook/research-methods/1a-epidemiology/epidemic-theory
Lai, A. C. K. et al. (2012) “Effectiveness of facemasks to reduce
exposure hazards for airborne infections among general populations”,
J. R. Soc. Interface. 9938–948 http://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2011.0537
Leung, N.H.L. et al. (2020) “Respiratory virus shedding in exhaled
breath and efficacy of face masks”, Nature Medicine (2020).
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0843-2
Lowen, A. C. et al. (2007) “Influenza Virus Transmission Is
Dependent on Relative Humidity and Temperature”, PLoS Pathog
3(10): e151. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.0030151
Paules, C. and Subbarao, S. (2017) “Influenza”, Lancet, Seminar|
Volume 390, ISSUE 10095, P697-708, August 12, 2017.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)30129-0
Sande, van der, M. et al. (2008) “Professional and Home-Made Face
Masks Reduce Exposure to Respiratory Infections among the
General Population”, PLoS ONE 3(7): e2618.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002618
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0002618
Shaman, J. et al. (2010) “Absolute Humidity and the Seasonal Onset
of Influenza in the Continental United States”, PLoS Biol 8(2):
e1000316. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1000316
Tracht, S. M. et al. (2010) “Mathematical Modeling of the
Effectiveness of Facemasks in Reducing the Spread of Novel
Influenza A (H1N1)”, PLoS ONE 5(2): e9018.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009018
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0009018
Viboud C. et al. (2010) “Preliminary Estimates of Mortality and Years
of Life Lost Associated with the 2009 A/H1N1 Pandemic in the US
and Comparison with Past Influenza Seasons”, PLoS Curr. 2010;
2:RRN1153. Published 2010 Mar 20. doi:10.1371/currents.rrn1153
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2843747/
Wada, K. et al. (2012) “Wearing face masks in public during the
influenza season may reflect other positive hygiene practices in
Japan”, BMC Public Health 12, 1065 (2012).
https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-12-1065
Yang, W. et al. (2011) “Concentrations and size distributions of
airborne influenza A viruses measured indoors at a health centre, a
day-care centre and on aeroplanes”, Journal of the Royal Society,
Interface. 2011Aug;8(61):1176-1184. DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2010.0686.
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsif.2010.0686
Yezli, S., Otter, J.A. (2011) “Minimum Infective Dose of the Major
Human Respiratory and Enteric Viruses Transmitted Through Food
and the Environment”, Food Environ Virol 3, 1–30.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12560-011-9056-7
Zwart, M. P. et al. (2009) “An experimental test of the independent
action hypothesis in virus–insect pathosystems”, Proc. R. Soc. B.
2762233–2242 http://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2009.0064
3.26 Acceptance of Donations from Northern Valley Community
Foundation (NVCF) and Addition of Laboratory Equipment in the
Capital Asset Ledger
Good day.
I am a resident of Butte County who strongly opposes the acceptance
of Addition of Laboratory Equipment in the Capital Asset Ledger for the
following reasons.
Liability. I assert that Butte County owning and/or operating SARS-CoV-
2 RT-PCR testing equipment is a grave mistake because owning testing
equipment would establish the county as complicit in a testing scheme
that the public accepts on on good faith yet is unable to detect active live
or hot infections but has been promoted as if it does. Additionally Butte
County would be complicit in the misappropriation of test results by
allowing them to be used to manufacture baseless "Covid case
numbers" and distort reality as these test simply are not able to detect
active infection (citations below). Contrary to acquiring additional lab
equipment, Butte County has an obligation to reject the use of RT-PCR
test results for confirming covid cases used to determine county
coronavirus case totals and managing lockdown tiers.. Misleading the
public with PCR inflated numbers needs to stop immediately. There are
other methods of detecting active viral infection, but PCR is not one of
them.
Understand that Sars-Cov-2 RT-PCR test results are not like simple a
pregnancy tests that provide a "yes" or "no" result. What we have with
RT-PRC viral testing is a pipeline of misinformation that adulterates the
needed data that epidemiologists rely upon. In the context of public
health, promoting such a baseless test is deceitful and amounts to
nothing more than assigning meaning where none exists.
Things are about to change however. Top scientistshave beenproviding
expert testimony, and opinion throughout Europe, U.S. and elsewhere in
preparation for lawsuits affirming, more elegantly, one would
hope, what I am telling you here. These suits will address the full extent
of fraudulent tests, and the public health malfeasance that has
transpired as it relates to SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR tests leading up to
and during the lockdown.
By making this request to accept lab equipment, Butte County Board of
Supervisors and Butte County Public
Health leadership is verifying that it does not understand the scope
of product limitations that have (for decades) been printed on the test
inserts. Butte County has been remiss to not have informed the public
about these limitations and how RT-PCR is incapable of detecting live
infection or for providing infectious disease diagnosis. This failure
allows Butte County to continue to count every positive test results as a
"new case" when these "cases" are determined by the test to be
infectious cases. I argue this is false misleading testing and it is not
based on sound public health practice.
Below is a collection of evidence to support my position.
"...PCR does not distinguish between infectious virus and non-infectious
nucleic acid."
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(20)30868-0/fulltext
"SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR continued to detect the virus until the 63rd day
after symptom onset whereas the virus could only be isolated from
respiratory specimens collected within the first 18 days."
https://www.cebm.net/covid-19/infectious-positive-pcr-test-result-
covid-19/
HOW VALID IS THE PCR TEST?
The biochemist and Nobel laureate Kary Mullis developed the PCR test
in 1983 to amplify DNA sequences in vitro. According to Mullis, his test
is not suitable for diagnostic purposes. Even nowadays, the test cannot
determine whether an active virus infection is present. The gene
sequences found with the test can just as easily come from a virus
infection that has already been overcome or a contamination that does
not lead to an infection at all. It is questionable whether the so-called
Drosten test will find the correct gene sequence at all. Many German
laboratories use so-called house tests on the basis of the test protocols
published by the WHO (compare e.g. the so-called Drosten test assay of
January 17, 2020). According to European standards, these basically
require official validation. In practice, however, this has largely been
avoided because of the “emergency”.
https://cormandrostenreview.com/report/
HOW DANGEROUS IS SARS-COV-2?
Fears that SARS-CoV-2 could be significantly more dangerous in terms
of communicability, burden of disease and mortality than influenza have
proven to be incorrect. In the vast majority of cases, the infection is
symptom-free or with mild flu symptoms. Old, debilitated people with
previous illnesses run a higher risk of developing Covid-19. Many of the
very difficult courses, especially at the beginning of the wave of illnesses
in March 2020, can be attributed to treatment errors caused by panic
(intubation, etc.). Long-term effects have not yet been proven. An
evaluation of a total of 23 studies carried out worldwide has shown that
the corona infection death rate (IFR) for people over 70 years of age is
around 0.12%, for people under 70 years of age it is only 0.04%.
Lockdowns drive pandemics, as demonstrates in the article.
Excerpt;
Q: If health authorities vastly underestimated the prevalence of the
virus at the beginning of the pandemic, why did the virus nevertheless
wait until lockdowns were imposed to suddenly start killing at levels
which exceeded normal deaths?
Q: Why, indeed, was the virus so late to hit Mexico, and why did it wait
until precisely the moment that Mexico was fully (and finally) prepared
for it to start killing at levels that greatly exceeded normal deaths in that
city?
https://medium.com/@JohnPospichal/questions-for-lockdown-
apologists-32a9bbf2e247
https://medium.com/@JohnPospichal/questions-for-lockdown-
apologists-mexico-city-5261d981992d
The Smoking Gun Disclaimers | Product Inserts
PRODUCT DISCLAIMERS: SARS-COV-2 RT-PCR testing: BOS, PLEASE
READ THE FINE PRINT OF THE VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL LANGUAGE
FOUND ON PRODUCT INSERTS FROM SEVERAL RT-PCR TEST
MANUFACTURERS.
Product Insert - Excerpt of testing limitations (partial list);
"This test cannot rule out diseases caused by other bacterial or viral
pathogens."
"Nucleic acid may persist in vivo, independent of virus
viability. Detection of analyte target(s) does not imply that the
corresponding virus(es) are infectious or are the causative agents for
clinical symptoms. "
"This test is a qualitative test and does not provide the quantitative
value of detected organism present."
"This test has not been evaluated for patients without signs and
symptoms of respiratory tract infection."
___________________________
Association is not causation. RT-PCR testing is capable of
finding the "needle in a haystack" alright but functionally incapable of
detecting infectious states or infectiousness. This misrepresentation
is literally being used against the population, a pretext for inflating
active case counts in Butte County. The evidence provided herein
provides a glimpse of a body of evidence
This must change. Test limitation disclaimers should be made
mandatory to accompany every test given in Butte County. We also need
an ordinance to prevent BCPH from assigning positive RT-PCR test
results as part of the case count unless infection is present.
New York Times here article explains a small snapshot of the actual
testing problems. Here in Chico, one lab I talked to confirmed
that Covid nasal swab tests are processed at a 45 Ct (cycle
threshold) Remember the number 45 - as it will be important as one
reads the NY Times article all about RT-PCR testing.
This article attempts portray 45 cycle threshold for coronavirus is pure
science fiction. Other labs in Chico are also currently testing at the
upper limit threshold range between 42-45 Ct also. "There are three
kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics." Maybe it's time we
listened to Mark Twain who knew a thing or two, about more than a
thing or two.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/29/health/coronavirus-
testing.html
PCR Test
The Covid testing fraud in a nutshell:
https://uncoverdc.com/2020/12/03/ten-fatal-errors-scientists-attack-
paper-that-established-global-pcr-driven-lockdown/
Regards,
Concerned Citizen of Butte County
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ToOurLocalLawmakersandEnforcersofButteCountyandState
Representatives:
AccordingtotheCaliforniaEmergencyServicesAct(ESA)Section
8558-b:astateofemergencycanonlybecalledifthethreat
overwhelmsthecurrentresourcesofthestate.Furthermore,thestate
ofemergencyhastobeterminatedattheearliestpossibledate.
Section8558(b)“Stateofemergency”meansthedulyproclaimed
existenceofconditionsofdisasterorofextremeperiltothesafetyof
personsandpropertywithinthestatecausedbysuchconditionsas
airpollution,fire,flood,storm,epidemic,riot,drought,suddenand
severeenergyshortage,plantoranimalinfestationordisease,the
Governor’swarningofanCaliforniaEmergencyServicesAct4
CaliforniaGovernor’sOfficeofEmergencyServicesearthquakeor
volcanicprediction,oranearthquake,orotherconditions,otherthan
conditionsresultingfromalaborcontroversyorconditionscausinga
“stateofwaremergency,”which,byreasonoftheirmagnitude,areor
arelikelytobebeyondthecontroloftheservices,personnel,
equipment,andfacilitiesofanysinglecounty,cityandcounty,orcity
andrequirethecombinedforcesofamutualaidregionorregionsto
combat.
THUS:
Astateofemergencyrelatedtopublichealthcanonlybedeclaredif
thethreatoverwhelmstheresponsecapabilitiesofCalifornia’shealth
carepractitioners.
ThousandsofhealthcareworkersarebeingfurloughedinCalifornia,
sothereiszeroevidenceofgroundsforthisstateofemergency
basedonpublichealth.
Thereisno"threatthatoverwhelmsthecurrentresourcesofthe
state"sincethecovid-relateddeaths(withinflatednumbers)are
fewerthan3,000inCA,comparedto6,000+fortheaverage
seasonalflu.
Therefore,covid-19cannotlawfullybeclassifiedasan"epidemic".An
epidemiciswhentherearedisproportionatelylargenumbers
experiencinganoutbreakofadisease.Thereisnoevidenceofthisin
California.Therefore,thebasisfortheStateofEmergencyisinvalid
andunlawful(seesection8558b).
AswehaveclearlyseenhereinCalifornia,withthevirusfatalities,
theyareapproximately1/3ofthetypicalfatalitiesforaregular
seasonalflu.Therefore,ourstateresourcesarenotoverwhelmed.
Thereforethestateofemergencyshouldhavebeenterminated
accordingtoCalifornialaw,whichstates,attheearliestpossibledate
thatconditionswarrant.Thereforetherearenolegalgroundsforan
additionalextensionoranewstateofemergencytobedeclared.
Thus,accordingtoCalifornialaw,thegroundsforthestateof
emergencydonotexist.
Therefore,thecurrentstateofemergencyinCaliforniaisinvalidand
unlawful.
Regardingthelengthofthestateofemergency,thelawismurky.For
thedeclarationoflocalemergencies,agoverningbodyisrequiredto
renewthestateofemergencyafter30days.
Forastate-widedeclarationofstateofemergency,wherebythestate
iscontrollingthefoodandpharmaceuticals,theordersexpireafter60
days.§8627.5.Thetemporarysuspensionofanystatute,ordinance,
regulation,orruleshallremainineffectuntiltheorderorregulationis
rescindedbytheGovernor,theGovernorproclaimstheterminationof
thestateofemergency,orforaperiodof60days,whicheveroccurs
first.
(Section8567(b):Wheneverthestateofwaremergencyorstateof
emergencyhasbeenterminated,theordersandregulationsshallbe
ofnofurtherforceoreffect.
ThismeansthatalloftheordersthatwerecreatedundertheStateof
Emergencyarealsoexpired,includingbutnotlimitedto:stayathome
order,socialdistancing,wearingofmasks,closingofbusinessesand
schools,etc.
Note:Therearecountlessreportsofotherstate'slegislativebodies
extendingordenyingtheirstateofemergencydeclaration,butwhy
nothingfromCalifornia?Iwouldliketoknowwhatthelawmakersare
doingtoaddressthisinvalidandunlawfulstateofemergency
declaration.