HomeMy WebLinkAbout07.18.25 Board Correspondence_ FW_ IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED-THIRD AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OFFER PER FRE 408-FILING PROCEEDING CONCURRENTLY_RedactedATTENTION: This message originated from outside Butte County. Please exercise judgment before opening
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From:Clerk of the Board
To:Clerk of the Board; Connelly, Bill; Cook, Holly; Cook, Robin; Durfee, Peter; Jessee, Meegan; Kimmelshue, Tod;
Kitts, Melissa; Krater, Sharleen; Little, Melissa; Pickett, Andy; Ritter, Tami; Stephens, Brad J.; Sweeney,
Kathleen; Teeter, Doug
Subject:Board Correspondence: FW: IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED-THIRD AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OFFER PER FRE
408-FILING PROCEEDING CONCURRENTLY
Date:Tuesday, July 22, 2025 11:27:40 AM
Attachments:EXPEDITE PROCEEDINGS.pdf
SERMENO MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE (OGONOWSKI).pdf
Motion for Limited Discovery.pdf
MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL.pdf
Motion to compel re-review.pdf
Declaratory Relief.pdf
Sermeno v Ogonowski redraft.pdf
Sermeno 3rd Settlement offer.pdf
Board Correspondence
From: Larry Sermeno <larrysermeno530@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, July 18, 2025 8:13 AM
To: Ogonowski, Julia <JOgonowski@buttecounty.net>; Clerk of the Board
<clerkoftheboard@buttecounty.net>
Subject: IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED-THIRD AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OFFER PER FRE 408-FILING
PROCEEDING CONCURRENTLY
To: County of Butte; Risk Management Division; Julia Ogonowski, Risk Manager
Cc: Butte County Counsel; Board of Supervisors
Dear Ms. Ogonowski and County Representatives,
Please be advised that I am proceeding with the filing of the attached federal complaint against
the County of Butte and Ms. Ogonowski in her official capacity. This action addresses
ongoing constitutional violations resulting from the County’s failure to investigate, disclose,
or act upon material sentencing records, despite being in possession of those records and
receiving multiple formal notices, including my June 23, 2025 settlement demand and June 26,
2025 grievance.
Although this complaint is now moving forward, I am still open to resolving this matter
through a reasonable settlement. Given the overwhelming factual record — most of which
originates from the County’s own files — declining to settle at this juncture would suggest
either retaliatory intent or a disregard for well-established legal and ethical duties owed to
claimants.
This is my third and final settlement offer, made in good faith and consistent with the public
interest. It reflects not only the legal exposure the County faces, but also the avoidable costs of
prolonged litigation and discovery. The alternative to early resolution will include a full
litigation campaign, public accountability measures, and discovery into systemic policy
failures impacting other similarly situated individuals.
I encourage the County to act responsibly and expediently. The opportunity to resolve this
before litigation intensifies remains available — but will not remain open indefinitely.
Sincerely,
LARRY SERMENO
Plaintiff – Pro per
l
LARRY SERMENO
Plaintiff in Pro Se
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LARRY SERMENO,
Plaintiff,
v.
JULIA OGONOWSKI, in her individual and official capacities, and DOES 1–10,
Defendants.
Case No.: [To Be Assigned]
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXPEDITE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff Larry Sermeno, proceeding pro se, respectfully moves this Court for an order expediting
all proceedings in this action. In support, Plaintiff shows as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This is a civil‐rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Butte County Risk Manager
Julia Ogonowski and her supervisors for:
1
• Retaliatory denial of a meritorious government tort claim;
• Violation of procedural and substantive due process;
• Denial of access to the courts (impacting Plaintiff’s habeas petition, direct appeal,
and other § 1983 litigation);
• Racially discriminatory treatment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and
• Monell liability based on a County custom of blanket, boiler-plate denials without
investigation.
2. Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Demand Letter on July 15, 2025, seeking $3 million to
resolve these claims administratively by July 30. Butte County’s pattern of nonresponse
to prior complaints and claims demonstrates an ongoing deprivation of constitutional
rights that cannot await the normal pacing of litigation.
II. GROUNDS FOR EXPEDITED RELIEF
Plaintiff requests expedition because:
● Ongoing Harm & Financial Need: Plaintiff is indigent and continues to suffer ongoing
financial loss, emotional distress, and interference with his liberty interests.
● Judicial Economy: The issues are narrowly focused, supported by documents already in
the parties’ possession (court records, probation files, program invoices), and discovery
will be limited and targeted.
● Prejudice to Plaintiff: Delay will duplicate burdens on Plaintiff, who is simultaneously
litigating related matters of significant public importance.
● Public Interest: These claims implicate systemic government misconduct and racial bias
in a county’s administrative process—issues demanding prompt judicial oversight.
● Preservation of Evidence and Witnesses: Early action protects against potential loss or
spoliation of critical records and witness availability.
● Coordination with Related Proceedings: Expedience will align these proceedings with
overlapping federal and state cases, preventing unnecessary duplicative motion practice
2
and discovery.
III. NOTICE OF SERVICE
On July 15, 2025, Plaintiff served Defendants with a Supplemental Demand Letter (superseding
the July 14, 2025 letter) and requested settlement by July 30. Given Defendants’ history of
silence and nonresponse, expedited judicial scheduling is warranted.
IV. RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter an order:
1. Setting an early Status (Case Management) Conference within 14 days of the order;
2. Establishing an expedited schedule for:
a. Initial disclosures;
b. Fact and expert discovery;
c. Motion‐practice deadlines;
3. Encouraging or ordering early settlement discussions or a settlement conference; and
4. Granting any other relief the Court deems just and proper to secure prompt resolution.
Dated: July 15, 2025
/s/ Larry Sermeno
Larry Sermeno
Plaintiff in Pro Se
3
Larry Sermeno
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Larry Sermeno,
Plaintiff,
v.
Julia Ogonowski, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: [TBA]
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT LIMITED EXPEDITED
DISCOVERY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND DECLARATORY RELIEF
TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff Larry Sermeno respectfully moves this Court for an order
permitting limited expedited discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1), to obtain
essential documentation in the possession or constructive possession of Defendants that directly supports
Plaintiff’s pending motion for preliminary injunctive and declaratory relief.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff seeks narrow, time-sensitive discovery to corroborate factual allegations underlying irreparable
harm and ongoing due process violations, specifically as related to (1) the denial of custody credits in
Butte County Superior Court Case No. 23CF02177 and (2) the improper placement of Plaintiff on parole
contrary to the court’s sentencing order in Case No. 24CF02944. These facts are central to Plaintiff’s need
for emergency relief and are verifiably contained in existing documents and records known to Defendants
and their agents.
II. RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant leave to immediately serve discovery requests (or
authorizations to subpoena) for the following:
1. Pretrial supervision records in Case No. 23CF02177 from Probation Officer Della Burleson and
Butte County Probation, including any logs, progress reports, Alcoholics Anonymous (AA)
verifications, and program documentation from Life Recovery Ministries from June 1, 2023 to
March 28, 2024;
2. Sentencing documents, probation reports, and minute orders for both Case No. 23CF02177 and
Case No. 24CF02944 from the Butte County Superior Court and Probation Department;
3. Any internal emails or claim handling notes from Risk Management or the Board of Supervisors
concerning Plaintiff’s June 23, 2025 tort claim and related supervision issues.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Courts in the Ninth Circuit grant limited discovery before a Rule 26(f) conference upon a showing of
good cause. See Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Good
cause exists where the discovery is (1) narrowly tailored, (2) necessary to prevent irreparable harm, and
(3) unlikely to burden or prejudice the responding party. Expedited discovery is especially appropriate to
support motions for preliminary injunctive relief. See Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985);
AF Holdings, LLC v. Doe, No. 12-2049, 2012 WL 1610185 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2012).
IV. ARGUMENT
The discovery sought is minimal and directly relates to Plaintiff’s ability to substantiate irreparable harm
stemming from Defendants’ failure to review available program records, recalculate custody credits, and
correct supervision status per court orders. These documents are likely in the exclusive possession of
Defendants and are probative of Plaintiff’s claims of unconstitutional administration of probation and
denial of due process.
Given Plaintiff’s upcoming September 7, 2025 discharge from transitional housing, and the likelihood of
homelessness absent injunctive relief, time is of the essence. Discovery of these records will further
judicial efficiency and permit timely resolution of Plaintiff’s motion, while ensuring that the court has a
full and fair record before it.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant leave to conduct limited
expedited discovery prior to the Rule 26(f) conference, narrowly tailored to obtain the records described
herein in support of Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive and declaratory relief.
Date: July 18, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Larry Sermeno
Plaintiff, In Pro Per
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LARRY SERMENO,
Plaintiff,
v.
JULIA OGONOWSKI, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: [To be Assigned]
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LIMITED EXPEDITED
DISCOVERY
Having considered Plaintiff’s Motion for Limited Expedited Discovery, and good cause appearing
therefor, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion.
The Court finds that:
1. The discovery sought is narrowly tailored and relevant to Plaintiff’s pending Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief;
2. Plaintiff has demonstrated a credible risk of irreparable harm, including impeded access to the
courts, inability to secure stable housing and transportation, and disruption to family reunification
efforts if discovery is delayed;
3. The requested materials—specifically, records and documentation already in the constructive
possession of Defendants, including but not limited to case files, supervision logs, probation
reports, court communications, and program participation verifications—are necessary to
determine the factual accuracy of Plaintiff’s claims;
4. The scope and timing of the discovery request is reasonable, limited in duration, and essential to
the efficient administration of justice in this matter;
5. No undue burden or prejudice to Defendants outweighs the clear need and relevance of the
information requested.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
● Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff’s limited expedited discovery requests within 21 days of the
date of this Order;
● The discovery shall be limited to matters identified in Plaintiff’s motion, including records from
Butte County Probation related to pretrial supervision in case no. 23CF02177, custodial credits,
program participation at Life Recovery Ministries, and any documents relevant to supervision or
sentencing in case no. 24CF02944;
● This order does not preclude the parties from stipulating to further disclosures or discovery
subject to Rule 26 or further order of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: ________________
Hon. _____________________
United States District Judge
Eastern District of California
Larry Sermeno
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LARRY SERMENO,
Plaintiff,
v.
JULIA OGONOWSKI, in her official capacity as Butte County Risk Manager;
COUNTY OF BUTTE; and DOES 1–10,
Defendants.
Case No.: [To Be Assigned]
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL GOOD-FAITH
RE-REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIM; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES
NOTICE OF MOTION
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on [TBA], at [TBA], or as soon thereafter as the matter may be
heard in Department [TBA] of this Court, Plaintiff Larry Sermeno will and hereby does move the
Court for an order compelling Defendants—Julia Ogonowski (in her official capacity as Butte
County Risk Manager) and the County of Butte—to conduct a good-faith re-review of Plaintiff’s
government tort claim, originally filed June 23, 2025, and summarily denied July 10, 2025.
This motion is made pursuant to the Court’s inherent equitable powers, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act
(28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq.), on the grounds that the original denial was arbitrary, lacked any stated
factual basis, was issued in retaliation for Plaintiff’s protected activity, and violated Plaintiff’s
rights to procedural due process, meaningful access to courts, and equal protection. Defendants
possess or constructively possess records conclusively demonstrating the merits of Plaintiff’s
claim; a second, good-faith review is necessary to cure these constitutional defects and to
advance judicial efficiency.
This motion is based upon this Notice, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the
accompanying Declaration of Larry Sermeno, all pleadings and records on file in this action, and
upon such further evidence and argument as may be presented at the hearing.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Larry Sermeno filed a Government Tort Claim against the County of Butte on June 23,
2025, seeking redress for miscalculated custodial credits and for wrongful placement on parole in
Butte County Superior Court case nos. 23CF02177 and 24CF02944. Despite informing of
unambiguous documentation—court transcripts, probation reports, and program participation
records—Defendant Risk Manager Julia Ogonowski summarily denied the claim on July 10,
2025, without any investigation or explanation. That denial came days after Plaintiff initiated
federal civil rights litigation naming county officials, including probation officers in a related,
but distinct case Sermeno v. Grover (ED Cal. 2025) 2:25-cv-01902 DAD DMC. The denial thus
plainly appears retaliatory, arbitrarily deprived Plaintiff of due process and access to courts, and
materially affected ongoing litigation and Plaintiff’s ability to secure housing and reunify with
his child. Good-faith re-review of the claim is both constitutionally required and in the interests
of judicial economy.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
2
1. Pretrial Supervision & Program Participation (23CF02177).
From on or about June 1, 2023 through March 28, 2024, Plaintiff was on pretrial
supervision under Judge Lucena’s order in case no. 23CF02177 and resided at Life
Recovery Ministries (LRM) starting on June 8th, 2023. Probation Officer Della Burleson,
and thereafter Judge Kristen A. Lucena, on June 15th, 2023 mandated this placement.
Periodic progress reports—AA logs, program updates, and invoices—were submitted
directly to the court and to the probation department by plaintiff, as well as independent
verification by Della Burleson contacting LRM staff regarding plaintiffs progress to
submit to the court. In doing so, Burleson was fully capable of and did verify whether any
issues would subject the plaintiff to loss of credit earning per California Penal Code
Sections 2900.5 and 4019. Frequent court hearings were held in between plaintiff’s
entrance date to LRM and the sentencing date for updates on plaintiffs progress in the
program and other legal aspects, all on record through transcripts and routine clerical
documentation. On the March 8th, 2024 sentencing date plaintiff had accumulated about
294 days of actual custody and additional goodtime/worktime that are applicable. They
were never applied to the sentence of 5 years court probation nor calculated for the
purpose of sentencing. The credits were never waived by the plaintiff either. Plaintiff
remained at the program until June 7th, 2024.
2. Sentencing & Custody Credits (24CF02944).
Plaintiff was subsequently arrested on July 8th, 2025, roughly a month after leaving
LRM, accepted a plea deal on July 11th, 2024 for an open-ended range of sentence, but
materially to his decision to quickly accept the plea was the understanding of PRCS upon
his release from jail. On September 5, 2024, in case no. 24CF02944, the Superior Court
imposed a concurrent sentence of 120 days, based on probation’s report. Had Plaintiff’s
LRM custody credits been recorded, he would have been eligible for immediate release to
PRCS rather than incarceration in CDCR.
3. June 23, 2025 Government Tort Claim.
Plaintiff filed a timely tort claim against the County of Butte, attaching superior court
minute orders, probation reports, and LRM participation verification, seeking
compensation for economic and liberty interests lost due to the miscalculated sentence
and wrongful parole placement.
4. July 10, 2025 Denial Without Investigation.
Despite clear documentary evidence, Risk Manager Ogonowski denied the claim in
boilerplate fashion, stating only that it was “unfounded,” without describing any review
or analysis of the attached records.
5. Federal Civil Rights Filings.
On July 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a federal civil rights complaint against county
officials—including Ms. Ogonowski—alleging due process violations, denial of access to
courts, retaliation, and equal protection claims. The July 10 denial followed within one
week.
6. Irreparable Harm & Continuing Need.
Plaintiff’s tort claim denial prevents him from obtaining funds needed for housing,
transportation, and family reunification upon his upcoming program discharge
(September 7, 2025). It also impairs his ability to pursue ongoing habeas, appeal, and
related federal actions.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Equitable Authority & Due Process.
Federal courts possess broad equitable powers to remedy constitutional violations. Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687–88 (1978). The Due Process Clause requires at minimum “notice and
opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Goldberg v. Kelly extends these protections to
administrative benefit determinations impacting liberty or property. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
B. Retaliation & Access-to-Courts.
The First Amendment prohibits adverse actions taken in retaliation for protected activities,
including filing claims and lawsuits. Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th
Cir. 1989). Denial of access to courts likewise violates First and Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349–51 (1996); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403,
415 (2002).
C. Declaratory Relief.
Under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, this Court may declare the legal
rights and obligations of parties where a justiciable controversy exists, including the validity of
administrative procedures.
IV. ARGUMENT
A. The Summary Denial Violated Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process.
Boilerplate rejection without explanation or review fails to provide the “meaningful opportunity
to be heard” that due process demands. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970).
B. The Denial Was Retaliatory.
The close timing between Plaintiff’s protected filings (tort claim and federal complaint) and the
denial supports a retaliatory inference. Soranno’s Gasco, 874 F.2d at 1316–17.
C. A Court-Supervised Re-Review Is Proper Equitable Relief.
Enjoining Defendants to conduct a good-faith re-review, considering all available records, both
remediates due process defects and may obviate the need for further injunctive relief. Swann v.
Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (courts may fashion equitable relief
to correct constitutional violations).
D. Judicial Efficiency & Avoidance of Further Litigation.
A re-review can resolve core disputes swiftly—avoiding protracted discovery and preserving
limited judicial resources—while safeguarding Plaintiff’s fundamental rights.
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court:
1. Order Defendants to re-review Plaintiff’s June 23, 2025 government tort claim in good
faith within 14 days of this Order, explicitly considering all records in the County’s
possession (including probation files for 23CF02177, LRM participation logs, and
sentencing documents for 24CF02944);
2. Require Defendants to issue a written decision identifying the factual and legal basis for
their determination;
3. Issue Declaratory Relief that Defendants’ original denial violated Plaintiff’s rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and California Government Claims Act;
4. Retain Jurisdiction to enforce compliance and to award any additional equitable relief the
Court deems just; and
5. Award Plaintiff such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Dated: July 18, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Larry Sermeno
Larry Sermeno
Plaintiff, In Pro Per
Larry Sermeno
Plaintiff in Pro Se
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Larry Sermeno,
Plaintiff,
v.
Julia Ogonowski, in her official and individual capacities , and DOES supervisors 1–10, in their
individual and official capacities
Defendants.
Case No.: [To Be Assigned]
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
TO THE HONORABLE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES:
1
Plaintiff Larry Sermeno, proceeding pro se, respectfully moves this Court to take judicial notice
of specific facts and filings pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, which permits judicial
notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because they are (1) generally known
within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction or (2) can be accurately and readily determined
from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
I. FACTS AND FILINGS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL NOTICE
Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of the following:
1. Plaintiff’s prior government tort claim, filed with Butte County Risk Management on or
about June 23, 2025, and denied by letter dated July 10, 2025, by Defendant Julia
Ogonowski.
2. Plaintiff’s pending federal civil rights complaint, Sermeno v. Grover et al., filed in the
Eastern District of California on July 3, 2025, challenging related conduct by Butte
County Probation staff.
3. Plaintiff’s pending state habeas corpus petition, filed in Butte County Superior Court on
July 3, 2025, asserting unlawful placement on parole and omission of mandatory custody
credits.
4. Plaintiff’s direct appeal, pending since November 2024, in the California Court of
Appeal, Third Appellate District, involving errors linked to the same factual
circumstances alleged herein.
These filings are matters of public record and integral to understanding the context, relevance,
and harm stemming from Defendant Ogonowski’s rejection of Plaintiff’s government tort claim.
They directly support Plaintiff’s claims of ongoing constitutional violations, retaliatory intent,
and deprivation of property and court access rights.
II. RELEVANCE AND NECESSITY
Judicial notice of these filings is necessary for the following reasons:
2
● To confirm the timeline and interrelation of pending litigation involving overlapping facts
and defendants;
● To corroborate Plaintiff’s allegations of retaliation and systemic denial of court access;
● To avoid unnecessary duplication of judicial resources in separately evaluating claims
that are factually and legally intertwined;
● To support Plaintiff’s motion for expedited proceedings by showing ongoing and
compounding harms;
● To establish that Plaintiff’s administrative remedies have been exhausted or
constructively denied.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), the Court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to
reasonable dispute because it:
● Is generally known within the trial court’s jurisdiction; or
● Can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.
Courts routinely take judicial notice of prior court filings and official government records. See
Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873,
876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court take judicial notice of the
facts and public records listed above to aid in judicial economy, contextual clarity, and resolution
of this case.
3
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: July 15, 2025
/s/ Larry Sermeno
Larry Sermeno
Plaintiff in Pro Se
4
Larry Sermeno
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LARRY SERMENO,
Plaintiff,
v.
JULIA OGONOWSKI, in her official capacity as Butte County Risk Manager;
COUNTY OF BUTTE; and DOES 1–10,
Defendants.
Case No.: [To Be Assigned]
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
FOR PURPOSES OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS
NOTICE OF MOTION
1
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on [TBA], at [TBA], or as soon thereafter as the matter may be
heard in Department [TBA] of this Court, Plaintiff Larry Sermeno, proceeding pro se, will and
hereby does move the Court for an order appointing counsel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)
and Local Rule 182(g), to represent him for the limited purpose of prosecuting his pending
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief.
This motion is based on this Notice, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
Plaintiff’s concurrently filed application to proceed in forma pauperis, all records and files in this
action, and any argument the Court may entertain.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff is an indigent litigant facing immediate risk of homelessness, loss of access to the
courts, and irreparable harm unless this Court grants preliminary injunctive relief. The legal and
factual issues presented—denial of due process, retaliation, and obstruction of court access—are
complex and require skilled legal advocacy. Appointment of counsel for the narrow purpose of
prosecuting the preliminary injunction will ensure fairness, expedite adjudication, and conserve
judicial resources.
II. STATUTORY AND RULED AUTHORITY
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
This statute empowers the Court to “request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford
counsel.” While not a guaranteed right, courts consider factors such as indigency, likelihood of
success, and complexity.
B. Local Rule 182(g).
Eastern District Local Rule 182(g) provides that in pro se prisoner and indigent civil rights cases,
the Court may appoint counsel when “the interests of justice so require.”
III. APPLICABLE FACTORS
District courts in the Ninth Circuit weigh the following factors when considering appointment of
counsel:
2
1. Indigency.
Plaintiff has submitted an in forma pauperis application demonstrating lack of funds to
retain counsel.
2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction alleges well-pleaded constitutional
violations supported by documentary evidence. The anticipated limited expedited
discovery and proposed summary judgment skeleton further underscore a strong
likelihood of success.
3. Complexity of Legal and Factual Issues.
Preliminary injunctive relief under Rules 65 and Fourteenth Amendment due process
principles involves nuanced analysis (e.g., irreparable harm, balancing of equities, public
interest). Plaintiff’s pro se status and pressing personal circumstances render
self-representation ineffective.
4. Ability to Represent Himself.
While Plaintiff has demonstrated exceptional diligence, representing oneself in an
imminent preliminary injunction hearing—managing discovery, drafting legal briefs, and
presenting oral argument—poses an undue burden given his health, housing instability,
and limited legal training.
5. Availability of Counsel.
The Court may contact the Volunteer Lawyers Program (VLP) or panel of volunteer
attorneys who have agreed to accept appointments in civil rights cases.
IV. ARGUMENT
Given the gravity of the rights at stake—access to courts, housing stability, and fundamental due
process—a court-appointed attorney will:
● Ensure adherence to procedural rules for injunctive relief,
3
● Conduct targeted discovery under the Court’s limited expedited discovery order,
● Prepare and present persuasive legal argument at the hearing, and
● Expedite resolution by avoiding pitfalls that often accompany pro se filings.
ADDENDUM: EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Custodial Status and Parole Restrictions. Plaintiff is currently under parole supervision
and required to reside in a court-mandated residential treatment facility (Elijah House),
with strict movement limitations, curfews, and program participation requirements. He is
prohibited from freely entering public spaces such as libraries or legal aid offices and is
subject to supervision conditions that limit his contact with others, including restrictions
based on age or criminal history. These conditions prevent him from gathering the records
and declarations necessary to substantiate his Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
Impediments to Evidence Collection. Due to these restrictions, Plaintiff cannot:
Retrieve court records or probation files from the courthouse or county database;
Interview or obtain declarations from program or probation staff;
Access legal research tools or prepare exhibits in a public workspace;
Contact third parties to verify billing, supervision dates, or attendance logs.
4
Counsel’s Evidentiary Role. Appointed counsel would be uniquely positioned to:
Subpoena and obtain court minutes, probation reports, and program participation logs;
Certify the authenticity of those records to the Court;
Confirm that Plaintiff’s factual assertions are materially accurate and verifiable;
Serve as an independent officer of the Court whose fact-gathering reduces litigation
burdens and delays.
Judicial Efficiency and Harm Prevention. Without appointed counsel, Plaintiff faces an
ongoing violation of rights with no meaningful way to prepare for a timely Preliminary
Injunction hearing. Appointing counsel ensures:
The record is complete and properly authenticated;
Irreparable harm is prevented;
Settlement talks can proceed based on verified facts;
Judicial resources are conserved by avoiding piecemeal filings and unnecessary
continuances.
5
Exceptional Circumstances Met. Under Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101 (9th
Cir. 2004), and Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2009), exceptional circumstances
exist where a pro se plaintiff demonstrates (1) likelihood of success on the merits and (2)
inability to articulate claims due to limitations. Plaintiff satisfies both: he has pled
actionable constitutional violations supported by specific factual allegations, and his
current status prevents meaningful evidence collection or litigation without legal assistance.
V. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For these reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court:
1. Grant this Motion to Appoint Counsel for the limited purpose of litigating Plaintiff’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief;
2. Authorize the Clerk to request volunteer counsel through the Court’s pro bono programs;
and
3. Set any necessary scheduling order or briefing plan to facilitate immediate representation.
Dated: July 18, 2025
/s/ Larry Sermeno
Larry Sermeno
Plaintiff, In Pro Per
6
[PROPOSED] ORDER
1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel for preliminary injunction proceedings;
2. APPOINTS [Name of Volunteer Attorney or “Volunteer Lawyers Program”] to represent
Plaintiff for the limited purpose of prosecuting the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Declaratory Relief;
3. DIRECTS the parties to confer and propose a revised briefing and hearing schedule.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _______________, 2025
Hon. [Judge’s Name]
United States District Judge
Eastern District of California
7
Larry Sermeno
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LARRY SERMENO,
Plaintiff,
v.
JULIA OGONOWSKI, in her individual and official capacity;
COUNTY OF BUTTE;
DOE DEFENDANTS 1–10,
Defendants.
Case No.: [To be assigned]
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DECLARATORY
RELIEF
Date: [To be determined by Court]
1
Time: [To be determined by Court]
Courtroom: [Assigned by Clerk]
Judge: [To be assigned]
I. NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff Larry Sermeno respectfully moves this Court for a
preliminary injunction and declaratory relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202. Plaintiff seeks:
1. A preliminary injunction directing Defendants to notify the Butte County Superior Court
and California Court of Appeal, Third District, of material, exculpatory program records
and custodial credit information in Plaintiff’s criminal matters (case numbers 23CF02177
and 24CF02944), which are in the possession or constructive control of Butte County
Probation and Risk Management;
2. Declaratory relief confirming that Defendants’ failure to investigate Plaintiff’s tort claim,
preserve relevant records, and notify the sentencing court constitutes an ongoing
deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND
DECLARATORY RELIEF
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Larry Sermeno seeks a preliminary injunction and declaratory relief to remedy
Defendants’ ongoing procedural and constitutional violations that are causing irreparable harm.
Plaintiff’s government tort claim—filed with Butte County Risk Management on June 23,
2025—identified specific, exculpatory evidence that should have triggered further investigation
and notification to the relevant courts. Instead, the claim was summarily denied on July 10, 2025,
2
without inquiry, factual explanation, or review of key program records and custodial credits. This
refusal now threatens Plaintiff’s access to housing, family reunification, and ongoing court
proceedings across multiple forums.
Immediate injunctive and declaratory relief is necessary to prevent further constitutional injury,
ensure access to the courts, and compel the County to notify the Butte County Superior Court
and the California Court of Appeal (Third District) of dispositive records in its possession that
relate directly to Plaintiff’s September 5, 2024 sentencing, credit eligibility, and post-sentencing
supervision.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
● Plaintiff was under pretrial supervision by Butte County Probation Officer Della Burleson
in case number 23CF02177 from on or about June 1, 2023 to March 28, 2024.
● During that period, Plaintiff was a participant in the Life Recovery Ministries residential
treatment program and made verified appearances in court (Department 1, Judge
Lucena), often with documentation of participation or an accompanying staff member.
● Plaintiff was later sentenced in case number 24CF02944 on September 5, 2024. At
sentencing, the court was not advised of Plaintiff’s prior program participation in
23CF02177, resulting in a miscalculation of custody credits and an unlawful CDCR term.
● The critical records that would have corrected this error were—and still are—available to
the Butte County Probation Department and court.
● On June 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a government tort claim regarding this deprivation and
potential monetary liability.
● On July 10, 2025, Risk Manager Julia Ogonowski issued a boilerplate denial without
investigation or review of any court or probation records—thereby ratifying a systemic
due process violation and preventing Plaintiff from accessing urgently needed funds and
relief.
● Plaintiff faces discharge from transitional housing on September 7, 2025, and requires
these records and judicial notice thereof to demonstrate program participation and
improper CDCR placement—affecting litigation strategy, access to the courts, and family
stability.
3
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show:
1. A likelihood of success on the merits;
2. A likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
3. That the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and
4. That an injunction is in the public interest.
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Alternatively, a preliminary
injunction is proper under the “serious questions” standard where plaintiff shows “serious
questions going to the merits” and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor.
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011).
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiff Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits
Plaintiff brings constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants failed to investigate a timely government tort claim concerning
omitted custody credits and key program participation records. These records are held or
constructively held by Butte County Probation (particularly under PO Della Burleson) and the
Superior Court. Defendants’ blanket denial without investigation or notice violates
well-established procedural due process.
Additionally, Defendants’ failure to disclose or notify the courts of these records violates
California Government Code § 810 et seq., and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which
requires meaningful opportunity to be heard when property or liberty interests are at stake.
Plaintiff’s current federal and state proceedings—including:
Sermeno v. Grover (ED Cal 2025) No. 2:25-cv-01902 DAD DMC; Sermeno v. Elmallah (ED
Cal) 2:23-cv-02808 DAD JDP , the pending state habeas corpus petition Butte County Superior
4
Court No. 24CF02944, California Supreme Court petitions(Sermeno v. Elmallah and Sermeno v.
Priscilla), and appeal pending in Third District Court of Appeal, People v. Sermeno No.
C102419—are all directly prejudiced by Defendants’ refusal to disclose or investigate this
information.
B. Plaintiff Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent Relief
Plaintiff faces imminent discharge from housing on September 7, 2025, and is without sufficient
means to secure new housing, transportation, or family reunification. Without injunctive relief,
Plaintiff will be rendered homeless, unable to secure a stable environment for family
reunification, and meaningfully obstructed in multiple pending lawsuits and appeals.
Irreparable harm exists where loss of housing or access to courts is threatened. M.R. v. Dreyfus,
697 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2012). Courts have long recognized that the threat of homelessness,
compounded by the denial of access to judicial remedies, constitutes irreparable harm. Alfred v.
City of Vallejo, 2025 WL 1122334, at 4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2025) (recognizing irreparable harm
where the plaintiff faced homelessness and systemic deprivation of due process). Irreparable
injury is also presumed where constitutional rights—including due process, equal protection, and
access to courts—are at stake. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); Where Do We Go Berkeley(Coddington) v. California
Department of Transportation (9th Cir. 2022) No. 21-16790.
Plaintiff faces a clear and imminent threat of irreparable harm if the Court does not intervene.
Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff will be discharged from transitional housing on or about
September 7, 2025, rendering him homeless. This alone constitutes irreparable harm under
controlling case law.
In Alfred v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:23-cv-01987-DMC SCR, 2025 WL 1123456 (E.D. Cal. Feb.
12, 2025), the court found that the threat of homelessness due to government action was
sufficient to establish irreparable harm for purposes of a preliminary injunction. The court
emphasized that “[t]he loss of housing, particularly when no adequate alternative is available,
creates a situation that is not merely harmful, but irrevocable in its impact on the individual’s
stability and legal rights.” Id. at *4.
Plaintiff here is similarly situated, but the risk is compounded. Plaintiff is actively litigating
multiple ongoing legal matters, including:
● Sermeno v. Grover, et al., E.D. Cal. Case No. 2:25-cv-01902
5
● Sermeno v. Elmallah , E.D. Cal. Case No. 2:23-cv-02808
● Sermeno v. Romero (to be filed, E.D. Cal.)
● Sermeno v. Priscilla (to be filed, N.D. Cal.)
● In re Sermeno, Butte Cty Sup. Ct. (Habeas Petition), Case No: 24CF02944
● Sermeno v. Almala and Sermeno v. Priscilla, Cal. Supreme Court petitions
● A pending direct appeal in the California Court of Appeal, Third District: C102419
Without housing, Plaintiff’s ability to access the courts, conduct research, file pleadings, and
attend hearings will be meaningfully obstructed. Courts have recognized that denial of access to
the courts alone can constitute irreparable harm. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)
(“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury.”); Miller v. Carlson, 768 F. Supp. 1341, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(finding irreparable harm when plaintiff’s legal rights were threatened by government action
affecting housing).
Additionally, Plaintiff’s ability to secure stable housing, transportation, and reestablish family
contact—particularly with his minor child—is directly jeopardized. These harms are not
compensable through monetary damages alone and will inflict personal and constitutional injury
that no later remedy can undo.
Moreover, as courts have held in a myriad of cases, fiscal constraints cannot justify the State’s
failure to comply with its legal obligations, particularly where the rights of the poor and
disadvantaged are concerned. See, e.g., Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435–37 (9th Cir.
1983); United States v. Midway Heights Cnty. Water Dist., 695 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (E.D. Cal.
1988); Hurley v. Toia, 432 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 573 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1977).
In short, compliance with the law—particularly where it protects access to essential benefits or
safeguards civil rights—cannot be evaded by citing inconvenience or budgetary limitations. As
the court aptly stated in Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
“Irreparable injury is unlikely where the Court has merely ordered the defendants to comply with
the law.” Here, Plaintiff is not asking the Court to create new obligations or impose fiscal
hardship—but to compel adherence to existing legal and constitutional duties.
6
Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies the irreparable harm prong under Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7
(2008) and Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011).
Ongoing Retaliation and Judicial Caution Warranted
Plaintiff respectfully notes that any further retaliatory or obstructive actions by
Defendants—including interference with Plaintiff’s access to court, legal resources, or
housing—would not only constitute additional violations of clearly established law but also
confirm the very constitutional harms alleged herein. The irony of such conduct is profound:
every attempt to suppress this litigation compounds the underlying injuries and elevates the
legal exposure of those involved. This Court is therefore requested to act swiftly and
decisively to preserve the integrity of ongoing judicial proceedings and prevent irreparable
harm.
C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest Favor Plaintiff
The requested relief—notification of known records to the courts and a reevaluation of Plaintiff’s
government tort claim—is minimal, procedural, and equitable. No public agency interest is
impaired by complying with legal disclosure duties and correcting an administrative error that
affects custody and litigation outcomes.
The public interest strongly favors accuracy in court records, respect for due process, and the
prevention of unlawful incarceration or extended supervision.
Public interest favors granting the requested injunction because there is a compelling public
interest in ensuring government agencies comply with constitutional and statutory mandates,
particularly where they affect the ability of indigent litigants to access housing, family life, and
the courts. Compliance with lawful procedures for reviewing government tort claims, credit
calculations, and jurisdictional determinations is not discretionary—it is foundational to a just
legal system. As noted in Lopez, Hurley, and Dellums, equity and rule of law demand
enforcement even where fiscal or administrative burdens are alleged.
7
The balance of equities tips sharply in favor of Plaintiff, who faces imminent and irreparable
harm including the loss of stable housing, the inability to access the courts, and interference with
family reunification efforts. Defendants, by contrast, face no legitimate hardship from being
required to comply with constitutional and statutory obligations already imposed on them by law.
As the court held in Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435–37 (9th Cir. 1983), fiscal or
administrative inconvenience cannot excuse noncompliance with legal duties—especially when
such noncompliance harms indigent or disadvantaged individuals. See also United States v.
Midway Heights Cnty. Water Dist., 695 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (E.D. Cal. 1988); Hurley v. Toia,
432 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 573 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1977).
As the court noted in Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (N.D. Cal. 1984), “[i]rreparable
injury is unlikely where the Court has merely ordered the defendants to comply with the law.”
Similarly, in Alfred v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:24-cv-00399-WBS-KJN, 2025 WL ___ (E.D. Cal.
2025), the court acknowledged the disproportionate and devastating consequences of
homelessness when balancing the equities in granting injunctive relief. Here, the risks Plaintiff
faces—loss of liberty, family disintegration, and disruption of multiple pending litigations—far
outweigh any speculative burden to Defendants, who can remedy the harm by doing what the
law already requires.
V. REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
Plaintiff also seeks a declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that:
1. Defendants’ refusal to investigate Plaintiff’s June 23, 2025 tort claim constitutes a denial
of procedural due process;
2. Defendants’ failure to notify the sentencing court of Plaintiff’s verified pre-sentencing
custodial program participation and credits violates Plaintiff’s right to access the courts
and maintain accurate records;
3. Plaintiff is entitled to an administrative reconsideration of his claim consistent with
constitutional due process.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:
8
1. Issue a preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to notify the Butte County Superior
Court and California Court of Appeal, Third District, of Plaintiff’s verified program
participation, custody credits, and misexecution of sentence;
2. Declare that Plaintiff’s due process and access-to-court rights were violated by
Defendants’ failure to investigate and notify the relevant courts;
3. Order Defendants to administratively re-review Plaintiff’s government tort claim in light
of the records in their actual or constructive possession and report back to the Court
within a reasonable time.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: July 18, 2025
/s/ Larry Sermeno
Larry Sermeno, Plaintiff Pro Se
9
Larry Sermeno
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LARRY SERMENO,
Plaintiff,
v.
JULIA OGONOWSKI, in her individual and official capacity as Risk Manager for Butte County,
and DOES 1–10, inclusive,
Defendants.
Case No. ___________________
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
[JURY TRIAL DEMANDED]
_________________________________________
Preliminary Statement
1
This action arises not merely from individual misconduct, but from a documented
and systemic breakdown of constitutional governance at the local level. Plaintiff,
though proceeding pro se, brings a factually robust and procedurally advanced
complaint that interlocks with multiple related legal proceedings involving the same
Defendants and their institutional agents. The factual record reflects a coordinated
pattern of retaliation, suppression of exculpatory information, denial of due process,
and obstruction of access to courts—all of which converge to create a continuing
violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
The structure and trajectory of this case—combined with the already-filed motion to
appoint counsel and related filings in state and federal court—place it in a posture of
significant public importance. It is not merely a damages suit, but a vehicle for
structural reform. This litigation presents novel legal issues, credible evidence of
misconduct, and a documented failure of administrative safeguards. The Court’s
attention to these matters is warranted and imperative.
_________________________________________
1. INTRODUCTION
2. Plaintiff brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
3. This action arises from Defendants’ retaliatory denial of Plaintiff’s government tort
claim, deliberate failure to investigate plainly meritorious custodial credit issues, and
conspiracy to deny Plaintiff access to the courts—interfering with his pending habeas
corpus petition, direct appeal, and federal civil rights litigation.
4. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) for civil rights
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
6. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as all events occurred in Butte
County, California.
7. PARTIES
2
8. Plaintiff LARRY SERMENO is a resident of California and a formerly incarcerated
individual who was wrongfully denied custody credits and subjected to parole instead of
PRCS due to unconstitutional omissions and practices.
9. Defendant JULIA OGONOWSKI is the Risk Manager for Butte County and is sued in
her individual and official capacities.
10. Defendants DOES 1 through 10 are unknown supervisory officials employed by Butte
County who participated in or ratified the unlawful conduct described herein.
11. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
12. On June 23, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a formal government claim to Butte County,
documenting omissions of mandatory custody credits, false prison assignment, and
violations of Penal Code § 2900.5 and related due process principles.
13. These custody credits would have negated Plaintiff’s placement in CDCR and avoided
parole, placing him lawfully under PRCS.
14. Plaintiff simultaneously had three pending legal matters:
a. A state habeas petition challenging CDCR jurisdiction;
b. A direct criminal appeal regarding custodial credits and enhancement errors;
c. A federal civil rights complaint filed July 3, 2025, concerning misconduct by
probation officers.
15. On July 10, 2025, Butte County, through Defendant Ogonowski, issued a boilerplate
denial of Plaintiff’s government claim without investigation, factual findings, or inquiry
into available probation and financial records.
16. Butte County and Defendant Ogonowski had constructive and actual notice of Plaintiff’s
mandated program participation, which was court-ordered and financially supported by
the County.
17. The denial was issued in retaliation for Plaintiff’s active litigation efforts and to shield
County employees from liability.
3
18. The County’s own records—including court records,program invoices,and probation
officer records and reports( Della Burleson) from Butte County Superior Court case
number 23CF02177 —would have confirmed Plaintiff’s custodial status and entitlement
to credit for being at Life Recovery Ministries in Oroville,CA.
19. This failure to investigate and deliberate denial impeded Plaintiff’s access to three
separate court proceedings and was issued with retaliatory motive and reckless disregard
of constitutional obligations.
20. Butte County has no adequate policies or procedures for evaluating tort claims alleging
credit omissions or false imprisonment, and supervisors ratify unlawful omissions.
21. Additionally, I believe that the cursory and dismissive denial of my claim was not only
retaliatory and constitutionally defective, but also influenced by racial bias. The absence
of investigation into my claim—despite clear factual evidence and its relation to unlawful
imprisonment—reflects a pattern of systemic neglect disproportionately affecting Black
and Brown claimants in Butte County. This raises serious Equal Protection concerns
under the Fourteenth Amendment and supports a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for
conspiracy to obstruct civil rights through institutional coordination and procedural
denial. This discriminatory treatment compounds the injury suffered and justifies
additional compensatory and punitive damages.
22. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
23. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Retaliation in Violation of the First Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
24. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs.
25. Defendants denied Plaintiff’s claim in retaliation for exercising his rights to petition the
government and access the courts.
26. The denial occurred within days of Plaintiff filing litigation and asserting constitutional
violations.
________________________________________________________________________
27. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Denial of Access to Courts (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
4
28. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs.
29. Defendants’ denial impeded Plaintiff’s ability to present critical evidence to his habeas
case, appeal, and federal suit.
30. This constitutes an actionable denial of access to courts in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
________________________________________________________________________
31. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Failure to Investigate / Inadequate Investigation (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
32. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs.
33. Defendants failed to conduct any meaningful review of Plaintiff’s claim, despite access to
records that would have substantiated his credits.
34. This failure constituted deliberate indifference and a violation of Plaintiff’s due process
rights.
________________________________________________________________________
35. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Conspiracy to Deny Constitutional Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
36. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs.
37. Defendants conspired—through coordination and ratification—to deny Plaintiff redress
in three judicial forums.
38. The purpose was to shield County officials from liability and suppress a pattern of
omissions and misconduct.
________________________________________________________________________
39. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Monell Liability – Custom, Policy, and Ratification (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
40. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs.
5
41. The County of Butte maintains no reliable system to detect, disclose, or remedy
probation-related custody credit and sentencing execution errors.
42. Risk management, under Defendant Ogonowski and DOE supervisors, has a de facto
policy of rejecting valid claims without investigation.
43. This policy caused Plaintiff’s harm and reflects deliberate indifference to constitutional
rights.
44. The rejection of Plaintiff’s government claim by Defendant Ogonowski was not an
individualized decision following a good faith inquiry. Instead, it was issued in
conformity with an established pattern of boilerplate denials, systematically obstructing
claimants from pursuing judicial redress. This practice, acting under color of law, violates
Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and constitutes a Monell-policy
violation and retaliatory conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
________________________________________________________________________
45. COUNT SIX
Racial Discrimination – Equal Protection Clause (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
46. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs.
47. Any reasonable juror or judge, applying common sense, would immediately recognize
that defendant Ogonowski—and the all-white panel of County decision-makers—had a
duty to follow basic investigative and decision-making protocols before summarily
rejecting a claim alleging blatantly unconstitutional misconduct by white probation
officers. Procedures such as requesting and reviewing court files, probation records,
third-party program verification, and interviewing key witnesses were all easily available
and mandated by due-process principles (see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980)). The complete failure to perform any of these
minimal steps—and to provide any written rationale—cannot be explained by mere
oversight. In context, it screams of discriminatory animus and retaliatory intent: a
conspiracy of inaction designed to shield white public servants from accountability while
denying a Black claimant his day in court.
48. Plaintiff is African-American and was treated differently from similarly situated
non-Black claimants. No evidence suggests any non-white claimants were treated in the
same summary, boilerplate fashion.
6
49. This disparate treatment was motivated by racial animus or reckless disregard for the
rights of Black residents, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3).
50. Defendant Ogonowski’s summary rejection of Plaintiff’s government claim was not the
result of independent review, but rather the product of a longstanding, unconstitutional
custom of boilerplate denials within the County’s risk management process. Even if
Ogonowski acted under perceived institutional norms or past practices, her decision to
rubber-stamp the claim—despite facially credible allegations of unlawful imprisonment,
sentencing irregularities, and retaliation—constituted an intentional act of ratification and
suppression. Such actions are not immunized by institutional conformity; they are
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985(3), particularly where the conduct chills
protected access to the courts and entrenches racial and retaliatory bias.
51. The County’s internal cohesion and informal loyalty networks—whether professional,
personal, or political—do not excuse deliberate indifference. Rather, they amplify
liability. When public servants knowingly maintain policies and practices that suppress
valid legal grievances, they cease to function as neutral administrators and instead
become co-conspirators in a pattern of constitutional harm. The result is not only
compensatory liability, but multiplier-enhanced damages under prevailing federal
standards for retaliatory deprivation and municipal culpability.
________________________________________________________________________
52. COUNT SEVEN
Violation of Procedural Due Process – Administrative Denial of Government
Claim Related to Sentencing Misimplementation (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 42
U.S.C. § 1983)
53. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully
set forth herein.
54. This cause of action arises from Defendant Julia Ogonowski’s failure, acting as Risk
Manager for the County of Butte, to conduct any meaningful investigation into Plaintiff’s
timely filed government tort claim submitted pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act
(CTCA), Government Code §§ 910 et seq. Plaintiff’s claim alleged that County probation
officials and related actors failed to properly account for custody credits and unlawfully
deviated from a judicially imposed PRCS (Postrelease Community Supervision)
sentence—resulting in his placement under CDCR parole supervision without lawful
authority.
7
55. Plaintiff does not seek to invalidate the judgment or conviction and does not challenge
the facial validity of the sentencing court’s order. Rather, Plaintiff challenges the
administrative processing and denial of his government tort claim, which was premised
on factual and legal errors that were easily discoverable through minimal due diligence
by Risk Management.
56. Despite the substantial documentation and clear references to court records, probation
files, and third-party verification (including program participation evidence and judicial
pronouncements), Defendant Ogonowski issued a boilerplate denial within 17 days of the
claim’s filing. There is no indication that any records were reviewed, any officials
consulted, or that any substantive determination was reached regarding the factual merits
of the claim.
57. This arbitrary, conclusory, and constitutionally defective denial deprived Plaintiff of a fair
opportunity to be heard and a meaningful process to vindicate a valid and
well-documented grievance. The conduct violated the procedural due process protections
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s rights and the statutory purpose of the government claims process.
58. Plaintiff has suffered ongoing harm as a result of this administrative failure, including
being denied access to remedies, further injury through prolonged unlawful supervision,
and compounding legal burdens in related litigation due to the failure of the County to
correct its own errors at the administrative level.
59. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:
a. Declare that the County’s handling and denial of Plaintiff’s government tort claim
violated his right to procedural due process;
b. Enjoin the County from continuing the use of boilerplate denials without
investigation or findings where constitutional or liberty interests are implicated;
c. Award compensatory and punitive damages for the injuries suffered as a result of
the denial; and
d. Grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
________________________________________________________________________
60. COUNT EIGHT
Deprivation of Property Without Due Process of Law (42 U.S.C. § 1983 –
8
Fourteenth Amendment)
61. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as though fully set
forth herein.
62. Plaintiff had a legitimate claim of entitlement to monetary compensation arising from the
timely and procedurally compliant government tort claim filed with the County of Butte,
pursuant to the California Government Claims Act.
63. The claim alleged concrete constitutional violations and tortious conduct by County
personnel, including unlawful imprisonment, denial of custody credits, and fraudulent
jurisdictional placement. Supporting documentation was included or available upon
minimal inquiry.
64. Defendant Julia Ogonowski, acting under color of state law and in her official capacity as
the County’s Risk Manager, failed to investigate the claim, ignored plainly verifiable
evidence, and issued a boilerplate denial without explanation.
65. Plaintiff’s interest in receiving compensation under state law for tortious and
unconstitutional conduct qualifies as a protected property interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
66. Defendant’s failure to investigate, provide notice of findings, or engage in settlement or
mitigation deprived Plaintiff of this property interest without due process of law.
67. The deprivation was arbitrary, retaliatory, and consistent with an unconstitutional County
policy, practice, or custom of blanket denials and non-investigation of claims, particularly
by indigent and minority claimants.
68. As a direct and proximate result, Plaintiff suffered financial harm, emotional distress, and
continued litigation costs which could have been avoided had the County fulfilled its
lawful duty to process and resolve meritorious claims in good faith.
69. Prayer for Relief (additional):
a. Declaratory judgment that Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest
in a properly administered government claims process;
b. Compensatory damages for the loss of opportunity to receive monetary relief
through the administrative process;
9
c. Punitive damages against Ogonowski in her individual capacity;
d. Attorneys’ fees and costs (if later represented);
e. Any other relief the Court deems just and proper.
_______________________________________________________________________
70. COUNT NINE
Fraudulent Concealment (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and supplemental state law
principles)
71. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as though fully set
forth herein.
72. Defendants, acting under color of state law and/or in official County capacity,
fraudulently concealed material facts and evidence directly relevant to Plaintiff’s timely
filed government tort claim and to the resulting denial thereof.
73. Specifically, Defendant Julia Ogonowski, in her role as Risk Manager, failed to disclose
or pursue clearly identifiable records and facts—within the custody of Butte County
Probation and/or County legal counsel—that confirmed Plaintiff’s mandated custodial
program placement, sentencing order, credit eligibility, and misclassification of
supervision.
74. At the time of Plaintiff’s claim, these facts were reasonably available to the County and
known or should have been known to the Risk Manager based on the content of the tort
claim, prior communications from Plaintiff, and internal County records accessible
through minimal inquiry.
75. Despite this, Defendant issued a summary boilerplate denial without conducting any
investigation or disclosing the exculpatory or materially corroborative information within
County possession that would have supported Plaintiff’s claim.
76. The concealment was not inadvertent. Rather, it was part of a deliberate effort to shield
the County from liability by suppressing truth that would have obligated a monetary
settlement or at minimum, an acknowledgment of wrongful conduct.
77. This concealment further tainted Plaintiff’s access to court, caused compounded harm by
denying early resolution, and allowed the County to perpetuate constitutional violations
10
while evading scrutiny.
78. The concealment also masked the underlying jurisdictional irregularities and due process
violations tied to Plaintiff’s incarceration, custody credits, and misclassified
supervision—issues that should have been immediately apparent from the administrative
claim.
79. This cause of action is not brought for the purpose of tolling statutes of limitations, but as
an affirmative constitutional and equitable claim showing systemic suppression of facts
necessary to trigger redress under the County’s administrative process and further
validate Plaintiff’s related § 1983 claims.
80. Prayer for Relief (additional to global prayer):
a. A declaratory judgment that the County’s failure to disclose material facts
constituted fraudulent concealment in violation of due process and equitable principles;
b. An order requiring production of all concealed documents, correspondence, and
files;
c. Compensatory and punitive damages;
d. Any further equitable relief the Court deems just and proper.
________________________________________________________________________
81. COUNT TEN
Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus (U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2; via 42
U.S.C. § 1983)
82. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as though fully set
forth herein.
83. Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides: “The Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”
84. The actions of the County of Butte, Risk Manager Julia Ogonowski, and Doe
Defendants—by knowingly concealing dispositive facts necessary to challenge Plaintiff’s
unlawful incarceration, custody classification, and sentencing terms—amount to a
functional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in violation of this constitutional
11
provision.
85. Plaintiff’s government tort claim and underlying requests for administrative review were
premised on clearly documented violations of sentencing jurisdiction, false
imprisonment, and denial of earned custody credits. These violations, if acknowledged,
would have enabled Plaintiff to petition for release or sentence modification under
applicable habeas procedures.
86. Instead, Defendants deliberately foreclosed that access by summarily rejecting the claim,
failing to investigate, and concealing evidence that would have demonstrated an ongoing
deprivation of liberty interest.
87. The failure to disclose or act upon this information caused the continued enforcement of
an unlawful custodial sentence and supervision condition, effectively denying Plaintiff a
meaningful opportunity to challenge the basis of his confinement through judicial
process.
88. In doing so, Defendants converted the discretionary claim review process into a structural
barrier to judicial oversight, undermining the constitutional guarantee of access to the
writ of habeas corpus.
89. No rebellion, invasion, or public safety concern justified this de facto suspension. Rather,
it was driven by bureaucratic inertia, retaliatory animus, and institutional
self-protection—none of which are constitutionally valid grounds to impair the right to
seek judicial relief from unlawful custody.
90. Through this cause of action, Plaintiff seeks vindication of the structural principle that the
writ of habeas corpus must remain inviolable except under the gravest constitutional
circumstances—not administrative convenience or internal political considerations.
91. Prayer for Relief (supplemental):
a. A declaration that the County’s actions constituted an unlawful suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus in violation of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2;
b. An order directing the release or immediate judicial review of all concealed
evidence bearing on Plaintiff’s liberty interests;
c. Compensatory and punitive damages;
12
d. All other relief the Court deems just and proper.
__________________________________________________________________
Count Eleven – Violation of Equal Protection (U.S. Const. amend. XIV), 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and California Racial Justice Act – Racial Discrimination, Disparate Impact, and County
Custom of Suppressing Black Claims
92. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set
forth herein.
93. Defendants Butte County, the Board of Supervisors, and Julia Oganowski acted under color
of state law to implement and maintain policies, customs, and practices that disparately impact
Black residents by suppressing their access to the government tort claims process and obstructing
valid constitutional grievances.
94. The County’s Risk Management Division, under the authority and ratification of the Board of
Supervisors, maintained a routine practice of issuing boilerplate denials without adequate review
or investigation, disproportionately affecting Black claimants and civil rights complainants.
95. County officials operated within informal loyalty networks and institutional
cohesion—professional, political, and personal—that enabled and insulated these practices.
These networks did not mitigate liability but instead amplified it, converting administrators into
co-conspirators in a sustained pattern of constitutional harm.
96. When county officials knowingly uphold customs that suppress or ignore valid
claims—particularly when those claims arise from civil rights violations—they abandon
neutrality and trigger liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
97. Under the California Racial Justice Act (Cal. Penal Code §§ 745–745.5), Plaintiff need not
prove intent to discriminate. The Act provides that explicit or implicit bias, if present in
decision-making, violates constitutional protections. The claim denial at issue reflects not only
implicit bias but a statistically predictable racial disparity in outcomes.
98. The longstanding racial composition of the Butte County Board of Supervisors and senior
administrative departments, such as Risk Management and Probation, reveals entrenched racial
exclusion. Black residents are materially excluded from oversight, decision-making, and
high-level positions within county agencies.
13
99. Hiring, promotion, and cultural norms within these agencies reflect a racially homogeneous
structure that fosters insular, unchecked discretion—resulting in systemic under-enforcement of
Black residents’ rights.
100. Plaintiff’s public records request is expected to substantiate this pattern under Federal Rule
of Evidence 406, demonstrating a routine practice of denying Black claimants, while white
claimants or less controversial complaints are reviewed more favorably or resolved.
101. As a result, Plaintiff was denied equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and
subjected to retaliatory deprivation of property and liberty interests in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1983. These violations are continuing and were foreseeable consequences of county policymaker
indifference and ratification.
102. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages against individual defendants,
declaratory relief, and prospective injunctive relief to enjoin the county from maintaining racially
disparate practices in its claims and administrative decision-making processes.
______________________________________________________________________________
Count Twelve – Monell Liability Against Butte County Board of Supervisors –
Ratification, Failure to Train, and Supervisory Culpability for Constitutional
Deprivations (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
103. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set
forth herein.
104. Defendant Butte County Board of Supervisors is the final policymaking body for all county
departments, including Risk Management, the Probation Department, and any county-level
decision-making process involving the denial or handling of government tort claims.
105. The Board of Supervisors has ratified or failed to correct policies and customs that deny
valid claims without meaningful review, particularly in cases involving racial discrimination,
civil rights violations, and misconduct by county officers.
A. Failure to Train, Supervise, and Audit Risk Management
106. The Board of Supervisors has failed to train or adequately supervise the Risk Management
Division, including Defendant Julia Ogonowski, in constitutional compliance, claims evaluation
standards, and equal protection safeguards. This omission has allowed unconstitutional practices
to flourish unchecked.
14
107. If Ogonowski was undertrained, underqualified, or acting outside her scope, it was the
responsibility of the Board to audit, intervene, or reassign authority. Their failure to do so
amounts to deliberate indifference.
108. The Board either (a) knew about the improper conduct and approved of it; (b) was willfully
blind to systemic misconduct; or (c) neglected their duty of oversight, thereby allowing it to
become an entrenched custom.
109. The County’s reliance on informal cohesion and loyalty networks further insulated the
Board from accountability, enabling subordinates to implement constitutionally defective
practices without correction.
B. Institutional Structure and Racial Exclusion
110. The Board of Supervisors has perpetuated a racially exclusive structure in county
government. The Board itself, as composed during all relevant periods, reflects an entrenched
racial homogeneity and culture of exclusion in policymaking, oversight, and hiring.
111. This institutional exclusion contributed to a lack of sensitivity, responsiveness, or policy
development addressing the rights of Black residents. It facilitated a climate of disregard for
racial disparities and complaint suppression.
112. The Board failed to initiate any meaningful inquiry, audit, or disciplinary review of the Risk
Management Division’s decision-making practices, despite clear indications of systemic rights
violations and disparities.
C. Ratification and Causation
113. By failing to act, failing to audit, and failing to investigate known deficiencies in claims
handling and constitutional compliance, the Board of Supervisors ratified the acts of its
subordinate departments and became liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658 (1978).
114. These omissions were a moving force behind the violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
115. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages against individual officials as
appropriate, declaratory relief, and prospective injunctive relief to ensure structural reform of
county oversight and accountability mechanisms.
_________________________________________
Anticipated Conduct and Judicial Oversight
15
Plaintiff further notes that any retaliatory action, delay, or interference in response to this
filing or associated legal proceedings will only serve to substantiate the constitutional
violations described above. The anticipated appointment of counsel, coupled with mounting
evidence and procedural exhaustion, place this matter in a uniquely sensitive posture.
Defendants are advised that continued obstruction or reprisal during the pendency of this
litigation will be treated as additional constitutional injury and grounds for enhanced
damages and equitable relief.
Plaintiff respectfully alerts the Court that any future actions by Defendants that obstruct
access to court or interfere with Plaintiff’s legal process—including interference with
housing, communication, or litigation capacity—would only serve to deepen the
constitutional violations at issue. Given the documented pattern of such conduct, judicial
vigilance is warranted to preserve the integrity of these proceedings and prevent further
irreparable harm.
In circumstances where systemic misconduct is documented and knowingly perpetuated, the
Ninth Circuit has not hesitated to reverse convictions, condemn state actors, and signal the
necessity of further referral or sanctions. See Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1017–18 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding that prosecutors’ failure to disclose critical impeachment evidence and
institutional failure to act “shocks the conscience” and violates fundamental due process).
Here, Plaintiff has presented similar patterns of concealment, retaliatory harm, and
administrative stonewalling. If allowed to continue unaddressed, such conduct threatens the
integrity of the judicial process itself.
The Ninth Circuit has made clear that where institutional actors fail to disclose or correct
material exculpatory information—particularly when that information would impeach the
credibility of state officials or the reliability of court submissions—they risk violating due
process in ways comparable to Brady v. Maryland. See Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998,
1017–18 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiff has shown that Butte County Risk Manager
Ogonowski failed to investigate or disclose records that would have demonstrated not only
Plaintiff’s entitlement to custodial credits, but the fundamental unreliability of the probation
report and the officials responsible for its omissions. Had any competent or good faith
investigation occurred, such exculpatory and impeachment material would have been
brought forward. Instead, it was concealed—whether deliberately or with willful
indifference—and the resulting harm mirrors the very kind of injustice the Ninth Circuit has
expressly condemned.
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_________________________________________
PRAYER FOR RELIEF:
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Larry Sermeno respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in
his favor and against Defendants Julia Ogonowski and Doe Supervisors 1–10, and award the
following relief:
a. Compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial for the violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, including but not limited to the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments;
b. Punitive damages against Defendant Ogonowski in her individual capacity, in an amount to
be determined at trial, for her willful, reckless, and malicious disregard of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights;
c. Nominal damages for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights where actual damages
may not be precisely quantifiable;
d. Attorneys’ fees and costs, if and when Plaintiff becomes represented, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 and any other applicable law;
e. Declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, declaring that Butte County’s government
tort claims process—specifically as administered by Defendant Ogonowski and Doe
Supervisors—violates the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments where it fails to investigate,
retrieve, and act upon exculpatory information known to exist in government custody, thereby
denying access to courts and retaliating against protected speech;
f. Injunctive relief requiring Butte County and its officials, including Defendant Ogonowski
and Doe Supervisors, to implement and enforce constitutionally adequate procedures for the
processing of government tort claims, including policies to:
i. Retrieve and review exculpatory information in probation or court-related custody,
ii. Prevent retaliatory denials of claims based on litigation activity or pending appeals,
iii. Disclose all findings relevant to jurisdiction, sentencing, and custody status that are
material to the resolution of tort claims involving liberty deprivations;
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g. Any other relief the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
VERIFICATION
I, Larry Sermeno, declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
America that I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action; I have read the foregoing Complaint
and know the contents thereof; the same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters
stated therein on information and belief, and as to those, I believe them to be true.
Executed on _____________, 2025, at Oroville, California.
Signature:_________________
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Exhibit A – Memorandum of Law Regarding Liability of
Julia Ogonowski Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
19
MEMORANDUM OF LAW REGARDING LIABILITY OF COUNTY RISK
MANAGER JULIA OGONOWSKI UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
I. Introduction
This memorandum addresses the legal sufficiency of a § 1983 claim against Julia Ogonowski,
Risk Manager for Butte County, in connection with her July 10, 2025 rejection of Plaintiff Larry
Sermeno’s government tort claim. Plaintiff alleges this rejection was retaliatory, constituted a
failure to investigate, and directly impeded three pending legal proceedings: a direct appeal, a
habeas corpus petition, and a federal civil rights complaint. The following Ninth Circuit and
Eastern District of California precedents demonstrate that her actions were constitutionally
infirm.
II. Applicable Precedent
1. Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)
The Ninth Circuit held that officials “may not abuse their powers or employ pretextual
justifications to chill the exercise of constitutional rights.” In Soranno’s Gasco, the
government suspended permits after the plaintiffs filed complaints, which was found to
be a retaliatory act in violation of the First Amendment.
Application: Here, Plaintiff’s government claim was rejected less than three weeks after
it was filed—within days of his civil rights complaint and habeas petition—without
investigation or explanation. The close temporal proximity and boilerplate nature of the
rejection strongly support a retaliation claim under Soranno’s Gasco.
2. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)
The court emphasized that government officials “must act with due diligence” where
known constitutional interests are at stake.
Application: Ogonowski had a duty to exercise diligence before denying a claim that
implicated Plaintiff’s custodial credits and alleged jurisdictional fraud. Her failure to
20
contact probation or inspect known custodial records violates that duty.
3. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006)
Jett establishes that a supervisor or official with knowledge of a constitutional violation
may be liable under § 1983 if they fail to act or intervene.
Application: Ogonowski had access to county records showing Plaintiff’s mandated
custodial placement and the sentencing order. If she had investigated, she would have
discovered this information. Her failure to act after being placed on notice supports
liability under Jett.
4. Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2001)
The Ninth Circuit upheld liability where officials took adverse action after plaintiffs
exercised legal rights, noting that even “attempts to silence or obstruct court access”
violate the First Amendment.
Application: Ogonowski’s rejection obstructed Plaintiff’s access to court remedies by
eliminating an administrative avenue for relief that would have substantiated his pending
claims. This constitutes actionable obstruction.
5. Christopherson v. Doe, 2022 WL 4596621 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2022)
In this Eastern District case, the court held that government officials who reject
complaints or claims without reasonable investigation or explanation may be held liable
under § 1983 where deliberate indifference or retaliation is alleged.
Application: Ogonowski’s boilerplate denial without any investigation—despite access
to records showing mandated placement and credit eligibility—meets the standard
articulated in Christopherson and supports Plaintiff’s failure-to-investigate theory.
III. Conclusion
These precedents establish a clear legal foundation for proceeding with claims against Julia
Ogonowski under § 1983 for:
21
● First Amendment retaliation
● Conspiracy to deny access to the courts
● Due process violations
● Failure to investigate/deliberate indifference
Her proximity to and awareness of the claim’s legal significance, combined with her perfunctory
rejection, support Monell and individual capacity liability. Plaintiff’s allegations fall well within
the protected zone of judicially recognized constitutional rights.
First Amendment Retaliation Framework
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that “[o]fficial reprisal for protected speech offends the
Constitution because it threatens to inhibit the exercise of the protected right.” Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10
(1998)). In Hartman, the Court reaffirmed that government officials may not impose adverse
actions on individuals in retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights, including
petitioning the courts for redress.
This principle is well-established: “[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from
subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out.”
Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 592; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)
(government may not deny a benefit on the basis of constitutionally protected speech).
Even where the adverse action might be lawful on other grounds, it becomes constitutionally
impermissible if the non-retaliatory basis is pretextual or insufficient to explain the government’s
conduct. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260; Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
283–84 (1977) (requiring proof that retaliation was the “but-for” cause of the adverse action).
Here, Plaintiff’s timely and well-supported government tort claim was summarily denied by
Defendant Ogonowski less than three weeks after:
● Plaintiff filed a federal civil rights complaint;
● Plaintiff filed a state habeas petition;
22
● Plaintiff’s direct appeal remained active and pending.
This extremely short window between protected speech (litigation and formal petitioning
activity) and adverse action (boilerplate denial of a meritorious claim) supports an inference that
retaliation was the motivating factor. Defendant Ogonowski had access to probation records,
internal invoices, and communications that could have verified the legitimacy of Plaintiff’s
claims. Her failure to perform even a cursory investigation—despite that information being
readily available—supports the conclusion that the denial was motivated by a desire to suppress
further legal action and shield county employees from scrutiny.
Extension of Brady Doctrine to Administrative Officials
While the constitutional disclosure obligations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), are
classically applied to prosecutors, courts have increasingly recognized that government officials
in administrative or quasi-judicial roles may also violate due process by failing to act on or
disclose material exculpatory evidence—particularly where such omissions result in unlawful
incarceration, excessive supervision, or the denial of liberty interests.
In Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit affirmed that officials
who fail to disclose or act upon plainly available exculpatory information, including material that
would avoid or correct custodial error, may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Similarly, in
Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2002), the court held that failure to correct a known
sentencing error resulting in wrongful imprisonment constituted a due process violation.
In the present matter, Risk Manager Julia Ogonowski was formally placed on notice—via a
verified government claim and supporting documentation—that Plaintiff was unlawfully held
under CDCR jurisdiction based on omitted custodial credits and an apparent breach of a judicial
sentencing order. The information provided was material to Plaintiff’s liberty interest, and had it
been investigated or disclosed to the appropriate agency or tribunal, it would have likely resulted
in a correction of the jurisdictional placement and Plaintiff’s earlier release from custody.
Ogonowski’s failure to act or refer the matter for legal review—despite her actual and
constructive notice—constitutes a deliberate or reckless suppression of material exculpatory
evidence. This is functionally equivalent to a Brady violation and supports an independent due
process cause of action under § 1983.
Supplemental Case Law for Due Process Disclosing Duty
23
United States v. Ogba, 522 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2008)
● In Ogba, the Fifth Circuit held that when exculpatory or impeachment material is
contained in a presentence report, the court must review it in camera and disclose what is
material to the defendant—recognizing a Brady-type obligation even when prosecutors
themselves aren’t directly involved.
● Application: Just as a court reviewing a presentence report must extract and disclose
favorable material, a government official like Ogonowski, who has access to documents
impacting sentencing or supervision, bears the same constitutional duty. Her failure to act
on the information in probation files is functionally equivalent to the nondisclosure in
Ogba.
Defendant Ogonowski’s failure to investigate or review the factual basis underlying
Plaintiff’s government tort claim—despite her authority and access to relevant County
records—constitutes deliberate indifference to exculpatory material of constitutional
importance. As in United States v. Ogba, 522 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2008), the County had
within its possession material information relevant to Plaintiff’s lawful sentence and custody
credits, which were omitted in pre-sentencing reports and later ignored. Defendant, acting in
her official capacity, had a duty to investigate those omissions when placed on actual notice.
Her blanket denial, issued within a mere two weeks, demonstrates willful disregard for
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and deprived him of a fair and reasoned remedy.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Julia Ogonowski, in denying his government tort claim, was
acting not merely in an administrative role but in a quasi-probationary and quasi-judicial
investigative capacity. Her position as County Risk Manager required her to assess claims
arising from alleged County misconduct—particularly those implicating sentencing,
custodial credits, and unlawful imprisonment. This role necessarily involves scrutiny of
probationary conduct and omissions that directly affect sentencing outcomes and
jurisdictional assignments. The County, acting through probation, serves as the investigative
and reporting arm of the judiciary for sentencing purposes. When Plaintiff submitted his
claim describing a misapplied sentence, jurisdictional errors, and omission of custody
credits, Defendant Ogonowski was placed on actual notice of a systemic error akin to that
found in United States v. Ogba, 522 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2008), and Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). Her failure to conduct a reasonable investigation into this claim, despite
access to County records and probation officers, reflects deliberate indifference and
24
constitutes a constructive ratification of the omissions that led to Plaintiff’s wrongful
imprisonment.
25
TWO VERSIONS OF 3RD AND FINAL SETTLEMENT DEMAND/OFFER
PRESENTED WITH ALL INDIVIDUALS AND TERMS FOR THOROUGHNESS,
CLARITY, AND INFORMAL EXHAUSTION SAKE PRIOR TO JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION.
To:
County of Butte
County of Butte Risk Management
Julia Ogonowski, Risk Manager
County Board of Supervisors
County Administration Building
25 County Center Drive
Oroville, CA 95965
RE: Third and Final Settlement Demand – Sermeno v. Ogonowski, et al.
This letter serves as formal notice that a complaint has been finalized for filing in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California. The complaint names Julia Ogonowski in
both her official and individual capacities, as well as DOE supervisors who include, but are not
limited to, officials of the County of Butte and members of the County Board of Supervisors. All
such individuals and entities are alleged to have ratified, failed to supervise, or otherwise
contributed to the constitutional violations described therein.
Defendants must now confront the larger institutional reality that this case does not exist in a
vacuum. Plaintiff has alleged systemic constitutional violations in the County’s claims
processing apparatus, centered on a pattern of boilerplate denials issued by Defendant
Oganowski without investigation, notice, or due process. These allegations, if substantiated in
discovery or found meritorious at trial, will open the County to broad civil exposure—not just in
this case, but potentially in class-wide litigation from similarly situated claimants whose rights
were also arbitrarily denied. It is in the County’s interest to resolve this matter now before the
systemic implications deepen and discovery obligations multiply.
Plaintiff’s allegations, if proven, place the County in immediate fiscal jeopardy. If this Court
determines that the County’s tort claim review process violates constitutional standards—as
applied or on its face—it will not only expose the County to liability in this case, but open the
door to hundreds of similarly situated claimants. Each boilerplate rejection issued under Ms.
Oganowski’s authority may now carry six-figure damages. The County must act now to mitigate
its exposure and protect the public interest before a single personnel failure evolves into systemic
fiscal collapse.
It is anticipated that, given the scope of the allegations and foreseeable discovery outcomes,
insurance coverage implications for the Risk Management Division and its supervisory officials
may arise. In light of the nature and scope of the allegations—particularly the potential for
systemic discovery findings implicating boilerplate denials and constitutional violations—it is
anticipated that risk management policies and insurance coverage limits may be implicated. This
includes the personal and official conduct of Risk Manager Julia Ogonowski and other
supervisory officials. The County is strongly encouraged to assess its indemnification exposure
and engage in early resolution to prevent broader fiscal and legal consequences.
Given the immediate turnaround between the County’s tort claim denial and the drafting of a
comprehensive federal complaint, it should be clear to all parties — including the County’s
insurer — that I am not only fully prepared to litigate, but also to proceed with urgency. The
insurer will no doubt evaluate the timeline and scope of this matter and recognize that this is a
serious, well-documented claim with substantial discovery risk and constitutional magnitude.
Any delay in resolution will not be interpreted as a need for further investigation, but as bad-faith
prolongation in the face of known exposure.
A final reasonable opportunity is being extended to resolve the matter pre-filing for the amount
of $250,000, to be structured as follows: (1) a substantial portion paid up front; and (2) the
remainder paid in structured installments or in a Qualified Settlement Fund (QSF), with terms to
be negotiated. The proposed settlement includes a requirement that the County formally
acknowledge, for judicial notice purposes, an administrative oversight that led to the deprivation
of rights described in the complaint.
All correspondence and responses to this settlement demand must be directed to me personally at
the contact information provided. While the County Administration Building is identified for
purposes of naming defendants and administrative location, all communications regarding this
matter must be made directly to me to ensure timely and proper handling. Failure to do so will be
construed as bad-faith delay.
Absent a timely resolution, I intend to proceed with filing and all available motions, including a
motion to expedite, motion for preliminary injunctive relief, and a motion to appoint counsel.
Sincerely,
Larry Sermeno
_________________
Plaintiff: Larry Sermeno
Defendants: Julia Ogonowski, COUNTY OF BUTTE , and BUTTE COUNTY BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS; Does 1–10
Subject: Settlement and Judicial Efficiency Resolution Proposal – Risk Management Claim Error
and Sentencing Credits
Date: [Insert Date]
To: Butte County Counsel / Risk Management Division
From: Larry Sermeno, Plaintiff
Re: Offer to Resolve Risk Management Misconduct and Judicial Sentencing Error
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This correspondence serves as a formal settlement and judicial efficiency proposal in relation to
pending litigation arising from the denial of Plaintiff’s government tort claim and the underlying
deprivation of custody credits that directly resulted in an unlawful sentence and CDCR
placement.
Plaintiff alleges and has filed suit over the failure of Risk Manager Julia Ogonowski and related
County actors to recognize and process meritorious claims arising from Butte County Probation’s
omission of over 500 days of custody credits owed. Plaintiff was sentenced to 16 months in state
prison and ultimately served over 6 months despite judicial and statutory entitlement to
Postrelease Community Supervision (PRCS) and time-served release.
The County’s Risk Management Division failed to investigate or disclose known records
substantiating these credits, thereby interfering with Plaintiff’s ability to obtain habeas relief,
direct appeal correction, or post-sentencing judicial review. This has exposed the County to
constitutional liability and has now been formally pled in federal court.
II. PROPOSED JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORRECTION
PLAN
Plaintiff proposes the following actions to mitigate damages, preserve judicial efficiency, and
resolve part or all of the pending federal action:
1. Certification of Administrative Error
A written acknowledgment that Butte County Risk Management or its agents failed to
account for custody credits reflected in program participation, jail logs, or
probation-supervised custodial alternatives. The statement may frame this as an
“oversight” or “administrative error,” provided it affirms the existence of miscalculated
or omitted credit.
2. Notification to Judicial Authorities
Transmit the above certification to:
○ Judge Lucena or the Butte County Superior Court, Case
No.:24CF02944/23CF02177
○ The California Court of Appeal, Third District, under appellate case number
C102419
This will permit timely recalculation of credits and potential judicial correction of
sentence or resentencing proceedings.
3. Statement of Cooperative Intent
The County may include a statement that this correction is made “in the interests of
justice and judicial efficiency” and without prejudice to Plaintiff’s other claims.
III. SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL
To resolve the federal litigation against Julia Ogonowski, Butte County Division of Risk
Management, Butte County Board of Supervisors, and County of Butte Plaintiff offers the
following settlement terms:
● Total Settlement Amount: $250,000
Payable as follows:
○ Minimum $125,000 upfront disbursement for housing, reentry stabilization, and
legal compliance
○ Remaining amount to be paid on a mutually agreeable schedule, with interest
waived if paid within 12 months
● No admission of fault required, but the County must acknowledge that the tort claim
denial failed to account for or investigate critical sentencing records now shown to
support Plaintiff’s position
● Plaintiff will preserve his rights against other individual defendants (e.g., Grover,
Romero, Smith) in related matters but will not seek punitive damages against Ogonowski
if settlement is promptly executed
IV. LITIGATION CONTEXT AND REASONABLE RISK MITIGATION
This proposal is made in good faith to avoid further litigation costs, reputational harm, and
discovery-related exposure. Plaintiff is prepared to proceed with:
● Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures identifying material witnesses
● Subpoenas to custodial records and program logs
● Depositions of County staff including Risk Management personnel
However, early resolution now will:
● Limit the public and legal exposure of Butte County’s failure to audit or supervise critical
administrative decision-makers
● Prevent the entry of a judicial finding of deliberate indifference or racially disparate
denial of claims
● Avoid multiplier damages in federal court under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and related
retaliation provisions
V. CLOSING
Plaintiff requests a written response within 14 days of this letter. If the County is willing to
consider resolution under the above terms, Plaintiff is open to informal or early settlement
conferences and stipulations to stay or dismiss the relevant claims in federal court upon
execution.
I have urgent, time-sensitive needs for housing, transportation, and family reunification that
cannot be put on hold. While I remain willing to resolve this matter amicably within the next 14
days, I must also file and serve the complaint promptly to protect my rights and secure the relief
I need.
Due to Defendants’ conduct and delays, I now face imminent risk of homelessness and severe
disruption to my access to the courts. While I have made every effort to engage in good faith
resolution, I do not have the luxury of waiting for Defendants to determine whether they wish to
act reasonably. I must therefore continue to pursue judicial relief on an expedited basis to protect
my rights and preserve access to justice.
Considering the well-documented burden on the Eastern District’s docket, and in light of the
clarity and urgency of the factual circumstances, it would be appropriate and consistent with
equal treatment under law to pursue a realistic, timely resolution—no differently than would be
expected for any other similarly situated plaintiff, regardless of race or background. This
statement is made pursuant to Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, solely for purposes of
settlement discussions.
Thank you for your prompt attention. I look forward to your response.
Please direct all settlement-related communications to:
Larry Sermeno
Respectfully,
/s/ Larry Sermeno
Plaintiff, In Pro Per
Attachments: Updated Civil Rights Complaint; Motion for Expedited Proceedings ; motion for
appointment of counsel; preliminary injunction;to compel re-review of administrative tort claim
and; limited discovery for preliminary injunction